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ABSTRACT 
In June 2002, the Australian Financial Reporting Council (FRC) made the decision to 
adopt the Australian equivalent of the International Financial Reporting Standards (A-
IFRS). A-IFRS became mandatory on the 1
st
 of January 2005, for all companies
reporting in Australia. The primary aim of converging to international accounting 
standards was to “facilitate cross-border comparisons by investors, and enable 
Australian companies to access international capital markets …” (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002, p. 102). Accounting information is critical for investment decision 
making. However, as there is considerable variation in accounting standards and 
disclosure requirements from country to country, foreign investors are aware of being 
informationally disadvantaged, compared to local investors. A single accounting regime, 
such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), is, therefore, expected to 
reduce the differences in accounting standards between countries, increase the 
comparability of accounting information, enhance investors’ understanding of the 
financial reporting of the host country, and increase foreign investor confidence in 
investing in the host country. The main argument advanced for the application of IFRS 
by a developed country such as Australia, which has existing high-quality accounting 
standards, was to improve foreign investment inflows.  
A broad research question is developed to assess whether foreign investment inflows to 
Australia increased following the introduction of A-IFRS, a phenomenon known as 
‘economic consequences’ in the accounting literature (Zeff, 1978). These ‘economic 
consequences’ reflect the changes in the decision-making behaviour of foreign 
investors, as discussed in this thesis, following the changes in accounting standards to 
A-IFRS. Building on the finance and accounting literature, the question is further
developed for each individual component of foreign investment inflows (i.e. portfolio
equity, direct equity, direct debt (between the affiliates), portfolio debt, loans,
derivatives, and other debt) to consider how each component can be affected differently,
and why. Thus, this thesis aims to examine the economic consequences of A-IFRS on
each component of foreign investment inflows.
A number of features make Australia an ideal country for which to examine foreign 
investment inflows. Firstly, prior to A-IFRS, Australia had a high-quality set of 
accounting standards, similar to IFRS. Secondly, with the sound governance of local 
institutions, strong legal enforcement, and a developed open market, Australia is more 
likely to have increased foreign investment inflows. Thirdly, Australia implemented A-
IFRS as a national-level policy, whereby Australian accounting standards have 
legislative backing. This means that all entities, both public and private, must prepare 
their financial statements according to A-IFRS. Therefore, the use of macro-level data, 
rather than micro-level observations, produces results that are valid as a level of 
analysis for this country.  
Using the quarterly aggregated and disaggregated series of foreign investment inflows 
from 1998Q1 to 2012Q4, the research design of the study consists of two stages. In the 
first stage, a structural break test is used to identify whether there is any break point 
around the A-IFRS application period in the data series. Previous studies have used 
dummy variables to capture the period of IFRS application by taking a value of 1 for 
the post-application period and 0 for the pre-application period. These studies, however, 
tend to pre-select the date of effect. Previous studies have indicated that the reaction of 
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foreign investors toward public information can differ depending on the type of 
investment, which reflects their role in the entities in which they invest. Therefore, they 
may not respond to the use of A-IFRS on the same date. Hence, an endogenous 
structural break test is used to detect any break endogenously; in other words, the 
selection of the break is led by the data. Because the data covers 24 years, more than 
one structural break is strongly anticipated. Therefore, an endogenous multiple 
structural break test is applied. To determine whether the identified break point can be 
associated with A-IFRS, an event window is constructed from 2004Q3 to 2007Q3, 
taking into consideration the transition, consolidation, and mandated reporting time 
lines. 
The structural break test is a univariate approach, in which any break identified within 
the A-IFRS event window could be associated with any other economic events that 
occurred around that time. The magnitude of the changes observed in the foreign inflow 
variables could be explained by the commodity-price boom experienced in Australia in 
2003/2004. The increase in inflows could also be explained by other factors such as the 
increased growth rate, rising interest rates, improved terms of trade, and the 
appreciation of the Australian dollar to a 30-year high. Therefore, in the second stage of 
the empirical analysis, an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model is developed 
to control for other possible events and to assess the effects of A-IFRS by including 
macroeconomic variables: real gross domestic product (RGDP), terms of trade (TOT), 
economic openness (OPEN), real exchange rate (EXCH) and lending rate (INT), and 
other global financial crises. The combined empirical evidence of both methods 
provides comprehensive insights into the effect of the application of A-IFRS on foreign 
investment inflows. 
Consistent with expectations, the multiple structural break test indicates the presence of 
a break around 2004Q4 for aggregated foreign investment. Disaggregating this inflow 
further into debt and equity components allows any early or late implementation effects 
to be assessed. Portfolio equity and loans appear to have a positive break during A-
IFRS implementation (2005Q3), while portfolio debt (2004 Q3) appears early during 
the transition period, which may reflect the importance of accounting reports in 
decision making for such components. The remaining foreign investment inflows 
indicate implementation lags around 2007. As expected, the only exception is direct 
equity, which indicates a structural break outside the event window (2003Q4). The 
endogenously determined structural breaks are tested further using the ARDL model. 
With the exceptions of other foreign debt and foreign direct equity, the results confirm a 
significant association between A-IFRS and foreign investment inflows such as 
portfolio (debt and equity), loans, derivatives, and direct debt. These findings strongly 
suggest that A-IFRS application may indeed have played a significant role in enhancing 
public information and increasing foreign debt and equity inflows. The findings 
highlight the fact that, in order to facilitate cross-border investment flows, it is vital to 
resolve the differences in accounting standards, thereby echoing the prediction of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (2002), mentioned above.  
This thesis has broad implications for the accounting literature and for event studies. 
Firstly, instead of focusing on cross-sectional analysis, this thesis uses time-series, 
multiple endogenous structural break tests and controls for macroeconomic conditions 
using an ARDL model. These methods could also be applied at the firm level, to 
provide a better understanding of the effects of the implementation of any given set of 
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accounting standards. Secondly, the findings are potentially useful to the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in its quest for a strategy to facilitate the global 
application of IFRS. Thirdly, the findings are important for any other country 
considering the application of IFRS, for both developed and developing countries, and 
for global stakeholders and lending agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
which are important ‘foreign investment providers’ (providing aid loans) for developing 
countries. Fourthly, the findings are also important for the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) and others, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), as they provide a better 
understanding of the effects of A-IFRS on various investment inflows, debt and equity.  
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CHAPTER1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Developments in information and communication technology have led economies 
becoming globally integrated. Such technology provides the infrastructure that enables 
financial centres around the world to be networked, permitting the rapid investment of 
capital across borders (Castells, 2011). Critical to this process is accounting 
information, as it provides “financial information about the reporting entity that is 
useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity” (IASB, 2010, p.9). However, as there 
is considerable variation in accounting standards and disclosure requirements, from 
country to country, foreign investors are aware of being informationally disadvantaged. 
Such an information gap could be addressed by the introduction of a single accounting 
regime, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). By reducing inter-
country differences in accounting standards, this should increase the comparability of 
accounting information, thereby, enhancing investors’ understanding of international 
financial reporting and, thus, increasing investor confidence in investing abroad 
(Beneish & Yohn, 2008). 
In June 2002, the Australian Financial Reporting Council (FRC) made the decision to 
apply the Australian equivalent of the International Financial Reporting Standards (A-
IFRS), on 1
st
 January 2005. The primary aim of these standards was to “facilitate cross-
border comparisons by investors, and enable Australian companies to access 
international capital markets…” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.102). However, 
as indicated by previous studies, investors are not equal in terms of their objectives, 
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needs, or even their roles in the entities. Therefore, they may react differently to any 
change in accounting standards (Razin, Sadka, & Yuen, 1998). In view of this, the 
present thesis aims to conduct an empirical investigation to determine whether the 
application of A-IFRS has increased Australia's foreign investment inflows, in debt and 
equity. 
1.2 Research Motivation  
This thesis is motivated by four factors. The first is a study by Zeff (1978), which 
examines the “economic consequences” of accounting reports. He argues that these 
consequences reflect the shift in the decision-making behaviour of investors and others, 
following a change in accounting standards. Therefore, to avoid unhealthy economic 
consequences any such change should first consider the needs of the stakeholders. An 
example of such an accounting change is the implementation of A-IFRS in the 1
st
 
January 2005. It was expected that A-IFRS would affect the decision-making behaviour 
of foreign investors, by lowering the information asymmetry between local and foreign 
investors (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). In essence, the primary objective of this 
thesis is to examine whether the implementation of A-IFRS did, in fact, realise this 
objective. The thesis will do this by determining whether there was any increase in 
foreign investment inflow following this event. 
The second motivation is a study by Razin et al. (1998). They argue that foreign 
investment components are driven by the differing information needs of the foreign 
investors who invest in them. It is logical to expect that foreign investment components 
have reacted differently to the application of A-IFRS. In view of this argument, a study 
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that takes into account all of these components, both debt and equity, will provide a 
better understanding of how the application of A-IFRS has affected foreign investment.  
The third motivation is a number of Australian studies that have examined the effect of 
the introduction of A-IFRS on the quality of accounting information (e.g., Chua, 
Cheong, & Gould, 2012; Goodwin, Ahmed, & Heaney, 2008; Jones & Higgins, 2006; 
Taylor & Richardson, 2014; Taylor & Tower, 2009). These suggest that the high 
quality and international comparability of A-IFRS may enhance foreign investment 
decision-making. Yet, despite this consensus about these potential benefits, empirical 
evidence of increased across-border capital inflow is lacking. Therefore, the present 
study seeks to fill this gap. In this way, it hopes to provide a better understanding, for 
regulators, standard-setters and financial-reporting stakeholders, of the application of 
such regime (i.e. A-IFRS).  
The fourth motivation is that previous studies in the literature have analyse the impact 
of IFRS in a variety of countries, of which the majority are members of EU (e.g., 
Biddle, Hilary, & Verdi, 2009; De Simone, 2016; Yu & Wahid, 2014). While their 
findings suggest that the use of global accounting standards does reduce the information 
disadvantage faced by foreign investors, the authors examine only a short time period, 
mostly two years, both before and after the application of IFRS (Beneish, Miller, & 
Yohn, 2015; Gordon, Loeb, & Zhu, 2012; Li, Ng, & Saffar, 2017). Given the global 
nature of the introduction of IFRS for regulators, standard-setters and financial 
reporting stakeholders, it is essential to study a long time-series (e.g., Bruggemann, 
Hitz, & Sellhorn, 2013; Callao, Jarne, & Laínez, 2007; Kvaal & Nobes 2012).   
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1.3 Theoretical Framework and Research Question 
Based on a review of the existing literature, this thesis develops a framework that 
depicts the effect of A-IFRS application on foreign-investment inflow. Within this 
structure, a research question is established. The framework is based on the expectation 
that foreign-investment inflow increased following the application of A-IFRS. This 
increase is assumed to be due to the reduction in information asymmetry, between local 
and foreign investors, that results from the high quality and greater comparability of the 
global standards. Thus, foreign investment providers would have made better 
investment decisions in terms of allocating their resources to a particular entity and 
protecting or enhancing their investments (e.g., Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 
2010). In view of this, this thesis establishes the research question as follows: 
Are foreign investment inflows to Australia significantly higher following the 
introduction of A-IFRS? 
To better understand how A-IFRS adoption affects each of the components of foreign 
investment, differently, the study uses ten components of international investment, both 
aggregated and disaggregated; these are total foreign investment, total debt and equity, 
portfolio and direct equity, direct debt, portfolio debt, loans, derivatives, and other 
debts. These components are explained, in more detail, in Chapter 4. 
Previous studies identify the benefits of IFRS. They focus on determining how the 
quality (e.g., Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Barth, Landsman, & Wayne, 2008; Kim, Tsui, 
& Yi, 2011), and international comparability of accounting (e.g., Brochet, Jagolinzer, & 
Riedl, 2013; Chen, Ding, & Xu, 2014) improved under IFRS, thereby enhancing 
investment decision-making. In contrast, this thesis examines the research question, by 
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focusing on how the level of each component of foreign investment inflow changed 
following the implementation of A-IFRS. In this way, the present study provides insight 
into the economic consequences of A-IFRS, an approach suggested by Dyckman and 
Zeff (2015, p.520), when they encourage future accounting research to focus on 
“economically important results”. This approach is also used by a number of 
international accounting studies: Armstrong et al. (2010), Beneish et al. (2015), Gordon 
et al. (2012), and Yu and Wahid (2014).  
1.4 Scope of the Study 
This thesis examines the effects of A-IFRS application by focusing on a single country, 
namely, Australia, and its foreign investment inflow. This focus is particularly apt for 
three main reasons. 
 Firstly, Kvaal and Nobes (2010) find substantial cross-country variation in IFRS 
policies, in terms of the choice of year for the application of the standards. In addition, 
there are other inter-country differences, such as type of institutional setting (e.g., 
economic, political, or cultural), language, and geographical location (Bruggemann et 
al., 2013). Therefore, using a single-country approach allows this study to avoid having 
to control for such differences between countries, and, thereby, increases the validity of 
the results (e.g., Brochet et al., 2013; Bruggemann et al., 2013; Camfferman & Zeff, 
2018).  
Secondly, several institutional features make Australia an ideal setting for such a study. 
Australia, along with New Zealand, was the first country outside the EU to use IFRS. 
Thus, this thesis will contribute to the existing literature that largely focuses on the EU 
and the US. Furthermore, pre-IFRS, Australia had already had a longer experience with 
   
6 
 
such standards, than many other countries. This means that any effect may be detected 
quickly (Chua et al., 2012). In addition, this thesis assesses information gathered at the 
national level rather than the firm level. This is because the application of A-IFRS in 
Australia (and New Zealand), was a national policy, whereby all entities, both listed 
and non-listed, were required to prepare their financial statements according to A-IFRS. 
Therefore, using national-level, rather than firm-level, observations will address the 
research objective and question, and avoid any self-selection problems that occur with 
firm-level studies (Bruggemann et al., 2013). In addition, Australia has sound 
governance of local institutions, strong legal enforcement, and a developed open market 
(see Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998), which means that it is more 
likely to realise the benefits of A-IFRS (e.g., Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; 
DeFond, Hu, Hung, & Li, 2011; Louis & Urcan, 2014). 
Finally, this thesis examines foreign investment inflow, only.
1
 Such inflow is vital to a 
country, like Australia, with huge resources and a relatively small population. An 
increase of such investment would contribute, significantly, to filling the gap between 
the country’s domestic savings and investment, and so assist in financing local projects, 
and encouraging further economic benefits. In addition, by examining the inflow, this 
thesis can control for other economic events that occurred at the same time as the 
application of A-IFRS. One such major event was the turnaround in the mining sector, 
which was expected to have affected foreign investment inflow significantly, especially 
                                                          
1
 This thesis does not look at investment outflows from Australia.  This is because several of the 
host countries which Australia invested were non-adopters of IFRS. For instance, the US, 
Canada, Japan, China, India and South America are major recipients of Australian foreign 
investment outflows (abs, 2017). However, none of these countries adopted IFRS concurrently 
with Australia, and, to date some still have not done so.  
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in direct equity (Minifie, 2013). In fact, according to Connolly and Orsmond (2011), 
and Kearns and Lowe (2011), the mining boom did cause a substantial increase in 
investment, with further increases expected. This highlights the fact that the magnitude 
of the changes observed in Australia’s foreign investment inflows could have been due 
to the commodity-price boom, the effect of which was experienced as increased growth 
rates, rising interest rates, improved terms of trade, and the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar to a 30-year high. 
Such economic events are controlled for, in the present thesis, using the following 
variables: real gross domestic product (RGDP), terms of trade (TOT), economic 
openness (OPEN), real exchange rate (EXCH) and lending rate (INT). These variables, 
their definitions and the reason for choosing them are described, in detail, in Chapter 6. 
1.5 Overview of the Research Method  
It is common in the literature to use dummy variables to capture the period of IFRS 
application; these take a value of 1 for the post-application period, and 0 for the pre-
application period.
2
  These studies, however, tend to pre-select the date of effect, a 
method that could be conceptually weak. Each type of foreign investor has a different 
information need (Razin et al, 1998). This means that each may respond at a different 
time to the implementation of A-IFRS.  Therefore, it is impossible to identify, a priori, 
when increases in inflows would occur. In such circumstances, using a pre-selected date 
may result in the statistical significance of the results being overstated (Banerjee, 
Lumsdaine, & Stock, 1992). 
                                                          
2
 In some cases, even a value (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) commensurate with the degree of implementation 
(e.g., Othman & Kossentini, 2015; Ramanna & Sletten, 2014). 
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In this thesis, the structural-break approach, adopted from the macroeconomic 
literature, is applied to time-series data that covers a 24-year period (1989Q1-2012Q4).   
Such an approach includes tests that determine the break date endogenously rather than 
using a pre-selected date. This allows the structural break, if there is one, to be 
identified by the data, itself – an approach suggested by Dyckman and Zeff (2015) who 
state that “Our interest lies not in rejecting the null hypothesis but rather in where we 
are led by the data to believe the finding of interest is to be found.” (p. 520). Since the 
sample period covers 24 years, more than one structural break is anticipated; therefore, 
the use of the multiple-structural-break test devised by Bai and Perron (2003) is deemed 
appropriate. Next, to determine if the break date can be associated with A-IFRS, an 
event window is constructed. This covers the first transition, consolidation and 
reporting periods, i.e., 2004Q3-2007Q3 (more detail on choosing the window is 
presented in Chapter 4). This method of identifying the break date, endogenously, is 
considered the main contribution of the present study.  
It is important to note, however, that if any breaks are detected within the specified 
window, these can only be attributed indirectly to A-IFRS. This is because the 
structural-break test is a univariate approach, whereby any breaks identified within the 
A-IFRS-event window could be associated with any of the other contemporaneous, 
economic events. For example, the increase in capital inflows around 2003-2004 could 
be due to the commodity-price boom experienced by Australia. Therefore, the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), 
is applied to control for other possible events; in this way, alternative, plausible 
explanations for increases in inflows can be ruled out. This is done by including in the 
model a series of macroeconomic variables: RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXCH, and INT. The 
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model also allows the long-term effects of A-IFRS to be captured. These effects are not 
addressed directly by accounting theory. However, a number of studies (e.g., 
Bruggemann et al., 2013; Callao et al., 2007; Daske et al., 2008) suggest that a country 
with relatively long experience of international standards and a high level of 
enforcement could experience greater benefits of IFRS in the long term. Therefore, the 
use of the structural-break test that determines the date of the break, endogenously, 
together with the ARDL model, may provide new insights into the association between 
IFRS and foreign investment. For example, the results of Gordon et al. (2012) showed 
that the benefits of IFRS are experienced only by countries whose domestic standards 
(GAAP) differ significantly from IFRS.  
1.6 Findings, Implications and Contributions 
The foreign investment inflows show evidence of a significant structural break, within 
the A-IFRS-event window. However, there is a variation in the date of this break: for 
both portfolio equity and loans, it is within the period of A-IFRS implementation, while 
portfolio debt shows the break within the transition period; the date is later for the 
remainder. The only exception is direct equity, the break date for which falls outside the 
event-window. To add further robustness to the findings, these endogenously-
determined structural breaks are then examined using the ARDL bound test. The results 
confirm a significant association between A-IFRS and foreign investment inflow, in 
terms both of debt and equity. The only exception is other foreign debt. 
These results are consistent with the study’s prediction that the application of A-IFRS is 
associated with increased foreign investment inflows. Thus, they have several important 
implications. Firstly, they highlight the importance, for accounting literature in general, 
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and for event studies in particular, of using time series data to determine whether the 
observed effects are persistent or only short lived. Secondly, they are also important for 
national accounting regulating bodies, by providing an understanding of the potential, 
positive consequences of the introduction of IFRS, in terms of their countries’ ability to 
attract increased foreign capital inflow. This may encourage more countries to apply 
IFRS. Thirdly, a significant increase in foreign direct debt, as indicated by the results, 
may imply “income-shifting” by Multinational Companies (MNC) (Taylor & 
Richardson, 2014). This is an unhealthy economic consequence, and, so, has an 
important implication for both the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT): they may need to introduce rigorous 
regulations regarding the use of direct debt by MNC.  
This thesis makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, 
it extends the scope of previous studies that focused, largely, on the EU and the US. 
Secondly, by using Australia - a country that already had the benefit of high-quality 
accounting standards prior to its GAAP convergence to A-IFRS this thesis is able to 
show that such counties can also reap the economic benefits of the application of a 
global set of standards (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Daske et al., 2008). Moreover, it 
adds to previous Australian studies by demonstrating that the primary regulatory aim of 
Australia’s implementation of A-IFRS, i.e., to increase its foreign investment inflow, 
was fulfilled (see Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). In addition, it contributes to the 
literature that investigates the effect of IFRS application on different types of 
investment (Ball et al., 2015: Beneish et al., 2015) by confirming that the various 
components of foreign investment are affected, differently. Moreover, the study 
investigates a foreign investment variable, namely, foreign derivative, that is not 
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included in any previous studies. It shows that this component had a significant, 
positive structural break within the implementation period of AASB 7: Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures. Finally, the study contributes to the existing literature that is 
based largely on short-term, cross-sectional data (e.g., Akisik & Pfeiffer, 2009; Gordon 
et al., 2012; Márquez-Ramos, 2011), by using time series data. In this way, it fills a gap 
that is identified by a number of previous studies (e.g., Bruggemann et al, 2013; Gray, 
2014). 
In conclusion, these findings suggest that A-IFRS application may, indeed, have played 
a significant role in increasing foreign investment, particularly that of debt and portfolio 
equity. Therefore, the findings highlight the fact that, in order to facilitate cross-border 
investment, it is vital to resolve the differences between national accounting standards. 
This echoes the pre-application prediction of the Commonwealth of Australia (2002). 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured in six chapters, with a general overview provided in this 
introductory chapter.  
Chapter 2 gives a general background to the study, outlining the motivation for 
IAS/IFRS application, in both Australia and other countries. As the thesis is concerned 
with Australia’s decision to apply IFRS, this chapter also briefly presents the arguments 
against such application. 
 Chapter 3 reviews the evidence, from the literature, of the impact of IFRS on foreign 
investment. It begins by looking at studies that provide theoretical and empirical 
explanations, from financial and accounting perspectives, for the existence of 
information disadvantage between local and foreign investors. It then moves on to 
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examine studies that use a framework to explore the rationale for the relationship 
between IFRS application and foreign investment in debt and equity. This review 
identifies gaps in the literature, which this thesis attempts to fill. 
Chapter 4 establishes the research framework that illustrates the effect of A-IFRS on 
foreign investment. This is followed by the development of the key research question, 
regarding this effect.  
Chapter 5 provides a description of the variables, study period, and data. Then, the 
method and the results of the structural break date test are presented. This is followed 
by a conclusion. 
Chapter 6 explains that in order to provide further evidence that A-IFRS application 
was the main contributor to the structural break in foreign investment inflow, controls 
need to be provided for other factors. This is done using the ARDL model. An 
analytical review of this model, in general, as well as a description of the specific 
models that are used in this thesis, are presented in this chapter. Then, based on the 
results of the bound test, the error correction version of the ARDL model is applied. 
This is followed by a discussion of the results and then a conclusion.  
Chapter 7 is the final, overall conclusion, consisting of a summary of the thesis, the 
implications of the results, the contribution of the research, and its potential limitations. 
The chapter concludes with suggestions for possible future lines of inquiry. 
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CHAPTER2:  Context and Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the study, by outlining the motivations for the 
adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) – later renamed the International 
Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS), from the international and Australian 
perspectives. As the thesis is concerned with Australia’s decision to converge its GAAP 
with a set of global accounting standards (A-IFRS), this chapter discusses the 
arguments for and against A-IFRS.
3
 The organisation of the chapter is as follows: 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide a brief overview of IASs/IFRS, and of A-IFRS 
convergence, respectively. Section 2.4 discusses the potential benefits of this 
convergence while Section 2.5 focuses on the costs, and Section 2.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.2 Introduction of IAS/IFRS 
Although the IFRS would appear to be a recent phenomenon, interest in the 
internationalisation of accounting standards actually began as early as the 1960s, with 
the establishment of the Accountants’ International Study Group (AISG) by the British 
accounting profession. This body highlighted the need for financial statements to 
provide comparative information, and for the establishment of a body with the authority 
to shape international accounting practices, in order to meet the needs of the increasing 
                                                          
3
 Following the example of a number of studies (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008; Wang & Welker, 
2011), this thesis uses the abbreviation, A-IFRS, to refer to the Australian equivalent of the 
International Financial Report Standards (IFRS). 
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internationalisation of capital markets (Zeff, 2012). Nevertheless, the first serious move 
towards the creation of a global set of standards was made in 1973, with the 
establishment of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC); this was 
supported by accountancy bodies in nine countries, namely, Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland (combined), and the US. 
This body was authorised to shape the international accounting standards (Zeff, 2012). 
However, its initial focus was on promoting the global aspect of the standards rather 
than assuring their quality. 
In the early 1990s, the G4 group, composed of representatives from the four Anglo-
American standard setters, the UK, the US, Canada and Australia, was established to 
improve the quality of accounting harmonisation.
4
  This later became the G4+1 when 
the IASC joined to keep its members informed of the group's deliberations. The support 
of the G4 enabled the IASC to become more active in its role as an international 
standard-setting body (Nobes & Parker, 2010, p.94). 
Meanwhile, in the 1990s, there was a strong push for the global integration of capital 
markets, and the privatisation of public sector entities, resulting in a significant increase 
in foreign investment flows (Dunstan, 2003). However, under the national accounting 
systems, companies wishing to enter the foreign capital market had to prepare two sets 
of accounts, one to meet internal (national) requirements, and another to satisfy external 
(international) requirements. Such a process was criticised by the EU as being costly for 
the issuing companies and confusing for the stockholders (EC, 1995). This highlighted 
the urgency of the need to develop a set of comprehensive core standards that would 
                                                          
4
 Later, New Zealand joined, as the fifth member.   
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reduce the cost, and increase the comparability of financial reporting, for companies 
aiming to invest internationally. 
 The IASC and the International Organisation of Security Commission (IOSCO), 
therefore, committed to completing, by 1999, a set of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) to be used by companies wanting to list their shares, globally. The 
IOSCO agreed that if these standards were acceptable, it would endorse them for cross-
border capital. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also agreed to 
accept the standards, on the condition that they were of  sufficiently high quality (Nobes 
& Parker, 2010, p.94).   
 In 2001, the IASC relinquished its sole responsibility for standard setting to the IASB, 
formerly the G4+1. This move was designed to make the standards more reliable, and, 
therefore, more readily trusted by other countries (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007, p. 498). 
One year later, the EU issued Regulation 1606/2002, which made the adoption of IAS 
mandatory for all its member countries by 2005. In its adoption announcement, the EU 
stressed that “IAS…will help eliminate barriers to cross-border trading in securities by 
ensuring that company accounts throughout the EU are more reliable and transparent 
and that they can be more easily compared. This will in turn increase market efficiency 
and reduce the cost of raising capital for companies, ultimately improving 
competitiveness and helping boost growth”. 5 
                                                          
5
 See; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-827_en.htm  
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During the intervening period, the IASB was required to work on these IAS, a task that 
was completed in 2004. By the time they were adopted, the IAS became the IFRS ( EC, 
2002). 
 The EU’s decision to adopt IFRS set an example to many other countries, prompting 
them to follow suit. The decision was also supported by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(Graham & Neu, 2003; Ramanna & Sletten, 2014).
6
  
In 2005, IFRS was fully accepted for use by companies registered on foreign stock 
exchanges. The only exception was the US, where the SEC still required all foreign-
listed companies to prepare their reports according to the US GAAP (Whittington, 
2005). However, this changed in 2007, when the SEC allowed all foreign companies to 
prepare their reports according to either IFRS or the US GAAP (SEC, 2008).  
By 2015, IFRS was widely used throughout the world, with over 130 countries either 
mandating or permitting their use, and with a number of others having convergence 
agendas (See Figure 2.1). This suggests that even countries such as Australia, with an 
existing high level of transparency in financial reporting and investor protection, saw 
the potential benefits of adopting IFRS, central to which was increased foreign capital 
mobility (e.g., Brochet et al., 2013; Hail, Leuz, & Wysocki, 2010).  
Overall, the main motivation for the adoption of IFRS is the need for a common, global 
business language to assist capital markets that have become internationally integrated. 
                                                          
6
 As a condition for receiving financial aid, the IMF and WB encouraged developing nations to 
adopt international accounting standards. 
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Such standards can enhance the information symmetry of financial-reporting 
information. This increased symmetry should make foreign investors more confident 
and better informed, when using financial reporting for cross-country investment 
purposes (Whittington, 2005).  
 
Figure 2. 1: the Statues of IFRS in 140 Countries around the World, 2015 
 
 
Source: IFRS (2015), www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world. 
 
2.3 IFRS Convergence by Australia 
Australia participates in global relationships through its membership of international 
organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the IOSCO, and the WTO, and through regional organisations, such as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (e.g., Beeson & Capling, 2002; Bell, 
1997). These memberships have helped to open the Australian economy to foreign 
markets and competition. However, in the global era, due to their lack of comparability, 
Australian national accounting standards (A-GAAP) were unable to meet the needs of 
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Australian businesses operating in the global capital market. To overcome this lack of 
comparability, Australia therefore, considered it necessary to implement international 
accounting standards (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 
In 1984, the Australian government founded the Accounting Standards Review Board 
(ASRB) and tasked it with reviewing and approving the accounting standards, with a 
view to giving the standards legislative backing (Walker, 1987). The board was later re-
established under the Australian Securities Commission (ASC) Act of 1989 and given a 
name change; from 1991, it was known as the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) (e.g., Godfrey, Hodgson, & Holmes, 2003, p. 407). 
In 1997, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP proposal No. 1) 
established the FRC, the key role of which was "to ensure that the AASC [Australian 
Accounting Standards Committee ] [was] committed to, and [working] towards, 
adoption of IASC standards having regard to what is taking place in the major capital 
raising economies” (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p.2). However, to achieve a 
balance between the quality and comparability requirements, Australia was simply 
required by the AASB to make its existing standards comply with those issued by the 
IASC, rather than having to adopt them (e.g., Alfredson, 2002; Collett, Godfrey, & 
Hrasky, 1998). This resulted in Australia having its own version of IAS. Then, in June 
2002, following the decision by the EU to adopt IFRS, the Australian FRC made the 
decision to adopt the Australian equivalent of IFRS (A-IFRS) on the 1
st
 of January, 
2005. The primary aim of these standards was to “facilitate cross-border comparisons 
by investors, and enable Australian companies to access international capital 
markets…” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.102).  The FRC chairman, Jeff Lucy, 
summed up the momentous nature of this convergence when he said: “This is the 
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biggest change to accounting standards ever” (Buffini, 2002b cited in Howieson & 
Langfield‐Smith, 2003, p.17).  
This decision by the FRC was well received in some influential quarters. Firstly, the 
Australian government was supportive, because such a decision was consistent with the 
belief, expressed in its long-standing policy under CLERP No. 9 of 2002, that the 
implementation of A-IFRS either before or after this time would cause Australia to be 
out-of-step with the EU, its most significant partner (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002, p.104).
7
 Secondly, the implementation of A-IFRS, with the potential to facilitate 
the flow of foreign investment, also met the requirement of Part 12 of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Act 2001 and the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) for a greater international role for the Australian economy (Collett et 
al., 1998).
8
  
2.4 Benefits of A-IFRS   
It was claimed that the national accounting standards (A-GAAP) were increasing both 
the costs for entities aiming to list in foreign capital markets, as they needed to prepare 
                                                          
7
 A major expected benefit of IAS adoption was an increase in foreign investment flows, the 
result of a reduction in the differences between the reporting systems of the various countries 
that adopted these standards. However, by 2005, the standards had been adopted by only a few 
countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Kuwait, Malta, Oman, Pakistan, Latvia, and Trinidad and Tobago), 
none of which occupied a key position in the global market. This was the main argument 
against IAS adoption in Australia before 2005 (Collett et al., 2001; McGregor, 1999; Spencer, 
1998).    
8
 The requirements of Part 12 of ASIC are; “(i) reducing the cost of capital; and (ii) enabling 
Australian entities to compete effectively overseas; and (iii) Having accounting standards that 
are clearly stated and easy to understand; and (c) to maintain investor confidence in the 
Australian economy (including its capital markets)” (ASICAct 2001, 2017, p.287). 
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two sets of financial reports, and the confusion faced by both foreign investors and 
Australian entities listed in foreign capital markets.
9
 To address these issues, the 
decision was made for Australia to apply A-IFRS (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 
It was expected that these standards would improve the situation by bringing with them 
a number of benefits:  
1. An enhancement in the quality of Australian financial reporting, to a level that is 
equivalent to that of best international practice; 
2. Financial reporting that is globally comparable, as well as lower reporting costs, 
as a result of companies having to produce one, rather than two, or even more, different 
sets of financial reports; 
3. Lower cost of capital, due to a reduction in the risk related to decision-making 
by investors (e.g., Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Collett, Godfrey, & Hrasky, 2001; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2002; Hail et al., 2010; Nobes & Parker, 2008; 
Whittington, 2005).   
On the assumption that these benefits are realised, this thesis holds that the major 
advantage of A-IFRS application is an increase in foreign investment inflows. The roles 
played by the above benefits, in achieving this key outcome, are discussed below.  
 To make informed investment decisions, investors need global accounting standards 
that produce high-quality financial reports. It is expected that A-IFRS, as a single set of 
accounting principles, would improve both the quantity and quality of disclosure, and, 
                                                          
9
 Under International Investment Position statement (IIP), foreign investment inflows include: 
1) Non-residents' investment in domestic projects in the domestic market, and 2) Non-residents' 
investment in domestic projects in the foreign market. 
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thereby, provide more relevant and reliable information to boost investor confidence. 
Researchers have consistently demonstrated that such benefits are more likely to occur 
in a country where the application of the standards is supported by a strong legal 
system, backed by a strong enforcement regime (e.g., Cheong, Kim, & Zurbruegg, 
2010; Daske et al., 2008; DeFond et al., 2011; Hail et al., 2010; Louis & Urcan, 2014). 
This clearly describes Australia – a country with common law, and Anglo-Saxon 
accounting practices that involve an investor orientated approach to accounting 
standards, both of which are backed by strong regulatory enforcement (Nobes & Parker, 
2008; p.32; Porta et al., 1998). Furthermore, Australia is a member of the IASB, with 
full voting rights, and also of the IOSCO  (Alfredson, 2003; Spencer, 1998). Empirical 
studies such as Cairns, Massoudi, Taplin, and Tarca (2011), Cheong et al. (2010), and 
Chua et al. (2012) find increases in the relevance and reliability of Australian financial 
reporting after A-IFRS convergence. 
 A-IFRS is expected to provide a common method of measuring cash flows, assets, and 
liabilities. As the number of countries adopting these standards increases, the easier it 
will be for foreign investors to compare their international investment options. This 
argument is supported by McGregor who claimed that, under A-IFRS, Australian 
entities would be able to produce financial reports that are instantly comparable with 
those of various other countries.
10
 He added that there would be a further benefit for 
Australian entities wanting to list in foreign capital markets, in countries that support 
IFRS, in that they would no longer have to produce two, or even more, sets of financial 
                                                          
10
 McGregor was an Australian member of the IASB. 
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reports. Consequently, this would lower the cost of reporting for them (Abenethy, 2002 
cited in Gerhardy, 2005).  
 Collett et al. (2001) extended the above arguments; while agreeing that foreign 
investment would be encouraged by increasing the comparability of reports, they 
further argued that this strategy would also reduce the premiums paid by investors to 
cover the risk associated with not fully understanding financial reports, due to 
information asymmetry. They concluded that this, in turn would lower the cost of 
capital and, consequently, provide an added incentive for foreign investors.  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the benefits of A-IFRS, in terms of 
increased comparability, lower reporting costs, and increased confidence in the quality 
of financial reports, would lead to better foreign investment decisions.  
2.5 Cost of A-IFRS 
According to Dunstan (2003), one of the direct expected costs of a change in 
accounting policy is its negative impact on financial reporting, which is likely to have a 
knock-on effect on investment decision-making. As mentioned previously, Australia 
chose to apply a set of equivalent standards that are specific to Australian entities 
(Nobes, 2008b; Taylor & Tower, 2009; Zeff & Nobes, 2010). These are known as the 
Australian convergence to the International Financial Reporting Standards (A-IFRS) 
(Nobes & Zeff, 2016; Morris, Gray, Pickering, & Aisbitt, 2014), and are described as 
being “fully converged with IFRS” (Zeff & Nobes, 2010, p.181).  However, despite 
this, A-IFRS still differed substantially from the existing standards (A-GAAP) in two 
ways: 1)  through “divergence”, i.e., when A-IFRS and A-GAAP used different 
methods to deal with the same issue, and; 2) through “absence”,  that is, when the A-
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IFRS  did not cover the same accounting issues as A-GAAP (Ding, Jeanjean, & 
Stolowy, 2005, p.326).
11
 A number of studies have reviewed the quality and the 
complexity of financial reporting under A-IFRS. Of these, the most controversial and 
comprehensive, by Haswell and Langfield-Smith (2008), identified “57 serious defects” 
and criticised, in particular, the Financial Instrument Standards (AASB 132 & 139) and 
the Intangible Standard (AASB 138). In fact, their claims proved to be correct, with the 
greatest defect being due to the move to fair value accounting.
12
  Australian studies, 
such as Birt, Rankin, and Song. (2013), Ernst and Young (2005), Jones and Higgins 
(2006), Jubb (2005), and Taylor and Tower (2009), identified key standards that were 
expected to affect financial reporting. These included: 
1. AASB 138 Intangible Assets; 
2. AASB 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement; 
3. AASB 132 Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure; 
4. AASB 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures. 
The first of these, AASB 138 Intangible Assets, is identified by several studies (e.g., 
Cheung, Evans, & Wright, 2008; Dunstan, 2003; Jubb, 2005), as the source of the most 
                                                          
11
 Nobes and Zeff (2016) claim that Australia's process of convergence is the most complex in 
the world. This is because the AASB presents options for each standard. These include options 
for: “(1) changing the designation of standards (e.g., IAS 1 becomes AASB 101); (2) inserting 
paragraphs relating to not-for-profit entities; (3) adding explanations about the Australian 
legal context (e.g., clarifying that the fair presentation ‘override’ in IAS 1 (para. 19) does not 
apply); and (4) deleting paragraphs on such issues as the scope of application of a standard 
and which old documents a standard is replacing.” (p. 285). 
12
 In terms of IFRS (A-IFRS), most financial instruments assets are recognised at fair value.  In 
terms of financial instrument liabilities, most are recognised at amortised cost, with the 
exception of derivative and financial instruments held for trading (see Armstrong et al., 2010). 
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significant changes in financial information. This standard had no prior equivalent in 
Australia (Godfrey & Koh, 2001). Cheong and Al Masum (2010) state that AASB 138 
brought about a fundamental change in the way in which intangible assets are 
recognised, measured, and treated, in Australia. For instance, the accounting treatment 
of expensing on investments in intangibles makes accounting earnings (profit) less 
representative of the real earnings (profit) of an entity. This is because, while the profits 
of an entity are understated for the year during which large investments have been made 
in intangibles, in subsequent years, they are overstated, since the economic 
consequences (i.e. income) that have resulted from the past year’s investment will have 
had no expenses charged against them. The effect of this lasts for a period of time (e.g., 
Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2012) and may result in some entities having difficulties paying 
their existing debt covenants. This, in turn, could push the entities to adjust their 
financial statements in order to meet the requirements of the debt covenant (Rawlings, 
2004). However, in the case of MNCs, of which most have intangible assets, this effect 
of AASB 138 may encourage managers to take action to shift their company's profits to 
a country with a low tax rate. This may involve adopting strategies such as transfer 
pricing of goods and services, borrowing from their affiliates, or using other accounting 
estimation methods, to reduce their tax (e.g., Ball, Li, & Shivakumar, 2015; De Simone, 
2016; Taylor & Tower, 2011). This, in turn, makes their reported earnings unreliable. 
Hence, the true value of a business is not communicated through its financial statements 
(e.g., Cheung et al., 2008; Ernst & Young, 2005; Nobes & Schwencke, 2006). 
The second standard, AASB 139: Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement, one of the IASB’s newer and more controversial standards, is described 
as one of the “world’s most complicated rules-based standards” (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
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2010).
13
 Taylor and Tower (2009) maintain that the principal effect of A-IFRS 
application on Australian financial reporting was due to this standard. For instance, the 
implementation of AASB 139 resulted in the recognition, by entities, of available-for-
sale investments, as well as all derivative financial instruments, both assets and 
liabilities, at fair value, on the balance sheet. The result of this was: 1) the recognition 
of unrealised economic gains, such as those from trading securities and other financial 
instruments; (2) the need to recognise in income statements the transitory losses and 
gains from the use of fair value, which may have increased the opportunities for 
managers to manipulate their financial reporting and so reduced the reliability of the 
information therein. 
 The third standard, AASB 132 Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure, 
required a greater number of financial instruments to be classified as debt, rather than 
equity. In conjunction with both the use of fair value and AASB 139, this leads to an 
increase in the debt-to-equity ratio, largely due to the changes in the derivatives market. 
Taylor and Tower (2009) argue that increasing this ratio causes thin capitalisation, a 
situation where the level of debt is much greater than the level of equity capital 
(Australia Taxation Office, 2005 cited in Taylor, Tower, & Zahn, 2011). This creates 
two problems: first, exposure to high credit risk. If most assets in a company are 
financed by debt, this, unlike equity, must be repaid. Such a situation may discourage 
                                                          
13
 The complexity of IAS 39 was due to the fact that it contained an excessive number of 
exceptions, inconsistencies, and other confusing elements, which caused users to struggle to 
apply it, and, ultimately, to question its authority. Entities reported that they often had to resort 
to paying hefty fees to consultants for advice. Therefore, a decision was made by the IASB to 
replace it with IFRS 9. However, replacing such a complex standard was not a straightforward 
process. According to Hashim, Li, and O'Halloran (2016), this process was completed in 2016, 
and was due to be made mandatory as of the 1
st
 of January, 2018.  
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investors, especially debt providers, from financing such a company, which in turn may 
increase the cost of debt (Mills & Newberry, 2004). Second, a tax issue; in Australia, a 
company is allowed to deduct interest from their income, for tax purposes, when the 
debt represents 75% or less of assets (Taylor et al., 2011). Thus, increasing the total 
debt-to-equity ratio can negatively affect the motivation of entities to use debt, in the 
long term. 
The final financial instruments standard, AASB 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures, 
is the Australian equivalent of IFRS 7 that was issued by the IASB (AASB), in 2005, to 
replace IAS 32 (AASB 132). This standard required the entities concerned to provide 
an ample quantity of high-quality disclosure concerning risk and the role of fair value 
(e.g., Bitr et al., 2013; Chung, Kim, Kim, & Yoo, 2012). The new standard, which came 
into effect in January 2007, responded to a call from stakeholders for increased 
transparency, following their experience with the complexity of AASB 139, and the use 
of derivatives. It did so by requiring increased quantitative and qualitative disclosure of 
the ways in which managers monitored and controlled the financial risk arising from the 
use of financial instruments. Hence, it addressed the demands of stakeholders for the 
kind of information that allowed them to assess an entity’s future economic 
performance, and, so, reduce investment-related risk (Barth & Landsman, 2010). 
Although financial instrument disclosures are informative for investors, the complexity 
of AASB 139, together with the additional requirement to disclose risk, under AASB 7, 
had the potential to make financial reports a complicated communication tool. The main 
purpose of disclosure regulation is to increase the amount of value-relevant information 
available to the public, on a timelier basis. However, if the additional information 
provided lacks quality, such disclosure can potentially add more 'noise', thereby making 
   
27 
 
it more difficult for investors to assess an entity’s true level of profitability and the 
subsequent risk this entails for them. Put simply, this means that the key information 
would be lost in the sheer volume of data. It also means that there would be increased 
compliance costs for entities (e.g., Haswell & Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
In addition to the above concerns regarding the change in accounting standards, other 
researchers argue that the solution to the uncertainty problem faced by foreign investors 
is too simplistic. They contend that a number of other factors, both exogenous and 
endogenous, such as culture, the differences from country to country, in terms of their 
taxation, political and legal systems, level of capital market development, and balance 
between debt and equity finance, could also contribute to the creation of information 
inequity between local and foreign investors.
14
 Furthermore, they argue that even with 
the adoption of international standards, these factors will continue to impact accounting 
practices (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Shima & Yang, 2012; Spencer, 
1998).  
Moreover, since 2005 continuous changes have had to be made to A-IFRS, mostly 
because of the ongoing changes to IFRS, made by the IASB. A number of new A-IFRS 
standards have had to be issued and numerous others revised and reissued.
15
 This 
continual changing and updating of the standards has complicated the convergence 
process, because there is always a time-lag between the issue of any IASB standard and 
                                                          
14
 Some researchers would prefer to include differences in culture in the above factors; 
however, Nobes (2006) argues that the cultural factor is already included. 
15
 For example, AASB 6 Explorations for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources; AASB7 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures; AASB 9 Financial Instruments; AASB 8 Operating 
Segments; AASB 114 Segment Reporting; AASB 1049 Whole of Government and General 
Government Sector Financial Reporting; and AASB 101 Presentations of Financial Statements 
(see the AASB website <http://www.aasb.gov.au> for details). 
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that of its Australian equivalent. This process of convergence may, therefore, have an 
ongoing negative impact on the international comparability of A-IFRS reporting (e.g., 
Chand & Cummings, 2008; Zeff & Nobes, 2010).  
From the above discussion, it would appear that it was not appropriate for Australia to 
move to A-IFRS, as such a change would have had the potential to affect both the 
quality and comparability of financial reporting. Consequently, A-IFRS application 
may not have realised its main predicted benefit, that of an increase in foreign 
investment flows. 
 On the other hand, Bradbury and Baskerville (2008) reason that Australia (and New 
Zealand), unlike many other countries that adopted IFRS, already had well-developed 
accounting standards. Therefore, the Australian motivation for switching to A-IFRS 
was not to enhance the quality of accounting standards, but, rather, to ‘buy into’ a 
globally-accepted process of producing future accounting standards. This is supported 
by Hail et al. (2010), who claim that the quality of financial reporting is unlikely to 
have declined as a result of IFRS application. Nobes (2008a) also supports this, adding 
that “no plausible alternative to IFRS would be better” (p. 283). This viewpoint echoes 
that of CLERP No. 1, which declared that “[t]here is no benefit in Australia having 
unique domestic accounting standards which, because of their unfamiliarity, would not 
be understood by the rest of the world...” (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p. 22). 
Furthermore, Potter, Ravlic, and Wright (2013) hold that it was inappropriate to argue 
against the development of accounting standards that would provide useful information 
for decision making; however, such development comes at a cost. In this regard, 
Dunstan (2003), referring to the adoption of such standards by New Zealand, concluded 
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that even though this move would involve short-term costs, these would be outweighed 
by its long-term, net benefits. 
 When Jones and Higgins (2006), in 2003, surveyed 60 senior executives from the Top 
200 ASX- listed companies about their perceptions of the costs and benefits of A-IFRS 
application, they found that only 38% of the respondents expected the benefits to 
exceed the costs. Interestingly, the majority of these indicated that they did not believe 
that such benefits would stem either from increased access to overseas capital markets 
or reduced cost of capital. Since this somewhat pessimistic finding would seem to be at 
odds with the widely held view that A-IFRS adoption could provide significant 
benefits, both in the short and the long term, it is certainly worth investigating the issue 
empirically. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a context for the present study. It began by giving a brief 
background to the global adoption of IFRS, including a discussion of the anticipated 
benefits of such an event. The literature voices a general expectation that IFRS adoption 
would result in reduced information asymmetry between local and foreign investors. 
This, in turn, was expected to enhance foreign investment mobility, which was the 
main, long-term goal of IFRS adoption.  
The second part of the chapter described the background to Australia’s convergence to 
IFRS. It included a discussion of the fact that, prior to this convergence, accounting 
standards in Australia were closely aligned with IAS, and that this had been the case 
since the 1970s. In addition, the application of A-IFRS in 2005 was considered by the 
Australian government and its standard setters to be the optimal way to support 
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Australian business and to improve its capacity to compete internationally. 
Furthermore, the chapter provided a discussion of the expected benefits of A-IFRS, that 
is, the improved quality and increased global comparability of financial statements, the 
reduced cost of capital due to a reduction in the risk related to decision making, and, 
ultimately, the removal of barriers to foreign investment mobility. Finally, it outlined 
the expected costs those to be borne if the above key benefits of A-IFRS were not 
realised. This outcome was likely, because the already high quality of Australia's 
accounting standards prior to the convergence would be negatively impacted by the use 
of the new standards, especially under AASB 132, 138, 139, and 7, which are 
connected with the use of fair value.   
This thesis does not attempt to investigate, directly, the positive and negative effects of 
each standard on foreign investment decision-making; neither does it try to argue that 
A-IFRS is better than A-GAAP. Rather, what it does seek to investigate empirically is 
whether Australia's convergence to IFRS increased foreign investment inflows. The 
investigation is based on the argument that A-IFRS-based financial statements contain 
more information than those prepared under A-GAAP. This is corroborated by the 
assertion in the literature that the use of a uniform system of accounting results in 
reduced information asymmetry between local and foreign investors, which is a key 
determinant of foreign investors’ financing decisions. By controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions (RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXCH, INT, and other financial 
crisis), the study is able to analyse any identified increases in foreign investment 
inflows (debt and equity) and present the findings as evidence that A-IFRS did attract 
increased foreign investment.   
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The next chapter reviews the evidence from both the international and Australian 
perspectives of the effects of the application of IFRS/A-IFRS on capital markets, 
including foreign investment. 
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CHAPTER 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
Investors aim to invest abroad, because doing so involves higher returns and/or lower 
risk. However, these benefits are associated with certain costs, incurred as a result of 
the information asymmetry between these foreign investors and their local counterparts 
(Young & Guenther, 2003). Such information asymmetry arises from the differences in 
accounting systems from country to country, and results in foreign investor uncertainty 
about the quality of the accounting information (Beneish & Yohn 2008). As a result, 
foreign investors are forced to pay high costs to have this information processed into a 
recognisable format. Such asymmetry could be reduced by the adoption of a uniform 
set of global accounting standards, that is, IFRS (Beneish & Yohn 2008). However, 
investors are not equal in terms of their objectives, needs, or even their roles in the 
entities, and, therefore, may react differently to any such reduction in information 
asymmetry (e.g., Goldstein & Razin, 2006; Razin et al., 1998). Consequently, in this 
thesis, which seeks to understand the effect of IFRS on foreign investment, care has 
been taken to distinguish between the different types of investor. 
Consistent with the objective of the thesis, this chapter reviews studies that have 
demonstrated a link between IFRS and foreign investment. These studies are divided 
into two groups: in Section 2, the theoretical and empirical studies that highlight the 
important role of information in foreign investment are reviewed, while Section 3 
considers those that examine the effect of IFRS on foreign investment. The latter are 
divided into three groups on the basis of the particular foreign investment aggregate 
they explored: i) portfolio equity; ii) direct equity; and iii) debts. Each group is 
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reviewed in turn. This section ends with a review of other relevant capital market 
studies. Finally, Section 4 identifies any gaps in the existing research, before providing 
a conclusion to the chapter. 
3.2 Foreign Investment 
 There is a considerable body of theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that 
information asymmetry between local and foreign investors, impairs foreign investment 
mobility. For example, a theoretical, macro-level model of this asymmetry, which was 
developed by Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), presents a compelling explanation of the 
home bias in international capital markets. The fundamental assumption underlying this 
model is that, because of the information disadvantage, foreign investors face what is 
known as the “lemons problem”.16 In situations in which investors face information 
asymmetry in foreign capital markets, they are unable to observe the future cash flow of 
their investments. Therefore, they are prepared to pay no more than an average price for 
such equity. This favours low-value firms ('lemons') that wish to sell equity at an 
average value. Hence, foreign investors become increasingly reluctant to engage in 
cross-border investment. This phenomenon implies that foreign-investment decisions 
are driven more by information asymmetry than by price. In support of this, Australian 
equity home bias is empirically investigated by Mishra (2008), using the 2001-2005 
dataset of the IMF.  It is revealed that Australian foreign equity is largely determined by 
                                                          
16
 The concept of the 'lemon problem' was first introduced by Akerlof (1970). According to 
him, the information asymmetry between the consumer and the payer causes an adverse-
selection problem, because consumers, having no information about the quality of a product, 
are, therefore, only willing to pay an average price. Because of this, it is more likely that poor-
quality products (i.e.'lemons') will be offered for sale rather than good-quality products.  
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foreign firms listing their shares on the domestic market. This is because the lower cost 
of information for local investors makes such foreign firms more accessible to them. 
Such a finding supports those of earlier studies by Kang and Stulz (1997) and Jiang and 
Kim (2004), who show that Japanese firms with high information asymmetry have low 
international ownership (by non-Japanese investors), and vice versa. In both studies, the 
conclusion is that because international ownership is sensitive to information 
asymmetry, it is chiefly attracted to information-rich firms, that is, those with a strong 
history of accounting performance. Similarly, Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) 
identify the differences between countries in terms of accounting information, as the 
key factor influencing the bias in equity holdings in the US. 
To investigate the effect of transaction costs on foreign investment, Martin and Rey 
(2004) devise a comprehensive framework that models international trade in assets. 
This is based on their belief that “imperfect substitution of assets”, in conjunction with 
increased transaction costs, affects the price of assets, and, consequently, the level of 
demand for them. Using this model, they analyse the effect of transaction costs on asset 
trade, in a two-country study. Their findings show that the cost of transactions reflects 
the information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors and results in low 
asset prices (equity), thereby causing demand for foreign assets to fall. This relationship 
is empirically investigated by Thapa and Poshakwale (2010). They identify the 
significant effect of transaction costs (i.e., those arising from commissions, fees, and 
market impact) on foreign-equity portfolio investment, in 36 countries. Their findings 
suggest that, if policy-makers were to lower transaction costs, these countries could 
expect to attract more foreign equity portfolio investment.  
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Other studies provide theoretical and empirical explanations of how information 
asymmetry might affect foreign investors, differently. Their premise is that investors 
are not equal in terms of their objectives, needs, or even their roles in the entities.   
They argue that because of this, it is important for studies to distinguish between the 
various types of investor. For example, as foreign direct investors own 10% or more of 
a firm’s shares, they are able to completely circumvent informational problems, since 
such ownership gives them access to private information concerning that company’s 
true productivity. Meanwhile, investors in portfolio debt and equity, who own less than 
10% of the shares, have no such privileged access and are, therefore, informationally 
disadvantaged. Given this situation, foreign direct investment is the preferred method of 
financing, followed by debt and then portfolio equity (Razin et al., 1998). In support of 
this, Goldstein and Razin (2006) find that the high degree of information transparency 
in developed economies reduces information asymmetry, thereby making portfolio 
investment more attractive to investors, than direct investment. 
Another comprehensive study of this topic is conducted by Daude and Fratzscher 
(2008), using bilateral capital stocks from 77 countries, including Australia. They 
examine four general categories of institutional investors: those in foreign direct 
investment, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and loans. Unlike Goldstein and Razin 
(2006), they find that information asymmetry has a substantially greater effect on 
foreign direct investment and loans, than on portfolio investment. However, in contrast 
to direct investment, portfolio investment is found to be sensitive to the quality of a 
country’s institutional factors. This study is relevant to the present thesis, in that both 
consider more than one disaggregated foreign investment. In addition, both use 
information asymmetry to explain changes in foreign investment inflow. However, the 
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present study uses more disaggregated components of foreign investment than have 
been used to date in the literature, and it also seeks to establish a link between changes 
in foreign investment inflows and the convergence of Australian standards to A-IFRS.   
With a focus on the debt market, a recent study by Abad, Sánchez-Ballesta, and Yagüe 
(2017) investigates the relationship between information asymmetry and debt- 
investment decisions in Spanish-listed, non- financial firms. They find that information 
asymmetry leads to a shorter debt-maturity and greater difficulty for firms, in accessing 
both public and bank debt. To overcome such limitations, these firms turn to trade 
credit as an alternative source of short-term finance. It is important to mention that the 
study does not distinguish between local and foreign investment. The effect of social 
trust as a measure of information asymmetry on the financial decision is studied by 
Levine, Lin, and Xie (2016). Analysing data from 34 countries for the period 1990–
2011, they find that, during financial crises, liquidity-dependent firms in high-trust 
economies succeed in obtaining more trade credit than those in low-trust economies. 
They conclude, therefore, that the greater degree of social trust that exists during times 
of financial crisis facilitates access to informal finance.  
In conclusion, theoretical and empirical financial studies show that investment mobility 
across borders is affected by information asymmetry and, perhaps more importantly, by 
the accounting differences between countries. In addition, they indicate that this effect 
varies according to the type of investment.  
The following section reviews studies that have demonstrated a link between the 
introduction of IFRS and changes in foreign investment. 
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3.3 IFRS and Foreign Investment 
Accounting information is critical for foreign investment decision making. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that economies that do not have in place a financial reporting 
system that can provide potential investors with relevant, reliable, and comparable 
information are experiencing considerable difficulty in attracting foreign investment 
(Akisik & Pfeiffer, 2009). In addition, as there is a great deal of variation in accounting 
standards and disclosure requirements, from country to country, foreign investors are 
aware of being informationally disadvantaged compared to local investors. A single 
accounting regime such as IFRS is expected to reduce such differences in accounting 
standards, increase the comparability of accounting information, enhance investors’ 
understanding of international financial reporting, and thereby increase investor 
confidence in investing abroad. This section examines the arguments in previous 
literature that explore the links between IFRS and foreign investment by considering 
three main types of investment: 1) portfolio equity; 2) direct equity; and 3) debt. Each 
type is reviewed in turn. 
3.3.1 Foreign Portfolio Equity 
Portfolio equity, unlike other types of investment, provides a direct way of accessing 
capital markets, and, therefore, is a source of both liquidity and flexibility. The result is 
a reduction in the cost of capital (IMF, 2009). However, it has been said that investors 
in portfolio equity face more information asymmetry than those in other types of 
investment. This is because their ownership of less than 10% of an entity’s shares 
means that they have, at best, only a limited role in the entity’s decision-making and no 
right to access insider information (e.g., Razin et al., 1998). Therefore, the reduction in 
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asymmetry under IFRS due to their demands for increased disclosure, improved 
accounting and auditing standards, and use of international auditors is expected to 
enable foreign portfolio equity providers to manage their projects more efficiently and, 
ultimately, to grow their investments (Choi, Lam, Sami, & Zhou, 2013).  
A substantial number of studies have examined the role played by accounting systems 
in attracting foreign portfolio equity. Choi and Levich (1991) use a survey to 
investigate the effects that the differences between national accounting systems had on 
the market decisions made by foreign investors in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US. As they believe that such differences have a greater effect on equity 
than debt, they focus more on equity investments than bonds. Roughly half of the 
participants surveyed in the study, felt that differences between international accounting 
standards influenced their market decisions. They also agree that the asymmetry created 
by such differences, might affect the pricing of securities and the composition of 
foreign portfolios.  
Salter (1998) investigates the effect of corporate financial disclosure made in 
accordance with the international financial reporting index (IFRI), on foreign 
investment. The key questions raised in this study are, firstly, whether firms in 
developed countries have levels of disclosure that differ from those in emerging 
countries, and secondly, if so, what effect these differences have on foreign investment 
inflows. Using comprehensive data for the years 1991, 1993, and 1995, obtained from 
the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), and disclosure 
indices for industrial firms in 33 of the world’s emerging and developed markets, the 
author finds that the disclosure by firms in the former type of market is greater than that 
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by firms in the latter. Salter (1998) concludes that increased disclosure may be regarded 
as an effective tool for a country to use, to attract more foreign portfolio investment.  
The adoption of IAS (or the US-GAAP, in the case of non-US entities) is studied by 
Ashbaugh (2001), using non-US firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSX). 
The results reveal that such companies attracted greater foreign equity, because they 
could provide more standardised information. It is also found that companies that adopt 
IAS, trade in more foreign equity markets, issue more equity, and provide more 
standardised information than companies that use only their domestic reporting 
systems.  
In a similar vein, the association between home bias and the choice of accounting 
methods of US investors that invest in non-US companies is investigated by Bradshaw, 
Bushee, and Miller (2004). They suggest that this association is driven by two factors: 
firstly, the degree to which the information that these investors access is familiar to 
them; and secondly, the use of the US GAAP as their preferred accounting system. 
Accordingly, the assumption is that US investors will demonstrate a preference for 
firms using accounting rules that are similar to those of the US GAAP, as these are 
more likely to produce information in a familiar format, which they can interpret easily, 
as a basis for decision-making. To test this, data from a cross-sectional sample of firms 
from 13 countries are examined. The finding is a significant one: when conformity is 
high, US investment is also high. This result fits with the frameworks devised by 
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) and Martin and Rey (2004), and suggests that the degree 
to which accounting practices are standardised is a crucial factor in investors’ decisions 
to invest in foreign companies. 
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The notion that the voluntary adoption of IAS attracts more foreign investment is also 
examined by Covrig, Defond, and Hung (2007). The authors study mutual funds from 
29 countries for the period 1999–2002. These are measured using two methods: the first 
is to establish the total number of shares owned by the mutual funds, which is then 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding; the second is using the natural 
logarithm of the number of mutual funds invested in the company. Both methods 
establish that switching to IAS significantly affects the level of foreign mutual fund 
ownership because of the better quality of information provided by such standards. In 
this way, home bias by foreign investors is mitigated and cross-border foreign capital 
mobility is facilitated. This is supported by the findings of Biscarri and Espinosa 
(2008), which suggest that a uniform set of global accounting standards is vital 
dimension of financial integration and, furthermore, that such integration would lead to 
more precise pricing of foreign assets and, ultimately, to improved efficiency in the 
allocation of foreign funds. 
Another study, by Yu and Wahid (2014), examines mutual funds companies in 28 
IFRS- and non-IRFS-adopting countries for the period 2000–2007. They find that after 
companies adopt IFRS, they experience a significant increase in foreign mutual funds. 
The authors suggest that the harmonisation of accounting reporting between countries 
plays a more important role in attracting foreign investment than does the improvement 
of domestic accounting systems. They further suggest that IFRS adoption leads to 
improved comparability of financial information, thereby, reducing the information 
processing costs paid by foreign investors. This, in turn, increases cross-border 
holdings, even in countries with weak investor protection. Consistent with this notion, 
DeFond et al. (2011) finds that foreign mutual-fund ownership increases when 
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comparability of information is improved by mandatory IFRS adoption. The study by 
Yu and Wahid (2014) and the present study both use a direct measurement method to 
estimate the effect of IFRS, that is, the change in foreign investment post-adoption. 
However, in the present study, the extent of this change is established by measuring the 
level of foreign investment, rather than using a ratio. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on 
a single country and uses the time series data of a number of different components of 
foreign investment.  
At the macroeconomic level, Amiram (2012) postulates that switching to IFRS would 
enable countries to attract more foreign portfolio equity, as, with a common set of 
global accounting rules, investors would be able to make decisions more easily. The 
study uses a gravity model based on cross-sectional data for 2000–2006 from 73 
countries, which were obtained from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS), conducted by the IMF. The findings confirm that a positive relationship does, 
in fact, exist between IFRS adoption and foreign investment, and that it is stronger 
when a group of countries share a common language, culture, and legal system. This 
supports the study’s hypothesis, that the use of a uniform, global accounting system 
enables a country to attract more foreign investment. 
In the US, Akisik and Pfeiffer (2009) investigate the trade-off between direct 
investment and portfolio investment (debt and equity) in foreign, developed and 
developing countries by US investors. They focus, particularly on the role played in this 
by accounting quality and corporate governance. Using IFRS and the US-GAAP as 
measures of the quality of financial reporting, they find that there is a strong positive 
relationship between portfolio investment and the quality of accounting standards, 
measured as a dummy variable for both IFRS and the US-GAAP. Moreover, this 
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correlation is more significant in countries with a strong level of enforcement.  Similar 
to Akisik and Pfeiffer (2009), Shima and Gordon (2011) build their hypothesis on the 
assumption that, “IFRS is considered an internationally accepted accounting standard, 
comparable to US GAAP [ and]…[w]hile some differences exist between the two, US 
investors would likely find IFRS statements more familiar than ones prepared under a 
country’s prior, home GAAP”(p. 482). They use data from 44 countries for the period 
2003–2006 and measure the adoption of IFRS as a dummy variable equal either to 1 or 
to 0. Like those of Akisik and Pfeiffer (2009), their findings suggest that IFRS adoption 
by a country with a strong level of enforcement attracts US portfolio equity to that 
country.  
Overall, the above studies provide evidence that IAS/IFRS has an effect on foreign 
portfolio equity, due to the enhanced information environment that is created by the 
increased disclosure and improved comparability under such standards. However, this 
effect is associated only with countries that have a strong level of enforcement. 
3.3.2 Foreign Direct Equity 
 Foreign direct equity arises when foreign investors own 10% or more of a local entity’s 
shares. In this way, they gain control of, or, at the very least, a significant level of 
influence over, management decisions (IMF, 2009, paragraph 6.9). In view of this, such 
investors, therefore, behave differently from those in other forms of investment (IMF, 
2009, paragraph 6.10). For example, they have the right to obtain insider information, 
so their investment is less affected by information asymmetry than other components of 
foreign investment. Therefore, when there is an issue with information asymmetry in 
the host country, direct investment is undertaken so that an entity’s business activities 
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may be monitored more closely (e.g., Muniandy, 2016; Razin et al., 1998). In view of 
this, it is expected that IFRS would have a negative or nil effect on foreign direct 
investment. This hypothesis is investigated by a number of studies. The study by 
DeFond, Gao, Li, and Xia (2014), examines the effect of IFRS adoption by China, on 
its foreign investment. The study uses panel data for the pre-adoption years (2005 and 
2006) and the post-adoption years (2007 and 2008). Three firm-level measures are used 
to gauge foreign investment: (1) a binary variable, indicating whether or not foreign 
firms hold stock in locally listed firms; (2) the number of foreign firms holding stock in 
the firm; and (3) the percentage of the firm’s shares that are owned by foreign firms. It 
was found that, after IFRS adoption, there is a drop in foreign institutional investment, 
especially among certain Chinese firms that have more opportunities to take unfair 
advantage of the fair-value provisions under IFRS, by manipulating them to increase 
their profits. 
Another study, by Louis and Urcan (2014), examines whether a country’s adoption of 
IFRS increases its cross-border acquisitions and, if so, whether this increase is driven 
simply by the adoption itself, or rather by the way in which it is enforced. They 
conclude that IFRS adoption does lead to an increase in foreign investment inflow, thus 
benefiting adopting countries. The results also suggest that the effect of IFRS is likely 
driven more by the use of a common reporting system than by the improvement in the 
quality of reporting of individual firms. However, they also found that this result is 
more significant in countries where the adoption of IFRS is voluntary.  
The role of IFRS adoption in Europe, from a macroeconomic perspective, is explored 
by Márquez-Ramos (2011), who focusing on the impact on international trade and 
foreign direct investment. Using 12-years’ worth of data, she demonstrates that there is 
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a positive relationship between accounting harmonisation and foreign investment. The 
results also show that, since 2002, there has been an increase in both trade in goods and 
FDI inflows in adopting countries. A similar result is found by Chen et al. (2014) in 
their study of 30 OECD countries for 2001– 2005. 
An earlier study was conducted by Young and Guenther (2003). Although not directly 
related to IFRS, it examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
financial reporting environments. The authors argue that the biggest potential barrier to 
foreign capital mobility is the asymmetric information environment resulting from the 
country-to-country variations in accounting standards, regulatory environments, and 
disclosure requirements. The study is based on the assumption that when accounting 
disclosure is of high quality, foreign capital mobility in turn, is high. A number of 
methods are employed in the study, to measure a country’s level of foreign capital 
mobility: one is based on a consumption-based empirical framework, and another is an 
international CAPM-based approach. The latter method uses the link between direct 
investment inflows and the opportunity for the country to attract foreign investment. 
The study finds that, of the 23 countries investigated, those who make more disclosures 
attract a higher level of foreign direct investment, especially those of which the rules for 
financial reporting are not aligned with those for tax accounting. Thus, it is evident that 
the tax accounting rules are more important for foreign investment than the level of 
disclosure itself. 
The interaction between IFRS, corporate governance, and foreign direct investment 
inflows is examined by Farooque and Yarram (2010). Using the 2004 data from a large 
sample of countries, as well as a number of control variables, such as accounting 
disclosure, property rights, and openness of markets, they conclude that IFRS adoption 
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has a significant impact on corporate governance, but not on foreign direct investment 
However, they believe that, once the quality of governance has been improved, the 
adoption of IFRS then allows greater mobility of capital across borders. Farooque and 
Yarram (2013) extend the above study by focusing on the period 1996–2007. As with 
their earlier study, a positive association between FDI and governance is again 
established. In addition, while governance is found to be affected by IFRS, there is no 
evidence of a direct link between FDI and IFRS. The conclusion of the study stresses 
the importance of improving governance at the macro level. Akisik and Pfeiffer (2009), 
also, find no effect of adopting US-GAAP or IFRS on US direct investment in foreign 
entities. Gordon et al. (2012) study 124 countries, for the period 1996–2009 and find 
that foreign direct investment does increase when IFRS is adopted, but only in cases in 
which the adopting country is a developing one and there is a considerable difference 
between its GAAP and the newly-adopted standards. As in the present thesis, Gordon et 
al. (2012) consider IFRS adoption as an event, in order to estimate its effect on foreign 
direct investment. Similar to the present study, they undertake a univariate comparison 
of the periods before and after adoption; however, this is done for both developing and 
developed countries, rather than for a single country.   
Similar to Gordon et al. (2012), Efobi, Nnadi, Odebiyi, and Beecroft (2014) investigate 
whether adopting IFRS results in firms attracting increased foreign direct investment; 
however, this study is conducted within an African institutional framework. The authors 
claim that African countries generally suffer from institutional corruption; therefore, 
given this poor institutional quality, the question they attempt to answer is what effect 
IFRS adoption has on foreign direct investment in such countries. Forty-Two African 
countries are studied for the period 2001–2012. Two estimation methods are applied: 
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the feasible generalised least square technique and the general method in the moment 
system. The outcomes indicate that the benefits of adopting IFRS, for African countries 
that have a developed institutional framework compared to those possessing a static one 
is an improvement of over 200% in foreign direct investment flow. 
A different approach is used by Ramanna and Sletten (2014) to examine the network 
benefits of IFRS adoption from a network theory perspective. Their study raises the 
important question of why countries voluntarily adopt IFRS. They hypothesise that 
“perceived network benefits from the extant worldwide adoption of IFRS can explain 
part of countries’ shift away from local accounting standards” (p. 1517). This means 
that as the number of adopting countries increases, so too does foreign investment. This 
increase in FDI is believed to be facilitated by the ability of IFRS to reduce information 
asymmetry between local and foreign investors, as both use IFRS. The study uses a 
sample of 92 countries (including Australia) for the period 2003–2008. As in the 
present study, the benefits of IFRS are measured by identifying changes in foreign 
direct investment, foreign equity portfolio investment, and foreign trade; however, 
because of a lack of data, only foreign trade is used. Moreover, a dummy variable is 
used to identify the window of IFRS adoption, taking a value of 1 for countries that 
adopted IFRS in 2003, and 2 for countries that adopted IFRS in 2004, and so on. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis. The results also suggest that the benefits of 
adopting the new standards can be realised even in a country in which high-quality 
accountant standards were in operation, prior to IFRS adoption. 
Overall, unlike the results for portfolio equity, the evidence of an association between 
IFRS adoption and increased direct investment is mixed. The findings are often found 
to apply to developing countries rather than developed countries, and, then, only when 
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there is a considerable difference between their local accounting standards and IFRS. 
Moreover, while the level of national institutional enforcement plays a key role in 
attracting portfolio equity, under IFRS, it has less effect on direct equity. Finally, it is 
found that taxation can play an important role in attracting direct investment. Countries, 
in which rules for financial accounting are not aligned with those for tax accounting 
succeed in attracting more foreign direct investment than those in which there is 
alignment of such rules.  This seems to indicate a relationship between the tax rate in 
the host country and the amount of direct investment it attracts, a finding that could 
have serious implications for Australia, a country with one of the highest tax rates in the 
world. It is important to mention here that in some resource-rich’ countries, such as 
Australia, where foreign direct investment is supposed to be attracted, there is a high 
level of restrictions affecting the level of such investment in an attempt to protect the 
country’s natural resources, especially those exploited by the mining sector. Golub, 
Hajkova, Mirza, Nicoletti, and Yoo (2003) estimate that Australia could attract 
approximately 45% more foreign direct investment than it does, by lowering foreign 
direct investment restrictions to the same level as those of the UK. Yet, this situation 
persists, despite the fact that Australia was ranked 14
th
 in the world, between 1996 and 
2005 in terms of being the most attractive investment destination (OECD, 2006, p. 21). 
These factors also need to be considered in interpreted the results. 
3.3.3 Foreign Debts 
 Debt and equity differ in the type of liability and risk associated with them. While 
equity gives the investor a claim on an entity’s assets, debt involves the entity having to 
pay back the principal and/or interest, usually according to a predetermined formula. 
This system of debt repayment is designed to limit the creditor’s exposure to risk. 
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However, as in equity, where the entity’s performance is important for debt obligation, 
it is also largely dependent on other variables such as the interest rate and risk level 
(IMF, 2009, paragraph 5.32). Therefore, IFRS adoption may affect equity and debt 
differently. 
According to the IMF (2009), foreign debt can be classified into five components: 
direct debt, portfolio debt, loans, derivatives, and other debt. The literature related to 
each of these is reviewed below.   
3.3.3.1 Foreign Direct Debt 
The term 'foreign direct debt' refers to lending and borrowing transactions between 
overseas, non-financial affiliates and, as such, it can be used by those who invest in it to 
access insider information (IMF, 2009).
17
 It may also be used to gain an advantage, 
such as a taxation benefit (Avdjiev, Chui, & Shin, 2014). For these reasons, foreign 
direct debt may react differently from other debt components to IFRS adoption. 
According to Kayis-Kumar (2015), the differences in tax rates across borders 
“incentivises multinational enterprises (MNEs) to finance their high-tax jurisdiction 
affiliates with excessive debt, thereby reducing their tax liability in those jurisdictions” 
(p.301). This strategy is called income-shifting, and it creates what is called 'thin 
capitalisation', a phenomenon that occurs when a company uses more debt than equity 
to finance its assets as a way of reducing its income tax, since it can then claim the 
interest payments as a tax deduction. The first study to investigate how such thin 
capitalisation is affected by IFRS adoption is that of Taylor and Tower (2009). They 
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 In financial corporations, all debt contracts between affiliates are considered to be portfolio 
or other investments. (IMF, 2009, p.105) 
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argue that using fair value as a measure of financial assets and liabilities involves 
significant assumptions by management. The result, therefore, is inherent uncertainty 
about the true value of assets, liabilities and equity, which, in turn, may affect the 
company’s thin-capitalisation position. Using a sample of 105 listed companies, the 
researchers find that “although the introduction of [A-IFRS] had a significant impact on 
the thin capitalisation position of Australian listed firms, there [was] only one company 
within the sample set of 105 that potentially [did] not comply with those provisions, as 
a direct result of [A-IFRS] adoption” (p.50). 
Another study, by Taylor et al. (2011), investigates the relationship between the amount 
of financial instrument disclosure made by a company and its international tax 
characteristics, using a sample of Australian publicly listed resource companies, of 
which most are MNC for the period 2003–2006. The authors argue that A-IFRS has the 
potential to affect a firm’s thin capitalisation. This is because, if such a firm is operating 
globally as part of an international group of corporations, there is a greater incentive for 
it to use direct debt to shift its profits from a country with a high tax-rate, such as 
Australia, to one where the tax-rate is lower, such as the US. Therefore, the researchers 
predict that the prospect of receiving tax benefits by income-shifting may encourage 
managers to reduce the amount of information disclosure they make regarding their 
financing arrangements and associated financial instruments. These findings confirm 
the prediction, and raise an important concern about the link between international tax 
structures and disclosure patterns. In their 2013 study, Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis 
examine the determinants of the thinly-capitalised structures of 203 publicly listed 
Australian firms for the 2006–2009 period (the equivalent of 812 firm-years). It was 
during this time that Australia started to use A-IFRS. The results indicate that a firm’s 
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thin-capitalisation position is significantly associated with its multi-national status, use 
of tax-havens, withholding of taxes, and tax uncertainty. Of these factors, the first two 
have the strongest association with thin capitalisation. This is further supported by 
Taylor and Richardson (2014). 
At an international level, De Simone (2016) investigates whether the adoption of IFRS 
by affiliates of MNC facilitates tax-motivated income-shifting. The author assumes that 
this income-shifting is undertaken either by: (i) a company’s use of a ‘flexible’ method 
of estimating profits, so as to give it the appearance of having achieved a lower bottom-
line in the high-tax country; or (ii) using a transfer-pricing method for goods and 
services, and internal debt (FDD) between the affiliates, in order to shift profits to a 
low-tax country. Under IFRS, increased comparability and disclosure, in conjunction 
with more stringent auditing of transfer-pricing and adjustment, should, in fact, reduce 
the opportunity for a company to use either of these methods (e.g., Ernst & Young, 
2005; Taylor & Tower, 2011). However, the findings of De Simone (2016) provide 
significant evidence that IFRS adoption by affiliates does facilitate tax-motivated 
changes in reported pre-tax profits. Nevertheless, De Simone does note that such 
changes are only possible for a couple of years after IFRS adoption. Consequently, if 
the increase in income-shifting stems mainly from using FDD, as the only legal way for 
MNCs to shift their profits, the increase should be considered the result of increased 
information transparency. This could also explain why such an effect occurred with a 
lag at the time of mandatory IFRS adoption, as, from that point, all companies would 
have had to present their financial positions according to IFRS. In support of this, 
Márquez-Ramos (2011) identifies a significant increase in direct debt, following IFRS 
adoption by the EU countries, which may be associated with a decrease in information 
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asymmetry. She concludes that “the adoption of a high-quality set of harmonised 
accounting standards fosters trade and [attracts] FDI, as the improvement in 
accounting information, in turn, fosters financial transparency and comparability, and 
reduces information asymmetries and unfamiliarity among agents in different 
countries.” (p. 56). 
3.3.3.2 Foreign Portfolio Debt and Loan 
Portfolio investment is usually defined as “cross border transactions and positions 
involving debt… other than those included in direct investment…” and consists of 
bonds and money-market instruments (IMF, 2009, paragraph 6.54). Loans, on the other 
hand are “financial assets that (a) are created when a creditor lends funds directly to a 
debtor, and (b) are evidenced by documents that are not negotiable” (IMF, 2009, 
paragraph 5.51). Like portfolio investment, it, too, is classified according to the length 
of time it takes to mature, that is, as a short- or long-term loan.
18
 
In a more recent study, Florou and Kosi (2015) investigate the association between the 
adoption of IFRS and borrowing decisions involving both bonds and loans. They 
predict that IFRS adopters are more likely to access public bonds, rather than private 
loans and so experience a decrease in bond-yield spread. The reason is the higher 
quality and greater comparability of their financial reporting. However, if IAS 39- 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement implementation, in conjunction 
with the introduction of fair-value use, affects the reliability of financial reporting under 
                                                          
18
 Under AASB 139 (IAS 39), the ways in which portfolio debt and loans are valuated are 
different: portfolio debt is measured using fair value while loans are measured using the 
amortising value (Armstrong et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2009). 
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IFRS, the outcome could be negative. They use samples from 16 countries, including 
Australia, for the period 2002–2007. The results are significant, supporting the notion 
that IFRS adoption increases the quality of financial reports and, therefore, the 
reliability of the accounting information contained within them. Consistent with the 
findings of previous research concerning portfolio equity, these results apply only to 
countries with a relatively more developed enforcement mechanism, tighter control of 
corruption, and lower financial risk.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that adoption of 
IFRS increases a firm’s value by reducing the cost of public debt. This is consistent 
with the results of Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008), that firms with poor-quality 
accounting systems tend to borrow from private rather than public markets. They also 
find that there is an association between the poor quality of an accounting system and 
an increase in the cost of capital debt, which is more significant for bonds than loans.  
Kim et al. (2011) also investigate the effect of IFRS on the information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers. They study the association between the voluntary 
adoption of IFRS and loan contracting, focusing on non-US borrowers from 40 
countries for the period 1997–2005. They find that IFRS adopters are charged lower 
loan rates than non-adopters. In addition, the former are more often offered non-price 
terms such as loan size and collateralisation by banks than are the latter. Also, IFRS 
adopters are more attractive to foreign lenders than non-adopters. The conclusion is that 
IFRS adoption results in increased disclosure by borrowers, thereby allowing lenders to 
more accurately estimate the quality of credit. This leads to increased debtor 
participation in foreign loan markets. This finding is further support by Brown (2014), 
Chan, Hsu, and Lee, (2013), and Chen, Chin, Wang, and Yao (2015).  
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Ball et al. (2015) arrive at a different result to Florou and Kosi (2015). They study the 
effect of IFRS information on debt markets in bonds and loans in a number of 
countries, including Australia. They focus on the change in debt-contracting around the 
date of IFRS adoption, especially under the application of IAS 39: Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. They argue that the gains and losses, 
resulting from the use of fair value and re-recognition of some financial instrument 
elements, under this standard may make the information in financial reports less reliable 
for debt contracting. In this case, IFRS adopters would be more likely to use private 
loans than to access public bonds. Moreover, the option under IFRS to use fair value to 
evaluate certain financial liabilities makes it less useful in debt contracting. This is 
because debt contracts stipulate that principal and interest must be repaid, rather than 
the fair value of the debt. Furthermore, using fair value may provide managers with 
more opportunities to manipulate their firms’ financial reporting. The authors assume 
that there will be less need for future renegotiation if the regulatory changes resulting 
from IFRS introduction improve reporting quality and, thus, reduce information 
asymmetry before the loan is contracted. This, in turn, will reduce the demand for debt 
covenants both accounting and non-accounting. The findings show that while there is 
an increase in the number of accounting covenants for bonds, loans show different 
results, with a decrease in the number of accounting covenants, and, conversely, an 
increase in non-accounting covenants. The suggestion is that the increased use of fair 
value under IFRS causes a transitory shock in earnings, which decreases the reliability 
of financial reporting destined for firms/banks. It is worth noting that, although the 
study investigates the effect of IFRS on debt investment, it does not specify whether the 
bonds and loans are local or foreign.  
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One of the most important and oft-cited studies in accounting literature, by Ball, Robin, 
and Sadka (2008), seeks to determine whether the quality of accounting standards has a 
greater effect on debt or equity markets. While this study is not related to either IFRS or 
foreign investment, it does have a connection to the present study, as both investigate 
the effects of financial reporting on debt and equity markets. The study looks at the 
quality of financial reporting, including timeliness, as well as whether financial 
statements are more useful to lenders or shareholders. In doing this, the authors assume 
that as timely financial reporting is a costly activity, it is dependent on demand, which 
they measure in the study by market size. Analysing the cross-sectional data from 22 
countries, they conclude that the characteristics of financial reporting are, primarily, a 
response to the demands of the debt market. Ball et al. (2008) suggest that increasing 
demand for financial reporting by debt markets puts firms and their accountants under 
pressure to produce financial reports in a more timely manner. In terms of IFRS, Barth 
et al. (2008) confirm that the adoption of IFRS by 21 EU countries is associated with a 
higher quality of information in terms of less earnings management, more timely loss 
recognition, and more value-relevance of accounting figures than was the application of 
the domestic standards. In Australia, Chua et al. (2012) also identifies an impact, 
following the application of A-IFRS, on the accounting quality that is positive in the 
sense that there is less income-smoothing, improved timeliness of loss recognition, and 
increased value-relevance of information in financial statements, especially in non-
financial firms.   
 At the macroeconomic level, there is scant empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
IFRS on debt. One notable exception is a study by Beneish et al. (2015), which builds 
on the work of Ball et al. (2008) by investigating whether the adoption of IFRS impacts 
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debt and equity markets differently. They predict that since debt contracting is based 
explicitly on information disclosed in reports concerning company performance, 
holders of debt bonds are, therefore, greater consumers of financial reporting than those 
who invest in portfolio equity. This is because, while the latter also rely on such 
information, they are not contractually tied to it. They argue further that, as the debt 
market is considerably larger than the equity market in the vast majority of adopting 
countries, it cannot be ignored by any study that aims to capture the potential effects of 
IFRS adoption on capital markets. As with the present thesis, this study measures the 
change in debt and equity components of foreign investment by comparing levels 
before and after IFRS adoption. Similar to most studies in the literature, a pre–post 
design is used, with the dummy variable equal to 1 during 2006 and 2007, and zero 
during 2003 and 2004. The authors find that debt is, in fact, more affected by IFRS 
adoption than equity, thereby confirming the prediction. Moreover, their results show 
that, unlike foreign debt, foreign equity flows increase only when a country is perceived 
as having strong governance prior to its adoption of IFRS. In contrast to Yu and Whihd 
(2014), Beneish et al. (2015) conclude that the observed effect of IFRS adoption is 
more likely to stem from the quality rather than the comparability of financial 
information. However, it should be noted that the study does have some limitations, as 
it uses only short-term data and a small sample of countries. 
3.3.3.3 Foreign Derivatives 
A derivative is “a financial instrument that is linked to another specific financial 
instrument or indicator or commodity and through which specific financial risks (such 
as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity and commodity price risks, credit 
risk, and so on) can be traded in their own right in financial markets” (IMF, 2009, 
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Paragraph 5.8). Unlike other debts, no principal is advanced for derivatives, so, there is 
no repayment requirement; neither does any interest accrue on financial derivative 
instruments. Most derivatives are associated with risk, which arises in part, from the use 
of fair value. This includes market risk, commodity-price risk, exchange-rate risk, and 
trade-credit risk (IMF, 2009). 
The effect of the use of fair value, both under FASB and IFRS, on derivative 
investments during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis is investigated by Barth and 
Landsman (2010). Their study, whose focus is restricted to banks, found no evidence of 
an effect of fair value on derivatives. Nevertheless, it does identify a lack of 
transparency concerning this type of investment, under IAS 132: Financial Instruments: 
Presentation. To enable investors to better understand the leverage inherent in such 
derivatives, the authors recommend that firms increase both the quality and quantity of 
their disclosures, provide more disaggregated information regarding the derivatives, and 
implement a risk-equivalence approach. While Barth and Landsman (2010) find that 
under IFRS 7, the disclosure concerning derivatives greatly improves the transparency 
of banks’ financial statements, Chung et al. (2012) provide evidence, from the Korean 
equity stock market, that in derivative-related loss announcements, the quality of the 
disclosure is more important than the quantity. 
In Australia, Chalmers (2001) examines the voluntary disclosure of derivative financial 
instruments using 140 listed firms, for the period 1992–1998. While the author finds 
evidence of an increase in the number of optional disclosures of derivative-instrument 
activity, she does note that this is largely confined to firms within the extractive 
industries, the majority of which are MNCs. She speculates that this is because such 
firms are driven by the necessity to be globally competitive. Her study is extended by 
   
57 
 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), who investigate managers’ responses during the period 
1992–1996 to the requirements regarding derivatives financial instrument disclosure in 
Australia. Their findings support those of the earlier study, also indicating a statistically 
significant increase in disclosure, particularly by mining and oil companies, most of 
which are multinationals. Overall, the results of the Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) study 
demonstrate that firms voluntarily disclose greater amounts of derivative instrument 
information because of the greater pressure exerted on them to be more transparent in 
their financial reporting and to comply with professional norms, especially in the 
international context. While neither study is related to A-IFRS, they both highlight the 
fact that because of the global nature of MNCs’ business activities, their financial 
instrument disclosures, especially in relation to derivatives, are of particular 
importance.  
Hassan (2004) investigates the value relevance of derivative disclosure under AASB 
1033: Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments by companies from the 
Australian extractive industry (1998 – 2001), an industry that makes extensive use of 
the derivative. He finds that the majority of participating entities provide little 
information regarding derivatives. Hassan (2004), therefore, suggests that what is 
needed, is more disclosure of information concerning hedging, fair value, and risk, and 
this needs to be enforced. Consistent with this, a later study by Taylor, Tower, and 
Neilson (2010) provides insights into the disclosure of financial risk management of 
Australian, publicly-listed resource companies, for the period 2002–2006, i.e., prior to 
the application of AASB 7. They find that the increase in disclosure, both voluntary and 
mandatory, of financial-risk management policies under A-IFRS, is associated 
significantly and positively with rising capital and the strength of the companies’ 
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corporate governance. The conclusion is that, because extractive resource entities 
regularly seek the help of foreign capital markets to finance their projects, they may be 
using derivatives, either directly or indirectly. In this case, increased disclosure of 
financial risk management is vital. Such an increase is driven by pressure from capital 
market participants for greater transparency, in order to reduce the element of 
uncertainty in their financial decision-making. In addition, given that, under AASB 139, 
firms are required to document the impact of hedging arrangements on risk off-setting, 
the authors suggest that the implementation of AASB 139 may be associated with 
greater transparency in the reporting of risk-management policies, especially those 
related to hedging activities. These findings are consistent with those of Chalmers 
(2001), Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), Gallery, Cooper, and Sweeting (2008), Kent and 
Stewart (2008), Taylor and Tower (2011), and Wee, Tarca, and Chang (2014), which 
suggest that the greater volumes of disclosure that made by firms brought them 
increased economic benefits. 
Birt et al. (2013) offer insights into the relationship between AASB 7 and financial-risk 
disclosure related to derivative use, in the Australian extractive industry. Their findings 
show that the majority of the firms in their sample (46 out of 79) do not include any 
information in their financial reports, about their motivation for using derivatives. 
However, of the 33 firms that provide reasons, most indicate that they use derivatives to 
mitigate the risk associated with commodity and foreign exchange. The researchers 
argue that, as the use of derivatives is related to risk, increased qualitative and 
quantitative disclosure is needed to help investors estimate the risk related to their 
investment decisions.  
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3.3.3.4 Other Foreign Debt 
Other debt is an important type of financing that includes deposits, and trade credit 
provided by a firm’s suppliers.19 While some studies suggest that IFRS affects other 
debt, such as foreign suppliers (Hail et al., 2010), there is no evidence to indicate how 
this occurs. To our knowledge, Li, Ng, and Jeffrey (2017) is the only study to examine 
the impact of IFRS on trade credit. They find that this impact is considerable, due to the 
reduction in information asymmetry under IFRS, which improves the quality of 
publicly available information. However, they discover that there is no such association 
in countries with strong governance. They attribute this to the absence of any 
significant level of information asymmetry between trade-credit providers and entities 
in these countries. Such an explanation is not far from the finding of Cuñat (2007), 
Love (2011), and Nilsen (2002), who suggest that trade creditors are able to obtain 
information from entities if there is a long-standing, trust-based relationship between 
them; in this case, the suppliers are usually happy to support the entity during a 
financial squeeze.  
In general, most of the above findings are confined to countries that are characterised 
by a relatively more-developed enforcement system, a stronger mechanism for 
controlling corruption and lower financial risk. Despite this, the fact remains that these 
studies do identify an effect of IFRS/A-IFRS on foreign debt; however, it should be 
noted that this effect does vary from component to component. 
                                                          
19
 “[Trade credit] … arises when payment for goods or services …is not made at the same time 
as the change in ownership of a good or provision of a service” (IMF, 2009, paragraph 5.71). 
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3.3.4 Other Capital Market Studies 
A number of other relevant studies that investigate the effect of financial reporting on 
investment decision-making, both local and foreign, and so have a connection to the 
present study, are reviewed in this subsection. Some of these studies examine the short-
lived reaction of the capital market to the decision to adopt IFRS. One such study, by 
Brochet et al. (2013), examines the reaction of the UK capital market. The authors 
argue that IFRS adoption, by enhancing the comparability of financial statements, 
reduces private information. Therefore, they predict that the result of this will be a 
reduction in the abnormal returns to insiders, that is, direct investors. Using data from a 
sample of listed firms, for the period 2003-2006 (i.e. two years preceding and two years 
following IFRS adoption), the study identifies a marked decrease in abnormal returns, 
both in the short-term (within five days of adoption) and long-term (within one, three, 
and six months of adoption). The authors attribute this result to the enhancement of 
comparability, rather than the increase in quality, of financial reporting, given that the 
UK already had standards that produced high-quality information, prior to IFRS 
adoption. This is consistent with the findings of Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz 
(2003), which show that information asymmetry was reduced when firms changed from 
the German GAAP to either IFRS or the US-GAAP. Further support for this is provided 
by Clarkson, Hanna, Richardson, and Thompson (2011), who investigate the impact of 
IFRS/A-IFRS on the value relevance of book value and earnings, for equity valuation, 
both in Europe and Australia. They find that, after IFRS adoption, the distribution of 
measurement errors for Code Law and Common Law countries converge. The 
researchers conclude from this that IFRS/A-IFRS may enhance the value relevance and 
cross-border comparability of financial reporting. A solely Australian study, by Cairns 
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et al. (2011) find that the mandatory use of fair value, under IAS 39/ AASB139, to 
valuate financial instruments and derivatives in particular, results in greater 
comparability of financial reports both within and between countries. Similarly, Cairns 
et al. (2011) conclude that mandating the use of fair value, as happened under IAS 39/ 
AASB 139, may improve the global information environment and provide values that 
are more up to date, outcomes that reflect the goals of certain standard setters, and meet 
the needs of users of financial reports, for information with greater relevance. 
The study by Brochet et al. (2013) is relevant to the present study in terms of its use of 
a direct method of capturing the reduction in the information asymmetry between 
insider and outsider investors, after IFRS adoption. In addition, it also considers that the 
reduction in the returns to insiders is due to the enhancement of public information. 
Moreover, to avoid the variance in institutional factors from country to country, they 
focus only on the capital market of a single, developed country that already had a high-
quality set of accounting standards, prior to IFRS adoption. This is also the case with 
the present study. However, the former study differs from the latter in terms of the 
actual focus country (the UK, as opposed to Australia, in this thesis), the variables 
chosen, and the method used.  
Armstrong et al. (2010) conducts an event study to investigate the reaction of the EU 
equity market to the adoption of IFRS. The authors assume that the benefits of the 
adoption stem from the fact that “…[investors] expected application of IFRS to result 
in higher-quality financial reporting relative to application of domestic standards, 
thereby enhancing financial reporting transparency, and reducing information 
asymmetry and information risk and, thus, lowering cost of capital” (p.32). They 
preselect 16 of a possible 40 dates, most of which are related to the adoption of IAS 39: 
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Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, and 32: Financial Instruments: 
Presentation, between 2002 and 2005, a period that preceded voluntary IFRS adoption. 
The authors find an increase in abnormal returns following the IFRS event and 
conclude that this occurs even in countries that already had high-quality accounting 
standards prior to IFRS adoption. These results indicate that, while European investors 
expected net benefits such as convergence, increased information quality, and a 
reduction in information asymmetry as a result of adopting IFRS, these benefits were, 
in fact, smaller in some countries, possibly due to their having less rigorous 
enforcement systems or, alternatively, to their early adoption of IFRS (2002–2005). 
This is supported by the findings of a study by Devalle, Onali, and Magarini (2010), 
which examines whether the value relevance of equity’s book value increased after 
IFRS adoption, they use a sample of firms listed in 2005 on the stock exchanges of five 
European countries: Germany, Spain, the UK, France, and Italy. They hypothesise that 
a shift to IFRS facilitates foreign investment by increasing information transparency 
and thereby market liquidity. To test this, they use the Chow test, and preselect 2005 as 
the likely date of the structural break. While their findings support the notion of 
increased value relevance, after IFRS adoption, the evidence is limited: they identified a 
significant structural break in the data from Germany, Spain, and France only. They 
propose that the absence of such a break in the Italian and UK data may be due to the 
influence of other factors. Finally, the authors suggest that more time may be needed to 
achieve cross-border comparability of financial reporting. To our knowledge, this study 
is the first in the international accounting literature to adopt what the authors 
themselves claimed, was the innovative approach of using a structural break (Chow 
test) to test the assumption that increased liquidity, following IFRS adoption in 2005 
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stemmed from the increase in the value relevance in financial reporting under such 
standards. In this respect, this has great relevance for the present study. 
The findings of Armstrong et al. (2010) and Devalle et al. (2010) are supported by those 
of Callao et al. (2007) and Daske et al. (2008). These show limited evidence of the 
effect of IFRS adoption on equity, and suggest that foreign investment will increase as a 
greater number of market participants become increasingly familiar with the 
requirements of IFRS. In addition, as with previous studies, Daske et al (2008) 
conclude that such benefits for capital markets occur in countries in which firms have 
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, and that they are 
most pronounced for firms that switch voluntarily to IFRS. 
 In a study employing a different approach, Wang and Welker (2011) investigate the 
impact of IFRS on managerial incentives to engage in equity issuance. They do this by 
looking for any increases in the cumulative value of the equity, during the period of 
transition to IFRS, which extends from 2002, the year in which intention to adopt was 
announced, to 2004, the year preceding mandatory adoption. They argue that managers 
expedite the issuance of equity during this period if they expect that the firm’s 
performance will be worse under IFRS than it was under the GAAP. Therefore, stock 
prices issued before a firm discloses reconciliations of their financial statements from 
GAAP to the international standards, may fail to reveal the true picture of that firm's 
performance. Moreover, as the managers of such firms possess inside information about 
this performance, they can use such a situation to their advantage. For instance, they 
can arrange for the firms’ financial activities to be conducted during the period of 
relatively more favourable market conditions that exist, before the publication of their 
reconciliation statements reveal the extent to which their firms’ financial performance 
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has been impacted by the adoption of IFRS. Consequently, the authors predict that any 
unexpected or high-volume issuance, during the period of transition to IFRS, is 
attributable to the change in accounting standards. Furthermore, according to the 
authors, because the increase in the value relevance of accounting information occurred 
after mandatory application, especially from 2005Q2, when the first half-year report 
under IFRS was made, the increase in equity after this time (2005Q2), can no longer be 
attributed to an increase in information asymmetry between managers and investors. 
Also, they focus on a developed country instead of a developing one, and on mandatory 
adoption rather than voluntary adoption, because they assume that, in both the latter 
cases, the cost of issuing equity will be higher than the benefits. 
As in the present study, the authors consider mandatory adoption of IFRS an exogenous 
shock to the entire capital market, which affects the equity price. Based on data from a 
sample of more than 2,900 listed firms in the US capital market, selected from 15 
countries, including Australia, the results show that because of the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, the firms did make financial decisions 
during the transition period as, at that time, the managers had more information than the 
investors. However, they did not have the same opportunity after the mandatory 
adoption, as the financial statements, under IFRS, contained more extensive 
information for investors. This is consistent with the findings of Brochet et al. (2013), 
and both of these studies support the argument of Ball (2006), which suggests that, 
unlike other political and taxation standards, IFRS is designed to provide more relevant 
and reliable information for the public, in order to reduce the agency problem, and 
thereby enhance decision-making. The findings of Wang and Welker (2011) 
complement the international literature by showing that accounting standards do not act 
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in isolation when impacting the corporate information environment and real economic 
activities, but, rather, do so, in combination with other institutional factors. 
Finally, a number of studies have investigated the effect of IFRS on the accuracy of 
financial analysts’ forecasts. The main argument of such studies is that as analysts are 
the principal consumers of financial reports, they have superior knowledge of the 
financial market. Therefore, if their forecasts are more accurate, after IFRS adoption, 
this would imply that the information under IFRS is more reliable. This argument is 
supported by Tan, Wang, and Welker (2011), who use a sample, drawn from 25 
countries, that consisting of 2,679 firms that complied with mandatory IFRS adoption 
and 601 firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily, during the period 2001–2007. They find 
that not only does the accuracy of foreign analysts’ forecast improve during the post-
adoption period, but also, that foreign analysts are more attracted to the firms that 
adopted IFRS. The latter effect of adoption applies especially to those who already had 
prior IFRS experience or had a foreign portfolio before IFRS was adopted in their home 
country. The study also finds that both of these effects are more marked in countries 
where there is a considerable disparity between their former GAAP and the newly 
adopted IFRS. The authors suggest that comparability and usefulness of accounting 
data are both enhanced by accounting harmonisation. A comprehensive study by 
Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) examine whether the increase in forecast 
accuracy during the period 2001–2007 is due to the higher quality and increased 
comparability of accounting information under IFRS or to the increased opportunities 
under IFRS to manipulate earnings and thereby meet analysts’ expectations. The 
findings confirm that IFRS provides more information to investors due to its greater 
comparability and that this holds true even when the standards are used by firms whose 
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GAAP was of a similar quality to IFRS. These results are more significant for 
mandatory adopters compared to both non-adopters and voluntary adopters. Australian 
studies such as those by Cheong et al. (2010) and Cotter, Tarca, and Wee (2012) 
support these findings.  
To summaries, the evidence presented here provides further support for the notion that 
the adoption of IFRS increases the efficiency of investment decision-making. However, 
in some cases, this support is limited, because the studies only use data from a short 
time-period. 
3.4 Conclusion  
The studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that due to the considerable scope for 
flexibility in the way in which individual nations determine their own accounting 
standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory practices, historically, financial 
reporting has varied greatly from country to country. It is argued in the literature and, 
therefore, assumed here that, in order to reduce information asymmetry among 
investors and to facilitate foreign capital mobility across borders, financial reporting 
needs to be standardised and that this can best be achieved by all countries agreeing to 
use a common set of accounting standards. 
From a foreign investment perspective, it was generally expected that such international 
standards would improve the efficiency of decision-making, by reducing the differences 
that existed among national accounting systems. It was believed that this, in turn, would 
enhance the quality and the comparability of financial reporting, thereby reducing 
uncertainty among decision-makers wishing to invest in foreign capital markets. The 
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empirical findings support the above predictions. Nevertheless, there remain a number 
of gaps in the existing research, which this thesis aims to explore: 
1. Some have examined the topic by focusing on only one or two foreign 
investment variables namely, foreign portfolio equity or foreign direct investment (e.g., 
Gordon et al., 2012; Yu & Wahid, 2014). As can be understood from the above review, 
the importance of public information varies according to the component of foreign 
investment. Hence, it would be beneficial to examine all components in order to 
ascertain how each is affected by the application of IRFS. 
2.  Many other studies tended to focus on companies by using a cross-sectional 
approach. These studies generally tend to focus on a short period of time, i.e. a two-year 
period. As highlighted by Gray (2014), such a narrow focus may fail to capture the 
global convergence of financial reporting. In addition, any benefits of IFRS detected in 
this way, especially in terms of portfolio debt and derivatives, could be due to the 
changes in methods used to evaluate assets and liabilities under IAS 39 and 32, such as 
the introduction of the use of fair value. 
3. In the literature, the use of dummy variables, which are used to measure the 
effect of IFRS, involves pre-selecting the date of the effect; this is most often 2005, the 
date of IFRS application.
20
 However, such a process of pre-selection is deemed to be 
conceptually weak, because, even if this date is known, it may not reflect when the 
initial effect was actually felt. The literature shows that the foreign investment 
                                                          
20
 A country that adopts the IFRS takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise, or a value (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5) ‘commensurate’ with the degree of adoption (e.g., Beneish et al., 2015; Ramanna & 
Sletten, 2014). 
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components vary in their reactions to IFRS. This is because, for each type of 
investment, investors have different needs of the information and a different degree of 
control over entities in which they invest. Therefore, the difference in the date of the 
effect of the change-over (lead or lag effect) is highly likely to occur among foreign 
investment components. The effect indicates with a lead when it was felt during the 
transition period, while it occurs with a lag when it appeared later than predicted. In 
view of this, using a pre-selected date may result in a false picture of how the various 
components of foreign investment were affected by IFRS, thereby, invalidating 
conventional hypothesis testing (Banerjee et al., 1992).  
As a contribution to the previous literature, this thesis focuses on a single country that 
is, Australia. This will achieve two benefits: 1) as Australia is one of developed 
countries that already had high-quality accounting standards prior to the introduction of 
A-IFRS, this will help to indicate the benefits of A-IFRS, if any, immediately (Chua et 
al., 2012); 2) using a single country will help to remove any variations between 
countries, in terms of their application dates and implementation processes, as well as 
their economic, political and cultural contexts (Brochet et al., 2013). 
The evidence, presented in this chapter, from previous studies shows that IFRS use is 
associated with increased foreign investment inflow. As one of its contributions to this 
aspect of the accounting literature, this thesis uses a new, more extensive dataset, which 
includes information on relative levels of foreign investment, across two different 
categories (aggregated and disaggregated components) in order to target the specific 
effects of restrictions on the volume and composition of foreign investment. Moreover, 
using both categories ensures that the validity of the present study’s findings is tested in 
a more robust way. 
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Also, in contrast to those studies that use a cross-sectional approach, the present study 
employs time series data to determine the date of the effect (the break date) 
endogenously, a method that is explained in Chapter 5. This approach allows any 
change in a variable to manifest itself, if and when the variable is affected by the 
introduction of A-IFRS. This is the major part of the contribution of this thesis.  
Finally, in this thesis, the data is assessed at the national level rather than the firm level. 
This is vital, because, in Australia, all entities are required to prepare their financial 
statements according to A-IFRS. Therefore, since the application of A-IFRS in 
Australia was, primarily, a policy adopted at the national level, the contention is that 
using national-level, rather than firm-level observations should add more robustness to 
the results.  
Overall, this thesis is a comprehensive study that examines the effect of A-IFRS 
application at a national level on all components of Australia’s foreign investment 
inflow, both aggregated and disaggregated, while at the same time taking into account 
the possible effects of other economic events (Chapter 6). 
  
   
70 
 
CHAPTER 4: Theoretical Framework and Research 
Question 
4.1 Introduction 
In June 2002, the Australian FRC made the decision to adopt IFRS on the 1
st
 the 
January, 2005. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, Australia chose to merge its GAAP 
with IFRS to create a set of global accounting standards that were suited specifically to 
Australian entities (A-IFRS), and these were applied at the national level (Nobes & 
Zeff, 2016; Taylor & Tower, 2009; Zeff & Nobes, 2010). The main purpose of A-IFRS 
was to facilitate cross-border investment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 
However, despite this optimistic goal, there was still a concern that the use of such 
standards might result in a reduction in the quality of financial reporting. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 stresses that, by improving both the quality and 
comparability of financial reporting, IFRS adoption reduced information asymmetry, 
thereby positively impacting foreign investment.
21
 However, some studies also point 
out that this impact differs according to the type of foreign investment. Moreover, they 
contend that a number of institutional factors, both exogenous and endogenous, such as 
legal systems and their enforcement regimes, taxation and political systems, extent of 
capital market development, and level of risk, can also affect the reaction of foreign 
investment to IFRS adoption.  
                                                          
21
 See, for example, Armstrong et al. (2010), Ashbaugh (2001), Barth et al. (2008), Bradshaw et 
al. (2004), Covrig et al. (2007), Daske et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2011), Leuz (2003).  
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The objective of this chapter is to develop a framework that depicts the effect of the 
converged standards (A-IFRS) on foreign investment inflows. Within this framework, a 
research question is developed to describe the link between A-IFRS application and 
foreign investment. Given that the effect of this application could differ according to 
the type of investment, the research question is further developed to describe the 
anticipated effect on each individual component of foreign investment.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 4.2, the research 
framework is developed, to demonstrate the effect of A-IFRS on foreign investment, 
while in Section 4.3, the research question regarding the relationship between A-IFRS 
and foreign investment inflows is provided. In Section 4.4, the A-IFRS event window is 
set. Finally, Section 4.5 presents a brief conclusion.  
4.2 A-IFRS – Foreign Investment Framework 
The objective of this thesis is to estimate directly the benefits derived from the 
application of A-IFRS by examining the changes in foreign investment, both equity and 
debt, around the date of this application. The main argument, here, is that A-IFRS 
benefits Australia by making it more attractive to foreign investors. This benefit is 
believed to be due to the improvement in financial reporting under such standards, 
which enables foreign capital providers to make better decisions regarding the 
allocation of their resources and the ways in which their investments may be improved 
(see Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4. 1: A-IFRS-Foreign Investment Framework 
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Figure 4.1 above illustrates how the qualitative characteristics of financial reporting, of 
which relevance and reliability are considered fundamental (SAC 3, 1990, paragraph 7), 
can affect foreign investment. For financial reporting to be value relevant, it must help 
decision makers to evaluate the past and present performance of an entity and 
accurately predict future events before making investment decisions. It should also 
provide feedback, either to confirm or correct these evaluations. However, because of 
the uncertainty about future events, the relevance of the information depends on its 
reliability. Information is considered reliable only when it represents faithfully the 
transaction events. Thus, relevant and reliable information will enhance the confidence 
of users when making decisions as it is free from error or bias (Hassan, 2004, p. 66). 
Empirical studies such as those by Cheong et al. (2010) and Chua et al. (2012) have 
found that A-IFRS increases the relevance and reliability of financial reporting. 
Although relevance and reliability are important, they are not sufficient to guarantee 
high-quality financial reporting. International comparability of information is also 
required to reduce the cost of its acquisition (Beneish et al., 2015; Brochet et al, 2013; 
DeFond, et al., 2011), thereby making foreign capital more mobile. Consistent with this 
notion, Ashbaugh (2001) and Bradshaw et al. (2004) found that there is more US 
investment in foreign companies whose accounting methods conform closely to those 
of the US GAAP. Further support is provided by Covrig et al. (2007) and Yu and 
Wahid (2014), who found that foreign mutual fund ownership is higher among 
companies using IFRS.  
Overall, by enhancing the quality of financial reporting, the application of A-IFRS 
should reduce information asymmetry and the cost of information acquisition, as well 
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as enhancing decision-making, thereby attracting more foreign investment. By focusing 
only on how A-IFRS changes the level of foreign investment inflows in each 
component, this thesis seeks to provide direct evidence of how A-IFRS accounting 
standards affect investment decisions by reducing information asymmetry among 
investors. However, this cannot be achieved unless there are high-quality accounting 
standards that are also more comparable. Therefore, in terms of these two 
characteristics, the tests are indirect in nature (see Armstrong et al., 2010; Wang & 
Welker, 2011; Yu & Wahid, 2014). 
Figure 4.1 shows a number of institutional factors, i.e., the legal standards system and 
the enforcement regime, which also affect the benefits of IFRS. For instance, when 
disclosure of important information is mandated, this reduces enforcement costs and 
limits the opportunities for management to manipulate a firm’s performance. 
Furthermore, a solid enforcement regime will reduce the cost of monitoring investments 
by providing incentives for entities to produce financial reporting that will be of a 
sufficiently high quality to satisfy the needs of outside investors (Bradshaw et al., 2004; 
Porta et al., 1998; Shim & Gordon, 2011). As discussed previously in Chapter 3, Akisik 
and Pfeiffer (2009), Amiram (2012), Cheong et al. (2010), Daske et al. (2008), and 
Florou and Kosi (2015) demonstrate consistently that the benefits of IFRS are more 
likely to be experienced in countries such as Australia, where the application of the 
standards is mandated by a strong legal standards system and backed by a robust 
enforcement regime. Studies, like the present one, that focus on a single country 
mitigate the need to control for the above institutional factors, as all entities in the same 
country must abide by the same rules. Nevertheless, such factors will be taken into 
account, particularly when the results are interpreted and compared with those of past 
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studies that focused on other countries. 
In addition, Figure 4.1 illustrates a number of economic factors; these were highlighted 
in previous studies as having a considerable effect on foreign investment. One of the 
major events that occurred within the A-IFRS implementation was the turnaround in the 
mining sector. This highlights the fact that the magnitude of the changes observed in the 
foreign inflow variables could be due to the commodity-price boom experienced by 
Australia. According to Connolly and Orsmond (2011), Kearns and Lowe (2011), and 
Minifie (2013), the mining boom caused a substantial increase in investment, with 
further investment still in the pipeline. The effects of these flows were felt through 
growth rates, rising interest rates, improved terms of trade, and appreciation of the 
Australian dollar to a 30-year high.
22
 The study controls for this economic event by 
using the following variables: RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXCH, and INT. These variables, 
their definitions, and the purpose of their use in this thesis are described in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
To summarise, within the framework of the present thesis, the fundamental question is 
whether the introduction of A-IFRS has resulted in information of a high quality being 
made available to foreign investors, or, put simply, whether foreign investment is more 
readily attracted when A-IFRS is used.  
                                                          
22
 Prior to this date, Australia had very low commodity-prices, and international companies 
such as Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton were underinvesting. In 2003, the price of resources, such 
as iron ore and coal, was rising. This created the mining boom that increased investment in the 
mining sector (Minifie, 2013). 
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4.3 Research Question 
Investors prefer to invest either in their own country or in a country with similar 
accounting standards, as, in both cases, their familiarity with the standards reduces the 
cost involved in acquiring or processing the financial information they need (e.g., 
Bradshaw et al., 2004). Therefore, it is not surprising that those economies that do not 
have in place a financial reporting system that can provide potential investors with 
relevant, reliable, and comparable information experience considerable difficulty in 
attracting foreign investment (Akisik & Pfeiffer, 2009). Therefore, conceptually, the 
main benefit of IFRS is likely to be the lower transaction costs associated with foreign 
investment and trade. These will flow from the decrease in information asymmetry that 
results from the greater homogeneity of such global accounting standards. According to 
this conceptual viewpoint, Australia may benefit from A-IFRS, in the following way. 
The use of IFRS by Australia’s trading partners, such as the EU, together with 
increased global acceptance of, and familiarity with, these standards by others could 
enhance information symmetry among investors, both local and foreign. This, in turn, 
would minimise the necessity for such investors to incur search costs in assessing the 
information required to evaluate firms’ financial and management performance. The 
ultimate benefit would be reduced risk and, hence, more foreign investment in 
Australia.  
Prior to 2005, the main argument against the use of IAS in Australia was that the 
standards were inferior in quality to the Australian national standards (A-GAAP). This, 
together with the fact that they were not globally accepted, meant that IAS was 
considered to be of no value to Australia (e.g., Collett et al., 2001). However, this 
perception changed in 2005, when IFRS became mandatory in many countries and 
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acceptable in others (Whittington, 2005). In addition, this was also the year in which 
substantial changes to IFRS – the result of an improvement project initiated by the 
IASB – became effective (see Chapter 2). In view of these developments, the 
government now judged that the time was right for Australia to begin using IFRS. This 
thesis establishes the research question as follows: 
Are foreign investment inflows to Australia significantly higher following the 
introduction of A-IFRS? 
In keeping with the aim of this thesis, this section examines how A-IFRS increases each 
of the debt and equity components of foreign investment inflow.  Such a disaggregated 
approach is important because, according to previous studies, investors are not equal in 
terms of their objectives, needs, or even their roles in the entities and, therefore, may 
react differently to any reduction in information asymmetry (Ball et al, 2015; Benish et 
al., 2015; Goldstein & Razin, 2006; Márquez-Ramos, 2011; Razin et al., 1998).  
4.3.1 A-IFRS and Foreign Equity  
The equity flows can be examined through two lenses i.e., those of portfolio equity and 
direct equity. According to Goldstein and Razin (2006), portfolio equity represents 
outside investors who own less than 10% of a company's shares and so cannot access its 
private information. Therefore, they depend more on public information. In contrast, 
direct equity represents inside investors who own 10% or more of the shares and so 
have access to inside information. Armstrong et al. (2010) and Shima and Gordon 
(2011) claim that in countries with strong legal enforcement, IFRS has a positive 
impact on portfolio equity. The combination of a strong enforcement regime and high-
quality financial reporting is an incentive for outside investors, as it reduces monitoring 
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and information processing costs. Yu and Wahid (2014), therefore, conclude that the 
international harmonisation of accounting reporting systems is vital for attracting 
foreign equity.  However, there is no clear evidence of an increase in direct equity, in 
developed countries following IFRS adoption. This is consistent with the arguments 
advanced by Goldstein and Razin (2006), Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006), that those who 
invest in direct equity have privileged access to company information, and are not 
dependent on public information. It can be inferred from this that investors in portfolio 
equity are more exposed to information asymmetry and adverse selection than those 
who invest in direct equity. The greater availability of public information under A-
IFRS, therefore, should affect portfolio equity more than direct equity. 
In sum, this thesis investigates the effect of A-IFRS application on foreign equity, 
disaggregated into portfolio equity and direct equity. In this way, it can address the 
contradictions apparent in the literature, which arise from studying inflows of both 
these components, together. 
4. 3.2 A-IFRS and Foreign Debt 
The application of A-IFRS may affect debt providers by enhancing public information, 
which, in turn, would allow lenders to estimate the quality of credit more accurately. 
Such an effect is examined in this thesis through five lenses: those of foreign direct debt 
(FDD), foreign portfolio debt (FPD), foreign loans (FL), foreign derivatives (FDR), and 
other foreign debt (OFD). 
Foreign Direct Debt 
FDD is the debt between affiliates of the same MNC. Therefore, those who invest in 
FDD are considered to be inside investors. Since, as such, they have the right to access 
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inside information, it was initially expected that, like FDE, FDD would remain 
unaffected by the use of A-IFRS. Nevertheless, studies have that international tax 
structures can have a considerable influence on MNCs’ financial accounting policies 
concerning their financial decision-making, especially in relation to FDD. This is due to 
the potential of such structures to impact a company’s cash flow and thereby its bottom 
line (e.g., Kayis-Kumar, 2015). In view of this key role played by tax in determining 
the financial outcomes for MNCs, it is hardly surprising that they are motivated to 
avoid paying as much tax as possible.
23
 They do this by shifting profits to low-tax 
countries, using a number of different methods:  estimation methods, transfer-pricing 
methods, used for goods and services, and the use of internal debt (FDD) between their 
affiliates (e.g. De Simone, 2016). However, IFRS requires consistent methods of 
estimating, and the disclosure of any subsequent changes in these methods, as well as 
increased comparability, in conjunction with an increase in the frequency of transfer-
pricing audits, under IFRS (e.g., Ernst &Young, 2005; Taylor et al., 2011). These 
requirements should in fact, have reduced the use of the estimation and transfer-pricing 
methods for goods and services. Consequently, if the increase in profit shifting stems 
mainly from the use of FDD as the only legal way for MNCs to shift their profits, the 
increase could be considered to be the result of increased information transparency. A 
limited number of studies have investigated this relationship between IFRS and FDD. 
For instance, Márquez-Ramos (2011) identified a significant increase in direct debt in 
                                                          
23
 Profit-shifting results in a difference between an entity’s reported income and its actual 
income. The income from production is under-reported/over-reported in countries with 
relatively high/low tax rates, because the firm claims lower/higher than market prices for intra-
firm international shipments of its products. Inversely, internal purchases may be under-
reported/over -reported (Bartelsman & Beetsman, 2000). 
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the EU, following its adoption of IFRS, which, she notes, could be associated with the 
decrease in information asymmetry. In addition, Taylor and Richardson (2014) found 
that, in Australia, MNCs are subject to thin capitalisation. Therefore, based on the 
above discussion and the findings of these previous studies, the effect of A-IFRS on 
FDD is essentially an empirical issue.  
Foreign Portfolio Debt and Loans 
Like portfolio equity, investment in FPD and FL is considered to be the domain of 
outside investors who depend on public information. Yet, studies point out that the 
financial reporting that satisfies the needs of the equity market may not be as useful to 
the debt market (e.g., Ball et al., 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2014). This is because, while 
using financial reporting to evaluate shares is the priority for shareholders, debt 
providers use it to evaluate the financial performance of the entity and monitor the 
conditions of the contract. Therefore, the effect on the equity market, of using IFRS 
cannot be extrapolated directly to the debt market (e.g., Ball et al., 2015; Florou & 
Kosi, 2014). These studies also identify two important needs of debt providers: 
relevance and reliability. Under the agreement between the company and its debt 
provider, financial reporting is used by the provider to control the conditions of their 
contract and evaluate the firm’s financial position, by which they can estimate risk. In 
order to do this, the firm must provide reliable information (e.g., Ball et al., 2008; Ball 
et al., 2015).  
There is considerable debate about whether or not A-IFRS is able to meet this need, 
especially in regard to their recognition and measurement rules under fair value 
accounting (e.g. 138 and 139) (e.g., Ball, et al, 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015). On the one 
hand, such accounting can enhance the public information environment by reducing the 
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opportunities for managers to hide bad news (agency problem), as well as providing 
investors with more timely and up-to-date asset values that accurately reflect the true 
financial performance of their companies. Consequently, if using A-IFRS provides the 
more relevant and reliable information considered essential by debt providers, the 
expectation is that using A-IFRS will lead to an increase in foreign debt (Ball et al., 
2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015). On the other hand, it is argued that the use of fair value, 
under IFRS may reduce the reliability of financial reporting, thereby increasing 
information asymmetry. This is because the use of fair value may result in the 
recognition of unrealised economic gains, such as those from trading-securities and 
other financial instruments. In addition, IFRS require the recognition, in income 
statements, of transitory losses and gains from the use of fair value, which may impair 
the usefulness of such figures for decision-making (Ball et al., 2015; Florou & Kosi, 
2015). Furthermore, as the standards also require the extensive use of unverifiable 
estimates and judgements, concerning the valuation of assets and liabilities, there can 
be increased opportunities for entities to manipulate balance sheets and earnings 
(earnings management), thereby reducing their reliability. Because of this, financial 
reporting under A-IFRS may not be useful for debt providers (Ball et al., 2015).  
 In their studies, which examined the association between IFRS and portfolio debt, 
Beneish et al. (2015) and Florou and Kosi (2015) found a significant, positive result. 
Similarly, Chen et al. (2015) and Kim et al. (2011) identified a significant, positive 
relationship between IFRS and foreign loan. In addition, Australian studies found no 
evidence of a reduction in the relevance or reliability in financial reporting, under A-
IFRS (e.g., Cairns et al., 2011; Cheong et al., 2010; Chua et al., 2012; Jeanjean & 
Stolowy, 2008). In view of these findings, the present study anticipates an increase in 
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both portfolio debt and loans after the use of A-IFRS. 
Foreign Derivatives 
The next type of foreign debt is FDR. The use of these by an entity usually entails risk. 
This could be either financial in nature, stemming from changes in the circumstances of 
the business itself, or it may be economic risk that arises from changes in the external 
economic environment. Since such risk can cause earnings volatility, which has the 
potential to negatively influence a firm’s performance (Hassan, 2004), it provides 
managers with a strong incentive to use derivative debt to minimise the risk, thereby 
increasing their firms’ value and, ultimately, maximising shareholder value (Hassan, 
2004; Taylor et al., 2011). However, to ensure that managers do not act 
opportunistically, they must provide more quantitative and qualitative disclosure, which 
in turn will reduce the cost of information for investors (Birt et al., 2013; Hassan, 2004; 
Taylor et al, 2011). In addition, entities can trade derivatives in capital markets by 
selling and buying the risk in expected cash flows (IMF, 2009, paragraph 5.80). 
Keeping in mind that the main objectives of financial reporting are assist users to 
identify the level of risk involved in their investment and understand the risk 
management policies of entities, any increase in the disclosure related to such 
investment could affect the expected rate of return that financial-report users demand 
from that entity, thereby impacting upon their decision-making. 
Birt et al. (2013) suggest that extensive disclosure of risk results in greater transparency 
of financial reporting, which enables investors to estimate precisely the level of risk 
carried by both their existing and potential investments. Taylor et al. (2010) best 
summaries this by stating that, in disclosing risk, firms are providing value-relevant 
information. Consistent with this, the expectation, here, is that the higher levels of 
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disclosure under A-IFRS, in conjunction with greater international comparability, will 
encourage more foreign investment in derivatives.   
Other Foreign Debt 
The final debt component is OFD. According to the IMF (2009), this type of debt 
includes currency and deposits, other payable accounting, and credit debt, from both 
financial and non-financial firms. The IFRS conceptual framework states that “[t]he 
objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information 
about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and 
other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity” (IASB, 
2010, p.9). Yet, to date, there is virtually no evidence of how other credit is affected by 
the use of IFRS. The expectation is that lower information asymmetry, under IFRS, 
increases foreign credit debt; however, this only becomes significant “where there is 
less trust between parties” (Li et al., 2017). Li et al. (2017) suggest that, in countries 
that already had high quality accounting standards before IFRS as well as strong 
enforcement, there is no trust issue between the firm and the other debt providers. This 
notion is supported by the findings of theoretical financial studies that, unlike 
traditional debt, which typically relies on debt covenants or financial reporting to 
protect the debt, other debt relies more on trust arising from close, long-term 
relationships between debtors and creditors (e.g., Cuñat, 2007; Love, 2011; Nilsen, 
2002). Most financial empirical evidence on this topic indicates consistently that firms 
increase their demand for short-term credit, either when public debt providers are 
suffering from information asymmetry or when the firms themselves are trying to cope 
with a financial squeeze (e.g., Abad et al., 2017). 
In keeping with this, in situations in which high information asymmetry exists or where 
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there are financial difficulties, more other debt will be used. This is because the 
relationship between other debt providers and entities is based on trust arising from 
their long-term relationship, which enables the former to access private information 
about the latter. Therefore, if A-IFRS enhances the information environment, it may 
well have no effect on other debt. Accordingly, the question of the effect of A-IFRS on 
OFD is an empirical issue. 
To summaries, in this section, the question of whether Australia’s foreign investment 
inflows increased after the use A-IFRS due to the reduction in information asymmetry 
faced by foreign investors is formulated. If there was an increase, a significant positive 
change in foreign investment, around 2005, can be expected.  
It is important to reiterate, at this stage that, while the literature shows that the benefit 
of IFRS stems from both the standards being of higher quality and the financial 
reporting being presented in a form that is more familiar to investors, this thesis focuses 
on how A-IFRS increased the level of foreign investment inflows in each component. 
Thus, it provides direct evidence of how A-IFRS accounting standards affect 
investment decisions by reducing information asymmetry among investors. On the 
other hand, the presence of a high quality of financial reporting under A-IFRS can only 
be extrapolated from the evidence of any increase in foreign investment around 2005. 
More details are provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.4 Setting the Event Window  
The most critical step in this investigation is to identify the A-IFRS event window. The 
time frame within which any effect of A-IFRS on Australia’s foreign investment will 
appear in the various components of that inflow. The process of arriving at the most 
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feasible time frame for this is a complex one. This involves a general review of the 
timeline of the implementation process. Careful consideration of a number of other 
factors that can influence the timing of the effect, such as the type of foreign investment 
components and the effect of other economic events that were concurrent with A-IFRS 
application, are needed. 
The convergence process began on 3
rd
 of July 2002, when the FRC of Australia 
announced that the use of the Australian equivalents of IFRS (i.e., A-IFRS) would be 
applied as of the financial period beginning on or after 1
st
 of January 2005. 
Subsequently, the AASB issued AASB1: First-time Application of Australian 
Equivalents to IFRSs. Australian entities were required to restate their financial 
statements according to the A-IFRS for the period ending on 31
st
 December, 2004. In 
addition, they were requested to reconcile their financial statements under A-GAAP to 
those under A-IFRS, for the opening balance on 1
st
 of January 2004, and the end-of-
year balance on 31
st
 of December 2004, and provide an explanation of any adjustments 
made, particularly those under AASB 139. Under AASB 1, entities were allowed to 
apply the requirements set out in the guide to the application of AASB 139, regarding 
the ways in which the fair value of financial instruments is determined. The subsequent 
gains and losses are treated, either: “[1)] prospectively, to transactions entered into 
after 25 October 2002, to align the relief with US GAAP requirements [; or 2)] 
prospectively, to transactions entered into after 1 January 2004.” (Deloitte, 2005).24 
According to Bradbury (2008), there was no Australian equivalent standard of AASB 
139 before the decision was made to change over to A-IFRS. This means that the 
                                                          
24
 https://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/au/2005-02.pdf  
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financial reporting for the period during which A-IFRS was applied for the first time 
would provide incremental information for decision-makers. Wang and Welker (2011) 
state that the first report under AASB 1, on 30
th
 of June, should have contained 
sufficiently detailed information to enable users to understand any adjustments to the 
balance sheet, and profit and loss accounts. 
Moreover, to ensure that investors were provided with information regarding the likely 
impact of A-IFRS on the financial position and operating results of entities, AASB 
1047: Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting Australian Equivalents to International 
Financial Reporting Standards was issued by the AASB in April 2004. This standard 
was implemented in a two-step process, over the first two years following the initial 
application of A-IFRS. The first step concerned the annual or mid-year reporting, on, or 
after, 30
th
 of Jun 2004, in which the entities were requested to disclose information 
about how they had managed the transition to A-IFRS, and about what they perceived 
to be the key differences between their accounting policies under the A-GAAP and 
those under A-IFRS. In the second step, for the annual or mid-year reporting, on, or 
after, 30
th
 of June 2005, entities were required to disclose any identified or reliably 
estimated changes to their financial statements that occurred under A-IFRS (AASB, 
2004; Commonwealth, 2002; Jubb, 2005; Wang & Welker, 2011).  
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASE) required mid-year reports to be provided 
within 75 days of the half-year mark, while annual reports were to be made available 
within three months of the end of the fiscal year. This meant that the change-over 
period to A-IFRS for Australian reporting entities was 2004Q3, the quarter in which the 
first mid-year financial reports were available for public use.  
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A number of factors may also influence when the effect of A-IFRS manifests itself. For 
instance, while the effect of IFRS adoption was an overall increase in foreign 
investment flows, this effect may have differed from component to component for such 
investments. According to Ball et al (2008) and Beneish et al. (2015), debt providers are 
more sensitive to accounting information and, accordingly, are more prolific consumers 
of it than investors in portfolio equity. In addition, Florou and Kosi (2015) state that 
information asymmetry may affect loan providers less that portfolio debt providers, as 
the former are informationally advantaged due to their ability to access inside 
information and holding equity and have access to insider information. Therefore, the 
expectation is that the effect of A-IFRS on foreign portfolio debt will have manifested 
itself earlier than the effect on other components after the mid-year comparative 
financial reports were issued, i.e., in or after 2004Q3, if the information contained in 
such reports was relevant and reliable. This trend may also have been followed by loans 
and equity.  
With regard to direct equity and direct debt, the expectation is that neither will show an 
effect of A-IFRS, as both are considered to be the domains of internal investors who 
have access to inside information. However, if the direct debt was related to profit-
transfer, it is expected that the effect will appear after the date on which use of A-IFRS 
was mandated, i.e., with a lag. This is because, after this, there would have been limited 
opportunity or none at all, for MNCs to use transfer pricing, or any of the estimation 
methods, to transfer their profits. Thus, the only way for them to do this would have 
been by using internal debt between their affiliates. 
Regarding derivatives, many of the studies reviewed in Chapter 3 provide evidence that 
their use is associated with risk. Therefore, the studies suggest that, to invest in 
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derivatives, investors need to have access to a greater quantity of high-quality 
information regarding the associated risk (Taylor et al., 2010). To meet this need, in 
2005, the IASB issued IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures, for adoption on 1
st
 
of January, 2007. Later, the AASB issued AASB 7, to be implemented on the same date, 
the purpose of which was to provide investors in derivatives with information about the 
nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments. The main requirement 
under AASB 7 is that entities provide a greater quantity, as well as a higher quality, of 
disclosure concerning risk and the role played by fair value, especially in relation to 
financial derivatives (Birt et al., 2013; Chung et al., 2012). In view of this, it is 
predicted that there will be evidence of a substantial effect on foreign investment in 
derivatives after the implementation of AASB 7, in 2007. 
Regarding other foreign debt, while the suggestion is that accounting information, 
especially under IFRS, plays an important role in the decisions made by those who 
provide such debt, such as suppliers, for instance (e.g., Hail et al., 2010), there is 
insufficient evidence to support this. Therefore, the issue of whether the effect of A-
IFRS on other foreign debt is to be anticipated with a lead or a lag is an empirical one. 
Based on the above discussion, and because the various components of foreign 
investment may have reacted differently to the reduction in information asymmetry that 
followed A-IFRS application, the period 2004Q3-2007Q3 is chosen as the window 
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during which any structural break associated with this application, is likely to appear 
(see Figure 4.1).
25
   
As this thesis covers a 24-year period (1989–2012), it is anticipated that Australia’s 
foreign investment inflows may also show evidence of the effects of other economic 
events that occurred during this time, including the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 
1997-1998, and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. These events are tabled in 
Figure 4.2. 
                                                          
25
 After 2007Q3, it is expected that foreign investment flows will show evidence of the negative 
effect of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
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Figure 4. 2: A-IFRS Event Window and Other Economic Events over the Period 1989–2012 
 
1989 1993-
1995 
GFL 
& 
1997-
1998 
2000 3 Jun 2002 2003 1 Jan 
2004 
30 Jun 2004 31 Dec 2004 30 Jun 
2005 
15 
Sep 
2005 
31 Dec 
2005 
31 Mar 
2006 
1 Jan 2007 2008 2012 
 MFC AFC GST Announcement 
of the 
application of 
A-IFRS 
CPB Date of 
transition 
opening 
audited 
balance 
sheet 
under A-
IFRS for 
the entity 
that 
prepares 
its half-
year 
reported 
for the 
period 
ending 
30 Jun 
2005 
Half-year 
comparatives. 
The first time 
of 
implementing 
AASB 1, 
AASB 1047, 
AASB 139, 
AASB 132. 
Full-year 
comparatives  
First half-
year A-
IFRS 
compliant 
report 
required 
Dead 
line 
of 
the 
first 
half-
year 
A-
IFRS 
First full-
year A-
IFRS 
compliant 
report 
required, 
and restated 
comparative 
for the full 
year ending 
31 Dec 
2004 
Deadline 
for filling 
the first 
full-year 
A-IFRS 
compliant 
report 
First time of 
implementing 
AASB 7 in 
Jan 
GFC  
Note: GFL= Global Financial Liberalisation, MFC= Mexican Financial Crisis, AFC= Asian Financial Crisis, GST= Goods and Service Tax, CPB= Commodity-Price 
Boom, GFC= Global Financial Crisis. 
 
(see: AASB, 2004, Armstrong et al., 2010; Birt et al., 2013; Commonwealth, 2002; Wang & Welker, 2011). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The present thesis examines the effects of the introduction of A-IFRS, a set of high-quality 
accounting standards, on foreign investment inflows. When the decision was made for 
Australia to use A-IFRS, it was expected that these standards would remove the financial 
barriers faced by foreign investors wanting to invest in Australia, by providing more 
relevant, reliable, and globally comparable financial reporting.  
Consequently, to address the objective of the present study, this chapter developed a broad 
theoretical framework that focused on foreign investment inflows. A question was 
developed to examine the association between A-IFRS and foreign investment inflows, in 
equity and debt. Both the framework and question draw on Australian and international, 
accounting and financial studies in the areas of IFRS/A-IFRS, investment and financial 
reporting quality. 
The following chapters (5 and 6) each detail the data collected and the specific research 
method used to investigate the research question formulated in this chapter, before finally 
presenting the results. 
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CHAPTER 5: Descriptive Statistics and Structural 
Break Test 
5.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter, by means of various structural break tests, I investigate whether A-IFRS 
affects Australian foreign investment inflows. It is a known fact that any event associated 
with policy change, a phenomenon identified by economic theory, can result in a structural 
break. As the introduction of A-IFRS in 2005 may be viewed as a policy change, a 
structural break test can be carried out to determine whether any break that is identified in 
the foreign investment inflow series may be associated with the date of the A-IFRS 
application, and whether that break is positive or negative.  
Before carrying out the structural break test, it is important to understand the trend and 
pattern of each of the selected variables. Therefore, this chapter first examines the time- 
series properties of the components of foreign investment inflows, both at the aggregated 
and disaggregated levels to see if there is any visual impression of a structural break due to 
the introduction of A-IFRS, or any other economic events.   
The traditional unit root test is used to check the stationarity of the foreign investment 
inflow series.  A policy change such as the use of A-IFRS can result in a structural break 
that may make an otherwise stationary series appear non-stationary.  One of the aims of 
this chapter is to test for unit root, in the presence of a structural break in the foreign 
investment inflow variables. Here, firstly, I apply an exogenously determined structural 
break of 2005Q3, as the date on which the first mid-year financial reporting, under A-
IFRS, was available for public use (see Section 4.4 for details). Next, rather than pre-
selecting the date, I use the unknown-structural-break approach, adopted from the 
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macroeconomic literature, to determine the break date, endogenously.  Since the sample 
period covers 24 years (1989Q1
__
2012Q4), more than one structural break is anticipated, 
so, the use of the multiple structural break test is deemed appropriate. Finally, I pinpoint 
the timing of any breaks that manifest themselves and then determine whether they can be 
associated with A-IFRS application. For each of the inflow variables, I confirm whether 
the coefficient of the structural-break dummy is positive or negative. If the values are 
significant and positive, I can conclude that the foreign investment inflows increased 
following the introduction of A-IFRS.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 presents the data, followed by the 
descriptive statistics. Then, in Section 5.3, the stationarity and unit root tests are applied in 
order to determine whether the data are stationary or have a unit root, with or without 
trend. In Section 5.4, the structural break tests are applied to indicate the structural break 
date both exogenously and endogenously. Finally, a conclusion of the results is presented 
in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides an overview of the trend and pattern of each component of 
Australia’s foreign investment inflow. As shown in Table 5.1, the flow, measured in US 
dollars, is a quarterly series, compiled by the IMF and made available on the International 
Investment Position Statistics database.
26
  Foreign inflows to Australia are divided broadly 
into total foreign equity flow and debt flow.
  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the total equity 
inflow is further disaggregated into direct equity and portfolio equity inflows, while the 
                                                          
26
 The data is also available on the database of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), in AU$.  
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total debt inflow is disaggregated into direct debt, portfolio debt, derivatives, loans, and 
other foreign debt.   
In this section, we describe the various types of foreign investment flow to Australia and 
discuss the role played by public information in investment decision-making. The 
disaggregated series allows us to assess the effect of A-IFRS use on each variable and to 
determine whether this effect differs from one variable to another. Table 5.1 presents the 
stocks of various types of foreign investment and their definitions, which are similar to 
those described in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual.   
 
Table 5.  1: Foreign investment inflows to Australia 
Variables Definitions 
 FPE Foreign portfolio equity is equity investments in Australian projects by foreign 
corporations, where the investment constitutes less than 10 % of the common 
shares. 
FDE Foreign direct equity is equity investments, of non-residents in Australian 
corporations when there is ownership of 10 % or more of the common shares. 
FDD Foreign direct debt is short- and long-term borrowing from non-resident 
(foreign) corporations and their affiliates by Australian residents. 
FPD Foreign portfolio debt is short- and long-term debt of Australian residents 
owed to and by foreigners. 
FL Foreign loans of Australian residents owed to non-residents.  
FDR Foreign derivatives owed by Australian residents. 
OFD Other foreign debt is all other debt not mentioned above. 
TFE Total foreign equity (TFE): FDE + FPE. 
TFD Total foreign debt (TFD): FDD + FPD +FDR + FL + OFD. 
TFI Total foreign investment (TFI): TFE + TFD 
Sources of data: Balance of Payment and International Investment Position Statistics 
(BOP/IIP).   http://data.imf.org/?sk=7A51304B-6426-40C0-83DD-CA473CA1FD52. 
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Total Foreign Investment  
Figure 5.1 depicts Australia’s TFI and its disaggregated components, that is, TFD and 
TFE. For the period 1989–2015, it shows an increase in TFI, which reflects the 
dependence of the Australian economy on foreign investment to close the investment 
savings gap. This is a common feature of developed countries. It appears that the increase 
was more rapid from 2002 onwards.  Likewise, both TFD and TFE show a general upward 
trend after 2002.  
Figure 5.  1: Australia’s Total Foreign Investment (TFI) disaggregated as Total Debt 
(TFD) and Total Equity (TFE) in US$bn, 1989-2015 
 
Source: calculated from IIP data. 
Figure 5.2 indicates that, during the period examined in this study, total foreign debt (TFD) 
constituted the largest portion of foreign investment inflows (TFI) to Australia. During the 
Global Financial Liberalisation (GFL) period of 1993–1994, total equity (TFE) as a 
proportion of total investment increased by 5%. During the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 
of 1997–1999, total equity (TFE) and total debt (TFD) both decreased, as shown in Figure 
5.1; however, TFE was affected to a lesser degree than TFD. This suggests that the latter 
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was more vulnerable to the effects of the AFC, than the former, and these series only 
reverts to their long-term trend around 2001-2002, following the financial turmoil in the 
US markets. During the growth period, from 2002 to 2007, total debt (TFD) and total 
equity (TFE) remained stable at 59% and 41%, respectively, of total investment. This 
suggests that both were affected in a similar way.
27
 The period of growth was followed by 
a major but short-term decline, both in debt and equity flows, during the GFC of 2007–
2009, and by the very end of this period, equity was affected more than debt, by almost 
10% of the total investment. 
It is evident, from Figures 5.1 and 5.2, that focusing only on total foreign inflows masks 
the behaviour of the disaggregated series. Therefore, in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the effects of A-IFRS on foreign investment inflows, it is essential to 
analyse the disaggregated foreign investment inflows, as well.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Previous studies (e.g., Vermeulen & De Haan, 2014)  use either a ratio, or net foreign investment 
to explain the behaviour of foreign capital flows. However, a comparison of Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
reveals that the behaviour of TFE and TFD during the period 2002Q4 to 2007Q4 is obscured by 
netting one against the other. To avoid a loss of information, therefore, it is preferable to study the 
time sequences of the components, separately, as gross amounts.  
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Figure 5.  2: Total Foreign Debt and Total Foreign Equity as a Percentage of Total Foreign 
Investment, and the Growth rate 
 
 
Source: calculated from IIP data. 
Equity Investment 
The behaviour of total equity (TFE), and its components, portfolio equity (FPE) and direct 
equity (FDE) are shown in Figure 5.3. There is a notable fluctuation in the performance of 
both components, with considerable growth after 2002, followed by a dip in 2008, due to 
the GFC. Another decline in the equity series, especially of FDE, can be observed around 
2012.
28
 
 
                                                          
28
 This could be due to the decline in commodity-prices, after the boom of 2012 (see, 
https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2016/sp-ag-2016-09-13.html. 
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Figure 5.  3: Total Foreign Equity (TFI) Disaggregated as Foreign Direct Equity (FDE) 
and Foreign Portfolio Equity (FPE) in US$bn, 1989-2015 
 
Source: calculated from IIP data. 
Debt Investment 
In Figure 5.4, total foreign debt (TFD) is made up of five distinct components: (1) direct 
debt (FDD), (2) portfolio debt (FPD), (3) derivative (FDR), (4) loans (FL) and (5) other 
debt (OFD). FPD constitutes the largest portion of TFD. After 2002, all components 
increased slightly. During the GFC period, FPD appears to be affected more than any other 
component. However, this effect was only short-lived, around 2008, after which it 
experienced a rapid increase in inflows.  
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Figure 5.  4: Total Foreign Debt (TFD) Disaggregated to Different Components in US$bn, 
1989-2015 
 
Source: Calculated from IIP data. 
There is an interesting observation to be made from the above figures. As all the preceding 
figures are based on raw data, they can give a misleading impression of the growth of the 
various components of foreign investment inflow. This growth appears to be exponential, a 
basic feature of many economic time series. However, after the data is transformed into 
logs, the patterns of growth, in all the series appear to be nearly linear. For example, in 
Figure 5.5, the log-transformed data clearly depicts these patterns in TFI inflows as being 
almost linear.
29
 Another notable feature of Figure 5.5 is that, from the end of 2002 through 
to the beginning of 2008, TFI grows at a greater rate than its long-run trend, which is a 
feature common to most of the component variables. This is consistent with the 
expectation that Australia’s foreign investment inflows increased after the application of 
A-IFRS. The statistical tests, reported in Section 5.4 seek to confirm this expectation. 
However, because other contemporaneous events, such as the commodity-price boom, 
                                                          
29
 See the graphs for the other variables, in Appendix B 
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which are detailed in Figure 4.2, occurred close to the A-IFRS event window (in 2003), 
they may provide an alternative explanation for the increase in Australia’s foreign 
investment inflows at this time. In addition, as is evident in all figures, the financial crises 
that occurred during the period of the study also affected, to varying degrees, the 
behaviour of the individual components of foreign investment, an effect that, if ignored, 
could cause the results of the study to be biased.  
Another interesting observation from the figures depicting raw and log data, is that after 
2012, there is a significant change in the pattern of the time series. As this event is outside 
the period of interest to this thesis, and could potentially affect the outcome of the study, 
data from 2013 to 2015 are omitted from the tests. 
It would seem that none of the time series under consideration are stationary in their raw 
form. However, Figure 5.5 suggests that the data fluctuate around a deterministic trend. 
Therefore, in the next section, in order to clarify the true behaviour of the data, application 
of a logarithm is followed by the traditional unit-root tests to determine whether the 
variables are stationary or non-stationary, with or without trend. This is a preliminary step 
to the empirical analysis of the structural break test. 
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Figure 5.  5: Time Sequences of the Total Foreign Investment Inflow, US$ bn, in Natural 
Logs, 1989 – 2015. 
 
 
5.3 Stationarity and Unit Root Test 
It is said that a time series is stationary if its mean, variance and auto-covariance are not 
dependent on time. Variables with means and variance that change over time, are known 
as non-stationary or unit-root variables (Glynn, Perera, & Verma, 2007). The unit-root test 
is particularly important in the present study, as it determines the type of structural-break 
method to use, in order to identify the date of the change in the time series. By including 
the trend in non-trending data, some of this change may be absorbed, producing spurious 
results (Piehl, Cooper, Braga, & Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, before testing for a structural 
break, it is essential to determine whether the data is stationary, with or without trend.  
In this section, two sets of tests are applied. The first, which treats the unit root as the null 
hypothesis, includes both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips and Perron 
(PP) unit root tests, while the second treats stationarity as the null hypothesis. This set 
includes The Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, which is used in this 
thesis. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) tests 
The first to be applied are the ADF and PP tests. The PP statistics are non-parametric 
versions of the ADF statistics, so their asymptotic distribution remains unaffected by serial 
correlation (Bartholdy, Peare, & Willett, 2000). Two versions of each test are applied, 
where: 
ADF models: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡   5.1 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡   5.2 
PP models: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 +  𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡    5.3 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝛽𝑡 +  𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     5.4 
In all, the null hypothesis is equivalent to: 
H0: 𝛼 = 0                                (i.e., the data has a unit root)  
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H1: 𝛼 < 0                                (i.e., the data has no unit root) 
 
where ∆ is the first-difference operator, 𝑦𝑡 is the foreign investment flow series, t is the 
time trend, and l is the number of lags to ensure that the error term, 𝜀𝑡  , is a white-noise 
disturbance and 𝑡 = 1 … , 𝑇 is the time period. Equations 5.1 and 5.3 include intercept(𝑢), 
while equations 5.2 and 5.4 include intercept (𝑢) and trend(𝑡).  
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Table 5.2 shows the results for ADF and PP, for both the aggregated and disaggregated 
series, with intercept, and intercept and trend. For each test, columns 1 and 2 show the t-
statistic value of the autoregressive coefficient (α), and column 3 shows the trend 
coefficient (β) (its t-statistic value is reported in parentheses). The null hypothesis of the 
unit root is rejected if the t-statistic for α is greater than the critical value (the critical 
values are provided in the footnote of Table 5.2). As expected, the results are mixed. The 
existence of a unit root is not rejected in any of the tests when only the intercept is 
included (Column 1 of each test). Although, when the trend (β) is included (Columns 3 of 
each test), the t-statistic values for the coefficient (α) are enhanced (Columns 2 of each 
test), the unit root hypothesis is only rejected for TFE and FDR under the ADF, and FDR 
and FPE under the PP test; however, it is only at the 10% level. All series (except FPD) 
show a significant positive trend at the 10% level or better, which supports the visual 
impression given by the graph in Figure 5.5. 
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Table 5.  2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test 
Results 
test ADF PP 
model Intercept Intercept and trend Intercept Intercept and trend 
Coefficients α α β α α Β 
Total Foreign 
Investment 
TFI 1.1912 -1.66 0.0023* 
(1.9312) 
0.4828 -1.88 0.0017* 
(1.8985) 
Total Foreign Equity TFE 0.3895 -3.20 0.0051*** 
(3.1910) 
-0.278 -3.02 0.0043*** 
(2.7669) 
Total Foreign Debt TFD 1.2485 -1.31 0.0011* 
(1.6859) 
1.1108 -1.39 0.0011* 
(1.6859) 
Foreign Portfolio 
Equity 
FPE -0.888 -2.52 0.0091** 
(2.4304) 
-0.832 -3.24 0.0058*** 
(2.770) 
Foreign Direct Equity FDE 0.330 -1.95 0.0023** 
(2.116) 
0.0582 -2.16 0.0023** 
(2.218) 
Foreign Direct Debt FDD 1.3739 -1.25 0.00123** 
(1.9976) 
1.5121 -1.20 0.00123** 
(1.998) 
Foreign Portfolio Debt FPD 0.3220 -1.49 0.0011 
(1.6283) 
0.6405 -1.49 0.0011 
(1.525) 
Foreign Loan FL -0.105 -1.50 0.00093* 
(1.65938) 
-0.105 -1.50 0.0009* 
(1.659) 
Foreign Derivative FDR -0.482 -3.24* 0.0140*** 
(3.225) 
-0.473 -3.23* 0.0118*** 
(3.336) 
Other Foreign Debt OFD 1.4097 -2.36 0.0058** 
(2.567) 
0.9716 -2.87 0.0052*** 
(3.0375) 
Note: 
Critical value; ADF = -3.500, -2.8922, -2.583192, PP = -3.5006, -2.8922, -2.583192 with intercept 
only, and ADF= -4.058, -3.458, -3.155, PP = -4.0576, -3. 457, -3.154 with intercept and trend, at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
In the ADF tests, in order to select the optimal lag length (l), the t test criterion approach is used. 
This involves starting with a pre-determined upper bound l max. If the last included lag is significant, 
l max is chosen. However, if l is not significant, it is incrementally reduced by one lag at a time until 
the lags become significant. If no lags are significant, l is set at zero. The test is employed with l =11, 
which is (𝑁𝑖 × 12 100⁄ ), where 𝑁𝑖 is the number of observations in each series. Also, a asymptotic 
critical value of approximately 5% is used to determine the significance of the t-statistic on the last 
lag (Perron, 1997). 
In the PP tests, the Bartlett kernel estimation method is selected (default method), and to control the 
lag length, Andrew’s Bandwidth is used. 
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There have been some criticisms of these two tests. For example, Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt, and Shin (1992) hold that the existence of a unit root is the null hypothesis of 
these tests, and in classical hypothesis testing, this null is accepted unless there are strong 
grounds   for doing otherwise. Therefore, the ADF and PP tests are not regarded as being 
very powerful against the relevant alternative hypothesis. The mixed results, reported in 
Table 5.2 could reflect the problems identified by Perron (1989) and others. The ADF and 
PP tests have low power if the series is stationary with trend, and the existence of 
structural breaks in stationary data, which is expected to be the case for the foreign 
investment inflow series, can sometimes make a stationary time series appear non-
stationary.  
In contrast, the second set of tests for unit root, which includes the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–
Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test used in this thesis, is based on the null hypothesis that a series 
is stationary. Such tests are said to have more power than the ADF and PP tests to accept 
the stationarity with trend. Accordingly, the KPSS test is used to supplement the first set of 
tests.  
 Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test 
This set is usually used to test the null hypothesis of stationarity, versus non-stationarity, 
around the mean or trend (see Lee & Lee, 2012). The KPSS takes the following forms: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                 5.5 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                    5.6 
Where 𝜀 is stationary and a random walk, i.e.: 
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𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑡           5.7 
The null hypothesis is H0 = 𝜎𝜔
2 = 0,  which implies that 𝜑𝑡 is constant.  
Table 5.3 shows the results of the KPSS test. The null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be 
rejected if the t-statistic for 𝜑 is less than the critical value (the critical limits are shown in 
the footnote of Table 5.3). For intercept only (Column 1), the null hypothesis of 
stationarity is rejected; however, when the trend is included (Columns 2 and 3) as 
expected, the foreign investment inflow series appear to be stationary around the 
deterministic trend, with a significant positive trend. 
The evidence obtained from the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests, along with the visual evidence 
provided in Figure 5.5, suggests that the data has trend. The mixed results concerning 
stationarity hint at the possibility of the series having one or more structural break. 
Therefore, in the following section, structural-breaks tests with trending data are used to 
investigate whether a break exists in Australia’s foreign investment components, around 
the date on which A-IFRS was introduced. 
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Table 5.  3: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS)Unit Root Test Results 
Model intercept Intercept and trend 
Coefficients α α Β 
Total Foreign Investment TFI 1.161 0.14 0.0274*** 
(43.90) 
Total Foreign Equity TFE 1.243 0.11 0.0278*** 
(48.97) 
Total Foreign Debt TFD 0.777 0.20 0.0271*** 
(37.591) 
Foreign Portfolio Equity FPE 0.591 0.08 0.035*** 
(50.22) 
Foreign Direct Equity FDE 2.959 0.13 0.023*** 
(35.76) 
Foreign Direct Debt FDD 0.533 0.21 0.0258*** 
(22.032) 
Foreign Portfolio Debt FPD 0.930 0.20 0.0272*** 
(37.868) 
Foreign Loan FL 1.868 0.159 0.0185*** 
(17.510) 
Foreign Derivative FDR 0.615 0.10 0.0429*** 
(38.172) 
Other Foreign Debt OFD 0.794 0.155 0.0318*** 
(65.181) 
Critical value: 0.7390, 0.4630, 0.3470 with intercept only, and 0.216, 0.146, 0.119 with intercept 
and trend, at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
5.4 Detecting the Structural Break Date 
This section aims to investigate the question of whether Australia’s foreign investment 
inflows increase after the application of A-IFRS. If there is an increase, a significant, 
positive break around 2005, is expected, in all or some of the components of Australia’s 
foreign investment inflows series. To answer the above question, two structural break 
methods are used. Firstly, testing for an exogenous single break allows, in the most 
traditional way, to identify the effect of the change-over to A-IFRS.  Here, the structural 
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break test is carried out using the pre-selected date of 2005Q3, when A-IFRS was formally 
implemented (See Section 4.4 and Figure 4.2 for more details). Secondly, testing for an 
endogenous break, this allows pinpointing the date of the break endogenously, that is, by 
allowing the break to be identified from the data, rather than using a pre-selected date. The 
benefits of endogenously identifying the break date are discussed in Section 4.4. Since the 
sample period of the study covers 24 years, more than one structural break is likely to 
occur; in view of this, the multiple endogenous break test is applied. This gives a broader 
view of the behaviour of foreign investment series, during the time of study. All the tests 
are univariate tests, where the only variables of interest are the shift in the intercept and the 
growth in the slope of the foreign investment inflows.  
It is expected that evidence of the benefit of A-IFRS will appear at the time of A-IFRS 
application around 2005 as a positive structural break in the foreign investment inflow 
series. As discussed previously (See Section 4.4), due to transition and mandatory period, 
the effect of A-IFRS is expected to manifest itself within a wide range of possible dates. 
The selected A-IFRS event window extends from the third quarter of 2004 to the third 
quarter of 2007, so to be as agnostic as possible with regard to potential transition effects 
or implementation lags.  
5.4.1 A Single Exogenous Structural Break  
In Section 5.3, it was argued that the traditional unit-root test is biased against rejecting the 
unit-root hypothesis, when structural breaks  are present (Edwards, 1995; Perron, 1989). 
Perron (1989) modified the DF unit root test to allow a structural break to be tested for 
using a pre-selected date. This involves estimating two groups of equations: the 
innovational outlier (IO) and the additive outlier (AO).  
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The IO allows for the change in the time series to be gradual. The first model, IO1, allows 
for the change in the intercept of the trend function:  
   𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 + +𝑑𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 +  𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡    5.8 
The second model (IO2) allows for the change in the trend only:      
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑇𝑡 +  𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 5.9 
The third (IO3) is a comprehensive and less restrictive model that allows the change in the 
intercept and trend:                           
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝑑𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 +  𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1
∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 5.10 
where 𝑇𝐵 is the time break, 𝐷𝑈𝑡 is an intercept dummy that is set equal to if t 𝑇𝐵 and 
to zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑇𝑡 is the trend dummy that is set equal to t if 𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵 and to zero 
otherwise, 𝐷(𝑇𝐵)=1 if t = 𝑇𝐵 + 1 and zero otherwise. 
The AO allows for immediate change. The first model AO1 allows for the change in the 
level (intercept), while the second model, AO2, allows for the change in the trend only; the 
third model, A03, allows for the change to manifest itself, in both the intercept and trend:  
 AO1 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡 +  𝛽𝑡 + ȳ𝑡 5.11 
  𝐴𝑂2 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 +  𝛽𝑡 +  𝛾𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ȳ𝑡 5.12 
AO 3 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡 +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ȳ𝑡 5.13 
where ȳ𝑡is the detrended series. In the next stage, the test is performed using the t-statistic 
for α =1 (unit root test): 
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ȳ𝑡 = 𝑎ȳ𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝑐𝑖 𝛥ȳ𝑡−𝑖 
𝑙
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑡    5.14 
Since IO3 and AO3 are the most comprehensive and less restrictive models, they are used 
in the thesis to exogenously test for a structural break.  
The single exogenous break (IO3 and AO3 models) test results 
Table 5.4 presents the results for the aggregated data. If foreign investors were affected by 
A-IFRS application in 2005, then there should be a positive, structural break in one, or all, 
foreign investment components.  
In Table 5.4, the results for the aggregated data (TFI, TFE and TFD) are reported; Panel A 
shows the IO3 results and Panel B shows the AO3 results.  Column 1 reports the intercept 
(u); column 2, the shift in the intercept (θ); column 3, the trend coefficient (β); column 4, 
the growth in the trend (γ) and column 5, the autoregressive coefficient (α). The t-values 
for each of these coefficients are reported in parentheses.  
The two main coefficients of interest are that of the post-intercept break dummy 
coefficient (θ), which reflects the shift in the intercept after 2005, and the post-trend break 
dummy coefficient (γ), which reflects the growth in the trend. 
As expected, the results of model IO3 (Panel A) shows that the shift in the intercept (𝜃) is 
statistically significant, and positive, for TFI and TFE. However, there is no significant 
effect on the slope (𝛾) after 2005. This may be due to the dynamics of the series (the auto-
regressive coefficient) in the estimating equations. To remove the effect of this dynamics, 
model AO3 is applied and the results are presented in Panel B. It shows that the shift in the 
intercept (𝜃) is significant and positive for all variables. For the growth in the slope (γ), the 
effect on this becomes significant and positive but the coefficient values are very small 
(γ=0.009). These results imply that, overall, there is evidence that Australian foreign 
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investment has a significant positive structural break around the date of A-IFRS 
application. 
Table 5.  4: Innovational and Additive Outlier Model for determining the Break Date, in 
Intercept and Slope (IO3 & AO3), (Perron, 1989), for Total Foreign Investment Inflows as 
Aggregate. 
Description V.s u θ β γ α 
Panel (A) 
Total foreign investment TFI 7.94** 
(2.288) 
0.095** 
(2.166) 
0.006** 
(2.533) 
0.003 
(1.184) 
0.696 
(-1.588) 
Total foreign equity TFE 6.879*** 
(4.098) 
0.094** 
(2.286) 
0.006*** 
(3.905) 
-0.0001 
(-0.082) 
0.725* 
(-4.086) 
Total foreign debt TFD 1.231 
(1.103) 
0.033 
(1.279) 
0.001 
(1.570) 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
0.952 
(-1.096) 
Panel (B) 
Total foreign investment TFI 25.90*** 
(984.97) 
0.34*** 
(7.26) 
0.020*** 
(30.058) 
0.009*** 
(4.042) 
0.687 
(-2.57) 
Total foreign equity TFE 24.89*** 
(770.54) 
0.27*** 
(4.77) 
0.023*** 
(28.086) 
0.0024 
(0.8530) 
0.544 
(-2.95) 
Total foreign debt TFD 25.5*** 
(939.20) 
0.38*** 
(7.89) 
0.018*** 
(26.582) 
0.014*** 
(5.687) 
0.924 
(-1.66) 
The assumption, here, is that there is a break under both the null and alternative hypothesis of unit root. 
Break date selected: 2005Q3; λ= 0.698 (λ= Tb/T). 
For the stationarity (α), the critical values for IO3, using Perron (1989), the asymptotic one-side p-values, 
are: -4.752708, -4.181250, and -3.861875, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For AO3, using 
Perron (1989), the asymptotic one-sided p-values are: -4.752708, -4.181250, and 3.861875. For DRA (76 
observations), λ= 0.6133, the critical values are -4.862667, -4.232, and -3.938000, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, for both models. 
These tests were repeated using 2004Q3 and 2005 as the dates of the expected breaks. While the results of 
these were acceptable, using 2005Q3 provides a more reliable result. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that, under the IO3 model, the effect on TFE is mainly driven by direct 
equity (FDE), and there is no significant effect on portfolio equity (FPE). When the AO3 
model is applied, the results are slightly different: while FDE has a significant positive 
structural break in both the intercept and slope, FPE shows a positive break in the 
intercept, and a significant negative break in the slope. These puzzling results for FPE 
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could be due to the presence of more than one break. 
Table 5.  5: Innovational and Additive Outlier Model for determining the Break Date, in 
Intercept and Slope (IO3 & AO3), (Perron, 1989), for Foreign Equity Inflows as 
Disaggregates. 
Description V.s u θ β γ α 
Panel (A) 
Foreign portfolio equity FPE 5.500*** 
(3.662) 
0.063 
(1.215) 
0.008*** 
(3.412) 
-0.004 
(-1.406) 
0.768 
(-3.639) 
Foreign direct equity FDE 5.613*** 
(3.586) 
0.085** 
(2.213) 
0.004*** 
(3.355) 
0.0017 
(0.9171) 
0.773 
(-3.578) 
Panel (B) 
Foreign portfolio equity FPE 23.50*** 
(517.09) 
0.19** 
(2.41) 
0.035*** 
(29.84) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.897) 
0.736 
(-2.26) 
Foreign direct equity FDE 24.62*** 
(761.35) 
0.28*** 
(4.89) 
0.017*** 
(20.5) 
0.011*** 
(3.845) 
0.629 
(-2.8) 
 
 
Table 5.6 (Panel A) shows that the results are not different when the TFD is disaggregated 
into its components. The results from model IO3 show no evidence of a structural break in 
2005Q3. FL and OFD both show significant breaks in the slope; however, the effects are 
negligible (γ=-0.003 and 0.004, respectively). Replacing the estimation method by the 
AO3 model (in Panel B), more evidence is found. All debts, except OFD and FDR, have a 
significant positive structural break in the intercept (𝜃) and all, except FL and FDR, have a 
significant positive structural break in the slope. However, the growth in the slope is 
negligible, at approximately zero, which could be due to mis-specified break date or the 
existence of more than one break.  
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Table 5.  6: Innovational and Additive Outlier Model for Determining the Break Date, in 
both Intercept and Slope (IO3 & AO3), for Foreign Debt Inflows as Disaggregates. 
Description V.s u θ β γ α 
Panel (A) 
Foreign direct 
debt 
FDD 0.692 
(0.734) 
0.018 
(0.477) 
0.001* 
(1.872) 
-0.001 
(-0.412) 
0.970 
(-0.745) 
Foreign portfolio 
debt 
FPD 2.258** 
(2.013) 
0.044 
(1.633) 
0.002** 
(2.149) 
0.0002 
(0.198) 
0.910 
(-2.003) 
Foreign loan FL 1.337 
(1.315) 
0.063 
(1.351) 
0.001* 
(1.921) 
-0.003* 
(-1.728) 
0.943 
(-1.325) 
Foreign 
derivative 
FDR 7.257*** 
(3.149) 
0.065 
(0.906) 
0.014*** 
(3.114) 
-0.002 
(-0.522) 
0.677 
(-3.142) 
Other foreign 
debt 
OFD 7.113*** 
(3.604) 
0.010 
(0.324) 
0.009*** 
(3.545) 
0.004* 
(1.9680) 
0.691 
(-3.590) 
Panel (B) 
Foreign direct 
debt 
FDD 23.5*** 
(507.97) 
0.57*** 
(6.83) 
0.012*** 
(10.412) 
0.024*** 
(5.853) 
0.889 
(-1.83) 
Foreign portfolio 
debt 
FPD 24.99*** 
(856.04) 
0.37*** 
(7.09) 
0.019*** 
(25.299) 
0.013*** 
(5.0271) 
0.904 
(-2.17) 
Foreign loan FL 23.94*** 
(517.57) 
0.74*** 
(8.980) 
0.008*** 
(6.3327) 
0.004 
(0.990) 
0.938 
(-1.447) 
Foreign 
derivative 
FDR 22.41*** 
(356.51) 
0.11 
(1.08) 
0.038*** 
(16.175) 
0.0065 
(1.3183) 
0.646 
(-3.455) 
Other foreign 
debt 
OFD 22.88*** 
(856.58) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.028*** 
(41.086) 
0.014*** 
(5.9355) 
0.706 
(-3.513) 
 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the results presented in this sub-section is 
that, apart from FDR, there are mixed results concerning the presence of a structural break, 
in both the debt and equity components of Australia’s foreign investment inflow in 
2005Q3. As mentioned earlier, using a pre-selected/exogenously selected date is not a 
particularly attractive method; however, it does provide a first-step preliminary break test 
analysis. Considering that there may have been implementation lags where the effects 
appeared later than predicted, or lead effects, which occurred during the transition-to-
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implementation period before the standards were mandatory (e.g., Beneish et al., 2015), it 
is, therefore, necessary, now, to endogenously identify the structural break. This approach 
allows the researcher to decide whether the identified break is related to A-IFRS or to 
another event. In addition, given the long time series (24 years), the occurrence of more 
than one structural break is highly likely. Accordingly, in the following sub-sections, the 
endogenous multiple- break test is applied. 
5.4.2 Multiple Endogenous Structural Break  
The period of study is from 1989Q1–2012Q4. Therefore, the Bai and Perron (2003) 
multiple structural break test is applied to assess the effects of A-IFRS application on each 
of the foreign investment inflows. This provides a more detailed view of the behaviour of 
the various investment inflows around the time of A-IFRS. It will indicate if the timing 
and the effects vary across these series.
30
   
Prior to carrying out the multiple structural break test, the single endogenous structural 
break test (Vogelsang & Perron, 1989) was used to identify the most important single 
structural break in the time series. The results are reported in Appendix C. Overall, there is 
weak evidence of a structural break within the A-IFRS event window; however, this was 
expected. As already mentioned, as the study covers 24 years, there is a high possibility 
that more than one important economic event could cause a break in the series (e.g., the 
AFC or GFC). Thus, there is the possibility that no evidence will be found of a single 
                                                          
30
 The multiple structural break test (Bai & Perron, 2003), assumes that there is no unit root in the 
data. This assumption of stationarity is based on studies by Ben-David and Papell (1998), which 
provide strong evidence in support of the rejection of the unit-root null hypothesis, in favour of a 
trend stationary with structural breaks. Likewise, many studies estimated a model where the 
coefficient of α is 0.93, 0.82, 0.89, and 0.82, namely α ≠1 (e.g., Lothian & Taylor, 1996; Prodan, 
2008; Rudebusch, 1993). 
   
115 
 
structural break around 2005 using this method. Alternatively, even a single break was to 
be detected, the presence of any other major event might mask the true date of the effect of 
the A-IFRS, thereby turning what might otherwise be a strongly positive result, into a 
weak positive, or even a negative. These arguments provide support for the use of the Bai 
and Perron (2003) multiple structural break model for 𝑚 + 1 regimes: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿1 + 𝑢𝑡 ,            𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇1, 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿2 + 𝑢𝑡 ,            𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1, … , 𝑇2, 
                 ⋮                                  ⋮ 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿𝑚+1 + 𝑢𝑡 ,       𝑡 = 𝑇𝑚 + 1, … , 𝑇, 5.15 
where 𝑦𝑡  is the observed dependant variable at time 𝑡  : in this thesis, this is the 
components of Australia’s foreign inflows; 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 are the vectors of the regresses, while 
β and 𝛿𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 + 1) are the corresponding coefficients of vectors with 𝛿𝑖 ≠ 𝛿𝑖+1 
(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚). 𝑢𝑡  is the disturbance term, at time 𝑡, while 𝑚 is the number of structural 
breaks. The time breaks are (𝑇 = 𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚) treated as unknown (endogenously).  
If all the coefficients in (5.15) are subject to change, then (5.15) becomes a pure structural 
change model and takes the following form 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡 5.16 
where 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗−1 + 1, … , 𝑇𝑗 , for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 + 1 with 𝑇0 = 1. 
Given that, I am interested in determining whether there is any break in the components of 
Australia’s foreign investment inflows around the time of A-IFRS application, I assume a 
pure structural change model as described in (5.16) may not be suitable as all the series are 
trending. In place of this,  the modified version of the Prodan (2008) model, which 
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assumes that all data are trending stationary, is applied.  The modified structural change 
model is depicted by  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 5.17 
This is a partial structural model and can be described as pure trend model where the 
breaks are assumed to be in the constant while the trend (𝑡) is estimated over the full 
sample.  Three issues must be considered when estimating (5.17).  Firstly, the need to pick 
the number of break points; since there are only 96 observations in the data series, a 
maximum of three breaks are allowed (𝑚 = 3), and the data is trimmed by at least 20% of 
the observations as breaks are not expected to be detected at either end of the sample.  
Given that the data is trending, a trend component is added to obtain a trend stationary 
series. To measure the minimum structure, I follow Bai and Perron (2006) by allowing for 
heterogeneity and serial correlations of the errors in the different sub-samples.
31
 
Multiple structure breaks are identified, by the BP test in a process consisting of two steps. 
The first involves testing for structural changes while, in the second step, the number of 
breaks is determined.  
In the first step, the UDmax and WDmax statistics, double maximum tests are used to test 
the null hypothesis – that there is no structural break– against the alternative– that there are 
an unknown number of breaks. If the null hypothesis of no break is rejected by the double 
maximum tests, then the next step is to apply the sequential sup 𝐹𝑇(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) procedure to 
determine the optimal number of structural breaks. This process is repeated by increasing 𝑙 
sequentially until the test sup 𝐹𝑇(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) fails to reject the no additional structural change 
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 I did not include an AR process in (5.17) to control for serial correlation as Prodan (2008) finds 
that the pure model is more efficient than the partial trend model (𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝑝𝑦𝑡−1+𝑢𝑡) for 
detecting structural breaks. 
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hypothesis. The number of breaks selected is associated with the minimum error of squares, 
and sup F is the F test for each sub-sample. For example, the sup 𝐹𝑇(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) test is not 
significant at the 5% level for any (𝑙 ≥ 2) for TFI, indicating the presence of two breaks in 
the series. These tests are carried out on all components, aggregated and disaggregated, to 
determine the potential break points (𝑇𝛽). 
The multiple endogenous break (Bai & Perron, 2003) test results and discussion 
Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 present the results of estimating the model for both aggregated and 
disaggregated foreign investment. As mentioned above, this model is a two-step process.   
The first step is to test for the presence of at least one structural break, by applying the 
global test. The two general tests for the presence of a structural break, the UDmax and 
WDmax, provide evidence of at least one structural break in each series (Columns 1 and 
2), at the 0.5% level of significance, or better. This is consistent with the findings of the 
earlier tests for a structural break. In Step 2, the sequential test is used to determine the 
optimal number of breaks when the Sup F (L+1/L) test is used to estimate the break dates 
(Columns 3 and 4). The findings of this step are significant at the 5% level, or better.
32
 The 
findings of the BP test in the second step show that all variables, except OFD, have two or 
more structural breaks. Some of these occurred in 2005, a date close to those estimated by 
the previous tests. 
In Table 5.7, both 1997Q4 and 2004Q4 are shown as break dates for TFI. The latter, which 
shows an increase in TFI, is within the A-IFRS event window. The former, which shows a 
decrease in TFI, falls within the AFC of 1997-1998. TFE also has two structural breaks: 
the first, which is negative, occurred in 2000Q1, and the second, which is positive, in 
                                                          
32
 Appendix D provides more detail regarding the results of the Bai and Perron (2003) test. 
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2004Q4. Similarly, TFD has two break dates, one in 1997Q2 and the other in 2004Q4. 
Overall, in all cases, the second break date appears to be in 2004Q4. This is within the 
window of when AASB 132 and AASB 139 were first used, and also of the introduction of 
AASB 1 and AASB 1047, both of which required greater disclosure of an entity’s financial 
position and operating results in its annual and mid-year report, in 2004 (See Section 4.4). 
This suggests that the use of A-IFRS, by providing foreign investors with relevant, reliable, 
and more comparable financial information (Wang & Welker, 2011), may have 
encouraged foreign investors to invest in both debt and equity in Australia. However, 
because each of the disaggregated foreign investment components may have reacted 
differently to A-IFRS, the structural break date that was identified using aggregated data 
could be due to the dominance of only one or two components of foreign investment flow. 
Accordingly, the next step was to disaggregate the equity and debt components of the 
foreign investment.   
Table 5.  7 : Results of the Multiple Structural Break Test for Total Foreign Investment 
Inflows as Aggregates 
V.s Step 1(double maximum tests) Step 2 (break dates selected) 
 UDmax WDmax Sup F (1/0) Sup F (2/1) TB1 TB2 
TFI 67.171 108.690 123.677 36.661 -1997Q4 +2004Q4 
TFE 47.500 47.500 47.500 16.733 -2000Q1 +2004Q4 
TFD 128.652 208.173 143.592 29.640 -1997Q2 +2004Q4 
Note 1: The critical values for Sup 𝐹𝑇(𝑘) for 𝑘 = 1, … ,3 are 8.22, 6.53 and 5.08 respectively; and for 
UDmax, and WDmax are 8.43 and 9.27 respectively. All tests are significant at 5% or better. 
Note 2: When I re-estimate, using a maximum break = 5, all variables appear to have a structural break 
around the A-IFRS window. 
 
 
In terms of disaggregated equity, the test results in Table 5.8 indicate two breaks in FPE, 
one of which occurs in 2005Q3, the date of the first half-year reporting that was prepared 
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using A-IFRS. This report was expected to reduce information asymmetry (Wang & 
Welker, 2011). In addition, there is evidence that FPE has a break in 1993Q4, the period of 
GFL. The appearance of such a break provides robustness to the results obtained using the 
Bai and Perron (2003) test. This result is consistent with the visual impression in Figure 
5.3. FDE has two structural breaks, in 1997Q4 and 2003Q4. The second of these is 
positive; however, as it falls within the year that marked Australia’s commodity-price 
boom (2003), a plausible explanation is that the effect on FDE is driven more by this event 
than the introduction of A-IFRS. However, to reach a definite conclusion concerning the 
source of the effect, the commodity-price boom and other economic events need to be 
controlled for; this is done in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.  8: Results of the Multiple Structural Break Test for Foreign Equity Inflows as 
Disaggregates 
V.s Step 1(double maximum tests) Step 2 (break dates selected) 
 UDmax WDmax Sup F (1/0) Sup F (2/1) TB1 TB2 
FPE 37.523 54.327 37.523 24.458 +1993Q4 +2005Q3 
FDE 69.181 90.847 92.786 40.961 -1997Q4 +2003Q4 
  
For disaggregate debt, the results, in Row 1 of Table 5.9 show that FDD has a positive 
structural break in 2006Q4. This result indicates that after the application of A-IFRS 
MNCs encouraged foreign affiliates to invest in their Australian partners, which may 
imply tax purposes. This date of the break is consistent with the findings of De Simone 
(2016), which suggests that affiliates need time to adjust to the shift in profit following 
their move to A-IFRS. Interestingly, FDD also has a positive structural break in 2001, a 
date that is close to that of the implementation of the GST in Australia in 2000.  This could 
also support the argument advanced in Chapter 4, that FDD is affected by the tax system. 
Further investigation of this is conducted in Chapter 6.  
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The second of the TDF disaggregated components is FPD which, as a public debt, is the 
most significant source of Australia’s foreign debt (See Appendix A). This was expected 
to increase significantly after the application of A-IFRS. FPD has two break dates: one in 
1998Q1 and the other in 2004Q3. The latter is close to the date of the structural break in 
TFD. This structural break in 2004Q3, confirmed this expectation as it is within the 
implementation of AASB 1, AASB 1047, AASB 139, and AASB 132. These standards, 
with great disclosure and the use of fair value under A-IFRS, may have provided foreign 
investors with more relevant and reliable information concerning the future cash flow of 
their investments, thereby enabling them to more accurately estimate the quality of their 
investments (e.g., Florou & Kosi, 2015; Taylor et al., 2010).  
The third component of debt is FL. According to previous studies, financial reporting plays 
a significant role in decision-making by banks. Thus, it was expected that FL would 
increase significantly after A-IFRS was introduced. The results showed a significant break 
in FL, in 2005Q3, a date that falls within the A-IFRS event window. This coincided with 
the date of the structural break in FPE; therefore, the same explanation, that public 
accounting information plays an important role in reducing information asymmetry, may 
also apply here. This finding is consistent with those of Brown (2014), Florou and Kosi 
(2015), and Kim et al. (2011). 
FDR indicated the presence of a non-significant structural break in 2005Q3, a date that 
was determined exogenously; however, when it was tested endogenously, two significant 
structural breaks were indicated. The first of these falls in 2002Q4, that is, within the 
timeframe of the government’s announcement of its intention to implement A-IFRS. The 
second is in 2007Q2. This is close to the break date of 2007Q1, which was identified under 
the single endogenous structural break test (See Appendix C), and both close to the date of 
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the implementation of AASB 7. This result suggests that FDR may be sensitive to the 
requirement of AASB 7, for increased disclosure regarding risk, especially that related to 
the use of derivatives, such as commodity risk, exchange risk, and so on (e.g., Birt et al, 
2013; Taylor & Tower, 2011). This extra information may enhance the investment 
decisions of foreign investors, thereby making them more confident investing in 
derivatives. Alternatively, the structural break could be due to the effect of the GFC: the 
greater uncertainty and higher risk during this crisis, drove foreign investors to invest in 
FDR. In Chapter 6, after the commodity price risk, credit risk, and exchange rate risk are 
controlled for, this will be investigated further. 
OFD is also positively affected in 2007Q3, that is, within the A-IFRS event window. This 
result is consistent with the suggestion of Hail et al. (2010) and the finding of Li et al. 
(2017), that firms that prepare their financial reporting under IFRS have more efficient 
contracts with suppliers. However, it is not clear why OFD shows a lag effect. Previous 
studies do mention that other foreign debt providers have the ability to access insider 
information (Love, 2011), which means it should not be overly affected by the increased 
disclosure concerning risk under AASB 7. An alternative explanation is that the GFC may 
have pushed providers of other foreign debt to support their Australian customers 
experiencing financial difficulties by providing them with more goods and services on 
credit, or short-term debt (e.g., Love, 2011). Further investigation of this is conducted in 
Chapter 6. 
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Table 5.  9: Results of the Multiple Structural Break Test for Foreign Debt Inflows as 
Disaggregates 
V.s Step 1(double maximum 
tests) 
Step 2 (break dates selected)  
 UDmax WDmax Sup F 
(1/0) 
Sup F 
(2/1) 
Sup F 
(3/2) 
TB1 TB2 TB3 
FDD 121.21 184.37 125.83 43.545 28.51 -1996Q4 +2001Q4 +2006Q4 
FPD 123.50 199.83 126.82 72.446  -1998Q1 +2004Q3  
FL 148.43 212.46 136.92 67.109 14.52 -1995Q1 +1999Q4 +2005Q3 
FDR 71.268 89.713 39.80 50.90  +2002Q4 +2007Q2  
OFD 24.512 39.663 50.131   +2007Q3   
 
Overall, up to this stage of the investigation, there is sufficient evidence to support the 
notion that the flow of foreign investment into Australia increased significantly, following 
the implementation of A-IFRS. The above results reveal some variations in the break dates 
indicated in the disaggregated foreign investment inflow variables. In some flow variables 
such as FPE and FL, the break date was around 2005Q3, while in others, such as FDD, 
FDR and OFD the break appeared with a lag, the effects of A-IFRS having been felt more 
than a year after the official implementation of A-IFRS. FPD was the only disaggregated 
variable with a lead effect, while FDE remained unaffected by A-FIRS. In general, since 
all these breaks occurred around 2005, and, therefore, within the A-IFRS event window of 
2004Q3–2007Q3, they are consistent with the effect of the introduction of A-IFRS. The 
different break dates suggest that the nature and degree of the effects of A-IFRS varied 
according to the type of flow component. These outcomes are consistent with the 
theoretical frameworks described by Razin et al. (1998) and others (See Chapters 3 and 4). 
In the present study, the Bai and Perron (2003) multiple-structural-break test plays an 
important role, because it identifies the effect of A-IFRS on foreign investment, after other 
events are controlled for. For instance, it identifies breaks, which, in most cases, coincide 
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with the occurrence of a historical event or financial crisis (e.g., 1993Q4 is the date of 
Global Financial Liberalisation, and is also close to the period of the Mexican Debt Crisis 
of 1994–1995, while 1997Q3 is around the time of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–
1998).
33
   
Overall, these results confirm the prediction that foreign investment inflows have a 
positive structural break around 2005, close to the date of the introduction of A-IFRS. This 
can be interpreted as support for the study’s prediction that Australia’s foreign investment 
inflows increased after the entities were required to use A-IFRS. 
5.4.5 Robustness Test  
To add robustness to the above findings, the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test is used. This 
test identifies breaks occurring under both the null and alternative hypotheses of unit root. 
The method and the results of this test are shown in Appendix E. Model C of the Two-
Break Minimum LM Unit-Root Test (2003), which allows for changes in the intercept and 
trend, is applied, in this thesis 
The results indicate that although the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test differs from that of the 
Bai and Perron, (2003), both identify, approximately, the same break date for each of the 
variables, one that falls within the A-IFRS event window. The only exception is FL, which 
has no break within this window under Lee and Strazicich (2013); however, the two breaks 
that are indicated, in 1993Q2 and 2000Q4, are close to those, in 1995Q1 and 1999Q4, that 
are indicated by the Bai and Perron (2003) test. Moreover, the Bai and Perron test 
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 There is no clear evidence that the Mexican debt crisis in 1994-1995 affected Australia foreign 
investment inflows; however, there is evidence that it had a significant effect on many other 
countries that have an important partnership with Australia, such as US (e.g., Musacchio, 2012). 
This might have affected the level of foreign investment that Australia received from such 
countries.  
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pinpoints yet another structural break in 2005Q3, a date within the A-IFRS event window. 
This provides further support for the use of the Bai and Perron (2003) multiple-structural-
break test. 
5.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter aimed to identify a structural break in each of the various components of 
Australia’s foreign investment inflows, to see if there was any positive structural break, 
around 2005, the year of A-IFRS implementation. Identifying this break date is central to 
the present study, since it is crucial to answering the question of whether this event was 
associated with an increase in foreign investment due to the capacity of the global 
standards to reduce the informational disadvantage of foreign investors, relative to their 
local counterparts.    
 Evidence of an increase in Australia’s foreign investment inflow, was obtained using time 
series from 1989Q1 to 2012Q4 coupled with a range of structural break methodologies, 
i.e., exogenous and endogenous structural break tests. Firstly, a single exogenously 
detected structural break test (innovational outlier (IO) and additive outlier (AO)) was 
carried out and mixed results of significant increases after 2005Q3 were found. The mixed 
outcome could be attributed to lead or lag effects of A-IFRS. In the next step, a structural 
break test that identified the break date endogenously was used. Since the time series 
covers a lengthy period of close to 24 years, it was anticipated that there could be more 
than one break (See Figure 4.2). Therefore, the Bai and Perron (2003) endogenous 
multiple structural break test was applied. Overall, the findings reported in Table 5.10 
indicate a significant structural break around the date of A-IFRS application, in all 
Australian foreign investment inflows, except FDE. These findings are further supported 
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by the application of a robustness test, the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test, with two 
structural breaks. 
Table 5.  10: Structural Breaks Dates (Bai & Perron (2003) test) 
Breaks TFI TFE TFD FPE FDE FDD FPD FL FDR OFD 
Break 1 1997Q4 2000Q1 1997Q2 1993Q4 1997Q4 1996Q4 1998Q4 1995Q1 2002Q4 2007Q3 
Break 2 2004Q4 2004Q4 2004Q4 2005Q3 2003Q4 2001Q4 2004Q3 1999Q4 2007Q2  
Break 3      2006Q4  2005Q3   
 
Overall, in keeping with the literature, the results of the structural break tests reported in 
this chapter confirm the prediction that foreign investment inflows significantly increased 
after the application of A-IFRS; the only exception to this is FDE, break date for which fell 
outside the A-IFRS event window. Furthermore, the consistency of the results for all the 
other components of foreign investment provides further support for the above prediction. 
The results show that some components had a significant break in 2005 (PEL and FL); 
others showed the effect with a lead (FPD), while the remainders registered the break with 
a lag (FDD, FDR, and OFD). This support the argument that different component may 
react differently to the reduction in information asymmetry (Razin et al., 1998). In general, 
since all of these break dates were around 2005, they were consistent with the expected 
effects of the introduction, under A-IFRS of a high-quality financial reporting regime with 
greater comparability. This conclusion is consistent with both the broad picture that 
emerged from the literature review in Chapter 3 and the visual impression conveyed by the 
sequence plots presented in Section 5.2. However, before accepting such a definitive 
conclusion, further tests are required to indicate whether the results could possibly have 
been affected by other economic events. Chapter 6, therefore, will explain the empirical 
method involved in these tests and, then, report the results with the discussion.  
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CHAPTER 6:  Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
Approach and the A-IFRS 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis argues that the application of A-IFRS attracts more foreign investment to a 
country, as by increasing familiarity with accounting standards, it reduces the information 
disadvantage faced by foreign investors. The exogenous and endogenous structural-break 
results obtained in Chapter 5 highlight the existence of a positive structural break within 
the A-IFRS window, which may be associated with the introduction of A-IFRS. However, 
it is important to note that any break detected within the specified window can only be 
attributed indirectly to A-IFRS.  
The exogenous- and endogenous structural-break tests are univariate approaches, whereby 
any break identified within the A-IFRS event window could also be associated with any of 
the other economic events that occurred around the time of A-IFRS application. For 
example, as mentioned in Section 4.4, an increase in capital inflows around 2003–2004 
could be due to the commodity-price boom experienced by Australia at that time.  
In this Chapter, I use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1998), which controls for other possible events by including the 
macroeconomic variables described in Table 6.2. The ARDL model also allows us to 
capture both the long-run and short-run effects of A-IFRS application. This is important to 
the study, as Bruggemann et al (2013), Callao et al. (2007), Daske et al. (2008), and 
Dunstan (2003) suggest that a country with a relatively long experience of the international 
standards and a high level of enforcement might experience greater benefits of IFRS in the 
long-run, along with the short-run effects. Therefore, the use of the ARDL model in 
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international accounting studies may allay some of the concerns raised by previous studies. 
For example, studies using a pre-selected date and short sample series have stressed that 
the benefits of IFRS are only experienced by countries whose domestic GAAP standards 
differed significantly from IFRS (e.g., Gordon et al., 2012). To the best of the knowledge, 
to date, there has been no empirical study that has used the ARDL framework to analyse 
the effect of A-IFRS application on foreign investment flows. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 presents a brief analytical review of 
the ARDL model and the choice of macroeconomic control variables, as well as the model 
specification that is used in this chapter. Then, in Section 6.3, based on the results of the 
bound test, the error correction version of the ARDL model is applied in order to 
determine the long- and short-run coefficients, both for the aggregated and disaggregated 
components of foreign investment. Finally, a conclusion is presented in Section 6.4. 
6.2 Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model 
The results from Chapter 5, which are reported in Table 6.1, show that all variables, with 
the exception of OFD, have two or more structural breaks, at least one of which appears to 
have occurred within the A-IFRS event window (the only exception is FDE). This 
reinforces the notion that the application of A-IFRS accounting standards affects foreign 
investment decision-making (the economic consequences of accounting information, as 
mentioned in Zeff (1978). However, before such a definitive conclusion can be accepted, 
other economic events that occurred around the same time as A-IFRS application need to 
be controlled for. This is done by applying the ARDL model, developed by Pesaran and 
Shin (1998). 
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Table 6. 1: Structural Breaks Dates (Bai & Perron (2003) test) 
Breaks TFI TFE TFD FPE FDE FDD FPD FL FDR OFD 
Break 1 1997Q4 2000Q1 1997Q2 1993Q4 1997Q4 1996Q4 1998Q4 1995Q1 2002Q4 2007Q3 
Break 2 2004Q4 2004Q4 2004Q4 2005Q3 2003Q4 2001Q4 2004Q3 1999Q4 2007Q2  
Break 3      2006Q4  2005Q3   
 
6.2.1 Benefits of Using ARDL Framework 
According to Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001), the ARDL model has a number of 
advantages. It is applicable irrespective of whether the flow variables are stationary or 
non-stationary and the pre-testing problems associated with the standard co-integration 
techniques can be avoided.
34
 It performs well on a small number of observations, and thus 
is well suited to this thesis, which there are only 96 observations. The dynamic error-
correction model derived from the ARDL integrates the short-run dynamics with the long-
run relationship without loss of information. This is important for this thesis, as it allows 
both the short- and long-run effects of A-IFRS application to be captured. In fact, this can 
also be achieved using a number of other economic models, of which the Engle-Granger 
(1987) and the Johansen and Juselius (1990) are just two examples. However, because of 
the low power and other problems associated with such models, especially in the presence 
of a structural break, the ARDL model is the popular choice of more recent time-series 
studies (e.g. Awan, Anjum, & Rahim, 2015; Pahlavani, 2005; Verma, 2008). 
6.2.2 ARDL Model Specification 
The ARDL model has two steps. The first involves the use of the bound test to investigate 
the long-run effect of A-IFRS application, while in the second, the coefficients of both its 
                                                          
34
 The assumption, here, is that foreign investment variables are stationary, with multiple structural 
breaks (See Chapter 5). 
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long- and short-run effects are estimated using the error-correction version of the ARDL 
model. According to Pesaran et al. (2001), the augmented ARDL is given by the following 
equation: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝛿0𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 −  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
𝑘
𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 +  𝜔𝑡 6.1 
where 𝑦𝑡  is the dependent variable described in Table 1, 𝑎0  is the constant term, 𝑡 is the 
time trend, 𝑥𝑖 is the control variable i, described in Table 6.2, while 𝐷𝑖 is the identified 
endogenous break dummies i reported in Table 6.1. Here, 𝛿0, 𝛼𝑗, 𝑎𝑗, 𝛽𝑖𝑗 , and  𝛿𝑖 are the 
estimated coefficients. 𝑚 is the selected number of endogenous breaks for each dependent 
variable, while 𝑘 is number of control variables. 𝑝 is the selected number of lags of the 
dependent variable, while  𝑞𝑖 is the selected number of lags of each control variable. 
As a first step, the F test is used to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between 
Australian foreign investments components with the control and deterministic terms in 
equation (6.1). If the F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical value, the null 
hypothesis of the existence of no long-run relationship will be rejected. On the other hand, 
if the F-statistic is lower than the critical values, this means that there is no long-run 
relationship. If, however, it falls between the lower and upper critical values, the result is 
inconclusive. In all cases, in keeping with the study by Kremers, Ericsson, and Dolado 
(1992), it is also useful to use error-correction terms (ECT) to establish a long-run 
relationship. 
Β𝑖 =  
𝛽𝑖0− 𝛽𝑖1…−𝛽𝑖?̂?
1− 𝛼1− 𝛼2…−𝛼?̂?
   where  𝑖 =  1, 2 … 𝑘 
Similarly, the long-run coefficients for a response of 𝑦𝑡  to the structural break 𝐷𝑖  are 
estimated by: 
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𝐶𝑖 =  
𝛿𝑖
1− 𝛼1− 𝛼2…−𝛼?̂?
   where 𝑖 =  1, 2 … 𝑚 
Consequently, the long-run equation can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝐶0t + ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑖=1  ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑖−1  +  𝑒𝑡 6.2 
Here 𝐶0,  𝐵𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐶𝑖  are the long run coefficients. 
 The error correction term (ECT) is defined as: 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡 −  𝐶0t − ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 −
𝑘
𝑖=1  ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑖−1  6.3 
Then, the short-run equation can be written as:  
∆𝑦𝑡 =  ?̂? +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 −  ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 + 𝜆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝜇𝑡  6.4 
Δ is the first differences operator while  ?̂?, 𝛾𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙𝑖 are the coefficients relating to the 
short-run dynamics of the model’s convergence to equilibrium and 𝜆 measures the speed 
of adjustment towards long run equilibrium. If 𝜆  is negative and significant, this indicates 
the existence of a stable long-run relationship between the dependent and regressor 
variables. 
Of the structural breaks (𝐷𝑖), the focus of this thesis is the dummy variable related to A-
IFRS application (DA-IFRS). This takes the value of 1 during and after the break, and zero 
otherwise. The expectation is that, if the application does attract an increased amount of 
foreign investment, the coefficients of DA-IFRS in the long- and short-run will be 
significantly positive. 
6.2.3 Choice of Macroeconomic Control Variables 
One of the major economic events, in Australia, that occurred within the A-IFRS event 
window is the turnaround in the mining sector. This raises the possibility of whether the 
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magnitude of the changes observed in the foreign inflow variables could be due to this 
commodity-price boom, rather than A-IFRS application. According to Connolly and 
Orsmond (2011) and Kearns and Lowe (2011), the effects of this event are experienced as 
increased growth, rising interest rates, improved terms of trade, and the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar. To control for these effects, I added to the ARDL model the following 
variables, one at a time: RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXCH, and INT. The variables I chose, their 
definitions, and my rationale for including them in the ARDL framework are described in 
detail in Table 6.2.  
Table 6. 2: Control Variables 
Control V.s Definitions Reason 
RGDP The log of real gross 
domestic product as a 
measurement of real income 
To control for the market size that attracts foreign investment 
due to commodity-price boom. 
It is expected that increased RGDP leads to increased foreign 
investment inflows (See Beneish et al., 2015; Louis & Urcan, 
2014; Chen et al., 2014; Gordon et al., 2012; Márquez-
Ramos, 2011; Akisik & Pfeiffer., 2009). 
TOT The Terms of trade refers to 
the physical exchange ratio at 
which goods are exchanged 
for one another between the 
countries. 
It is calculated as export 
price index/import price 
index. 
To control for the effect of the commodity-price boom on 
foreign investment mobility. 
It is expected that increased TOT leads to increased foreign 
investment mobility (See Downes, Hanslow, & Tulip, 2014). 
OPEN Absolute value of exports, 
plus imports, as a percentage 
of RGDP. 
To control for the investment climate that attracts foreign 
investment. It measures the openness of the economy. 
It is expected that increased OPEN leads to increased foreign 
investment mobility (See Gordon et al, 2012; Akisik & 
Pfeiffer, 2009). 
EXCH The real effective exchange 
rate, based on Consumer 
Price Index 
To control for changes in the Australian currency. 
It is expected that when the real exchange rate appreciates, it 
attracts foreign flows (See: Beneish et al., 2015; Louis & 
Urcan, 2014). 
INT The lending rate is the bank 
rate that meets the financing 
needs. 
To control for the level of interest rates. 
It is expected that when the interest rate increases, it attracts 
foreign savings (See: Beneish et al., 2015; Louis & Urcan, 
2014 for details). 
 
Sources of data - International Financial Statistics (IFS). http://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-B6BA-49ED-8AB9-
52B0C1A0179B&sId=1409151240976.   
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6.3 Results of the ARDL Model and Discussion 
Since there are only 96 observations, the maximum lags of two are chosen for 𝑝 and 𝑞𝑖. 
Each of the flow variables is estimated five times, using the different control variables 
described in Table 6.2. These variables are expected to control for any major economic 
events that might have an impact on the flow variables. For example, the RGDP, TOT and 
OPEN describe Australia’s investment climate and increases in the size of these variables 
are expected to attract more foreign investment inflows. On the other hand, increases in 
EXCH and INT are expected to attract more foreign savings flows, which, in turn 
increases foreign investment flows. These models are then run once again, this time 
including RGDP, as an original variable, along with one of the other control variables. 
This second set of estimations, the results of which are reported in Appendix H, provides a 
further robustness check. Each model includes intercept, trend, and the structural breaks 
identified through the Bai and Perron (2003) test. As mentioned earlier, the coefficient of 
interest, both in the long and short run, is the one that reflects the effect of A-IFRS 
application on foreign investment variables, that is, DA-IFRS.  
Diagnostic and stability tests are then conducted to ascertain the appropriateness of the 
ARDL model (See Appendix F). The model passes the tests for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. The stability of the long-run coefficients is evaluated, using the 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMQ).  For most 
flow variables, the plots fall within the boundaries, (See Appendix G). However, those for 
FDD and FPD cross the critical-value line. In both of these variables, a structural break is 
identified around 2008, the date associated with GFC (See Figure 6.1), making it difficult 
to assess the effects of A-IFRS. To avoid such a problem, the observations from 2008Q3 
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to 2009Q2 have been dropped from the A-IFRS dummy variable for these two flow 
variables.  
The F-statistic for the bound test is reported in the second row of each table.  With the 
exception of FL for all other foreign flow variables, the null hypothesis of no long-run 
relationship is rejected, indicating a stable long-run relationship between foreign 
investments and the control and deterministic terms. The next step is to estimate the long- 
and short-run coefficients of the ARDL model with two fixed lags.
35
 The short-run 
coefficient is used to test for the short-run effects of A-IFRS application and other control 
variables on foreign investment, while the long-run coefficient allows the long-run effect 
to be ascertained. A full set of the results for both of these coefficients is provided in 
Appendix H. The main focus here is to determine whether the DA-IFRS and ECT 
coefficients are significant, as this is crucial to the present study. The statistically 
significant, positive coefficients of the DA-IFRS, both in the short- and the long-run, 
provide evidence of the increased usefulness of financial statements for investor decision-
making, post-adoption.  
  
                                                          
35
 As there are 96 observations, the fixed lags of two are chosen. 
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Figure 6.  1:  CUSUMQ test for FDD and FPD (examples) 
Panel A: FDD 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Panel B: FPD 
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Total Foreign Investment (TFI) 
Table 6.3 reports the results for TFI. The ECT coefficient has the correct sign and is 
statistically significant, an indication that deviations from the long-run are corrected 
around 11% to 23% in the next period, which shows a relatively slow pace of adjustment 
back to equilibrium. The statistically significant positive coefficients of DA-IFRS in the 
short-run around 13-14 % provide evidence of the increased usefulness of financial 
statements for investor decision-making, after A-IFRS-adoption. 
 
   
135 
 
Table 6. 3: Total Foreign Investment (TFI) 
Control variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 6.47** 2.33 6.56** 4.19 4.35 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.14*** 
(4.07) 
0.14*** 
(2.82) 
0.13*** 
(3.02) 
0.13*** 
(3.13) 
0.14*** 
(2.87) 
ECT (-1) -0.21*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.11*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.55) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.40*** 
(2.92) 
0.44 
(1.29) 
0.28* 
(1.69) 
0.42** 
(2.09) 
0.14 
(0.99) 
R
^2
 0.998253 0.996168 0.996968 0.997608 0.996126 
F test 6072.771 2762.036 3493.173 4431.444 2732.364 
Notes:  1. ***, **, * coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
2. The critical values for the regressions are 6.1, 4.68, and 4.05 (lower bound) and 
6.73, 5.15, and 4.49 (upper bound) for 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels of significance 
respectively. 
3. DA-IFRS is the dummy variable representing the A-IFRS application 
4.ECT(-1) is the error correction term to measure the existence of the long-run relationship 
between the dependent variable and the regressors. 
5- For more robustness, Model 2 (and 6 in Appendix H.1), for all foreign investment 
components, have been re-estimated, using the bulk commodity-price to control for 
commodity-price boom, instead of TOT.  Overall, the results yield similar conclusions to 
those from the TOT models. 
 
It can be seen from the table, that these results are further strengthened when new variables 
are added to each of the regressions. The DA-IFRS dummy variable maintains its sign and 
significance (except for Models 2 and 5, in the long-run). Secondly, when RGDP is 
included as an important indicator of the state of the economy and each of the other control 
variables is added to the ARDL model, the results are similar (See Models 6-9 in 
Appendix H.1). This is clear evidence that A-IFRS application may have played a 
significant role in increasing total foreign investment in the short term. This finding 
supports the importance of information availability for foreign investment inflows, which 
is mentioned in a number of studies (Gordon & Bovenberg, 1996; DeFond et al., 2011, 
Márquez-Ramos, 2011). However, as reported in Table 6.3 there is no clear evidence to 
imply that A-IFRS has a long run effect on the aggregated investment inflows. 
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1- Total Foreign Equity (TFE) 
 Table 6.4 shows the results for TFE. It has been suggested that A-IFRS increased foreign 
equity; however, while it can be seen that the coefficients of DA-IFRS are positive, both in 
the long and short run, they are non-significant (the only exception is the short run in 
Model 1). These results may be driven by direct equity, which is expected to show either a 
limited or no effect from A-IFRS application (Razin et al., 1998), and indicate a significant 
structural break within the commodity-price boom (see Table 6.1). In the next stage, each 
component of foreign equity is investigated separately. 
Table 6. 4: Total Foreign Equity (TFE) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 5.556** 3.874 4.160 5.901** 7.212*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.169** 
(2.034) 
0.118 
(1.115) 
0.1501 
(1.516) 
0.1375 
(1.5994) 
0.0956 
(0.9033) 
ECT (-1) -0.266*** 
(-4.320) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.158) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.365) 
-0.2462*** 
(-4.5189) 
-0.3816*** 
(-4.483) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.0927 
(0.6691) 
0.2897 
(1.0421) 
-0.0008 
(-0.004) 
0.1053 
(0.6684) 
-0.0522 
(-0.358) 
R
^2
 0.994810 0.991686 0.992557 0.994626 0.991494 
F test 2036.632 1267.365 1416.902 1966.357 1238.485 
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Foreign Portfolio Equity (FPE) 
In the results reported in Table 6.5, the large coefficients of DA-IFRS for both the short- 
and long-run indicate that A-IFRS resulted in a significant increase in foreign portfolio 
equity investment into Australia. The existence of a long-run effect of A-IFRS is further 
supported by the fact that the ECT coefficient is negative and significant. The long-run 
effect could be inferred due to the gradual improvement in compliance, the increasing 
familiarity of preparers and auditors with the new guidelines, and the emergence of new 
standards, as well as the increasing effectiveness of enforcement, over time (Bruggemann 
et al., 2013). These outcomes add depth and richness to the earlier findings (in the 
literature) that portfolio equity was likely to be affected under IFRS, because, by 
demanding high disclosure and creating more international comparability, the application 
of such standards enhanced the public information environment (e.g., Akisik & Pfeiffer, 
2009; Brochet et al., 2013; Shima & Gordon, 2011; Wang & Welker, 2011; Yu & Wahid, 
2014). These studies also indicate that this effect on portfolio equity is greater in countries 
where the legal system is effective in protecting the claims of investors; this is the case 
with Australia (See Porta et al., 1998). However, no previous study has determined the 
date of the effect, endogenously; neither has any investigated the effect of IFRS using time 
series data.  
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Table 6. 5: Foreign Portfolio Equity (FPE) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 6.58** 5.33** 6.89*** 6.68*** 7.32*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.36*** 
(2.87) 
0.29** 
(2.12) 
0.41*** 
(3.04) 
0.32*** 
(2.64) 
0.307** 
(2.15) 
ECT(-1) -0.26*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.23*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.36*** 
(-4.40) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.96*** 
(3.79) 
1.07*** 
(3.37) 
1.42*** 
(3.80) 
0.93*** 
(3.65) 
0.79*** 
(3.87) 
R
^2
 0.992878 0.990893 0.991896 0.993200 0.990456 
F test 1481.162 1156.058 1300.430 1551.902 1102.611 
 
Foreign Direct Equity (FDE)
36
 
The results reported in Table 6.6, show that even at the 10 % level of significance, there is 
insufficient support for the premise that A-IFRS application had any effect on FDE. This 
means that the structural break in 2003Q4 cannot be attributed to the application of A-
IFRS. Rather, it appears to be the result of an economic event that is common to all the 
control variables and so may be due to the commodity-price boom that was expected to 
increase FDE inflow to Australia (e.g., Minifie, 2013). This also can explain the 
insignificant result obtained for TFE (See Table 6.4).  These results add further credibility 
to the notion that because foreign direct investors have a significant degree of control over 
the companies in which they invest, they are impervious to information asymmetry. This 
                                                          
36
 Although the break date for FDE is outside the A-IFRS event window, it is close to the event 
window, and to add more robustness to the results, it is considered here as an A-IFRS’s break. 
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conclusion is in line with a number of other accounting and financial studies (e.g., Akisik 
& Pfeiffer, 2009; Goldstein & Razin, 2006). An alternative explanation was given, 
attributing the effect on DEL to other factors, such as the high Australian tax-rate and 
government restrictions, such as discrimination in the approval process for projects, and 
restrictions on land ownership. These clearly affect the level of such investment in an 
attempt to protect the country’s natural resources, especially those exploited by the mining 
sector. Golub et al. (2003) estimate that Australia could attract around 45% more foreign 
direct investment than it does, by lowering foreign direct investment restrictions to the 
same level as that of the UK.   
Table 6. 6: Foreign Direct Equity (FDE) 
Control variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 11.85*** 5.31** 6.46*** 7.32*** 7.73*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS -0.04 
(-0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.07 
(-0.75) 
-0.03 
(-0.36) 
-0.03 
(-0.30) 
ECT(-1) -0.78*** 
(-6.09) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.25*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.38*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.34*** 
(-4.35) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.07 
(1.48) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
-0.09 
(-0.49) 
0.06 
(0.60) 
-0.08 
(-0.57) 
R
^2
 0.994807 0.990906 0.991824 0.993568 0.990783 
F test 2035.285 1157.702 1288.940 1641.273 1142.082 
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2- Total Foreign Debt (TFD) 
Table 6.7 provides only limited evidence that A-IFRS application affected TFD. The 
results show that while, in the short run, the DA-IFRS coefficients are positive, but not 
significant (except for Model 9 in Appendix H.5), in the long run, they are significant for 
the second set of models only (See results for Models 6, 7, 8, and 9, in Appendix H.5). The 
existence of this long-run effect of A-IFRS on TFD is further supported by an ECT, which 
is both significant and negative; however, the small value of this coefficient indicates the 
existence of an unstable, long-run relationship between TFD and the regressors. These 
findings fail to provide strong support for the explanation, based on information 
asymmetry, which is advanced by a number of studies (e.g., Bharath et al., 2008; Kim et 
al., 2011). While such a finding is perhaps surprising, it is definitely informative, 
especially considering that TFD represents more than 60% of TFI (See Appendix A). This 
may be due to that the fact that the present study focuses on Australia, a country that 
already had high-quality accounting standards and, therefore, no information asymmetry 
between foreign-debt providers and local companies prior to A-IFRS application. 
However, it is important to interpret the results carefully, as they may have been 
influenced by the increased volatility of earnings and debt-related risk that followed the 
GFC of 2008 (Adzis, 2012), effects that are evident in the results of the CUSUM test (See 
Appendix G) under Model 6. There is also the possibility that this outcome is driven by 
one or two of the disaggregated variables, such as FDD and FPD, which, under the 
CUSUMQ test, already showed structural breaks in 2008 (See Figure 6.1 above).
37
 This 
                                                          
37
Also, in Figure 5.4, FPD appeared to be affected by GFC more than any other components, which 
dropped considerably. However, this effect was short-term only (2008), followed by a rapid 
increase. 
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instability may have affected the significance of the coefficients of TFD. In view of this 
uncertainty, it is necessary to examine the effect of A-IFRS, on each component of TFD in 
turn. 
Table 6. 7: Total Foreign Debt (TFD) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 3.004 2.950 8.521*** 3.364 5.779** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.051 
(1.219) 
0.061 
(1.059) 
0.0762 
(1.478) 
0.049 
(1.016) 
0.054 
(0.999) 
ECT (-1) -0.077** 
(-2.203) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.715) 
-0.158*** 
(-4.508) 
-0.126** 
(-2.338) 
-0.172*** 
(-3.750) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.431 
(1.611) 
0.1445 
(0.531) 
0.1729 
(1.091) 
0.2349 
(1.376) 
-0.044 
(-0.288) 
R
^2
 0.998558 0.997353 0.997953 0.998162 0.997681 
F test 7359.343 4003.555 5180.208 5769.698 4571.630 
 
 
Foreign Direct Debt (FDD) 
As reported in Table 6.8, the ECT is negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
deviations from the long run are corrected, around 12–25% in the following period. This 
represents a relatively slow pace of re-adjustment to equilibrium. DA-IFRS is significant 
and positive in both the short and long run, indicating an increase in FDD inflows 
following A-IFRS application. Compared to the aggregated data reported in Table 6.3, the 
short-run coefficient for FDD is similar, while its long-run coefficient is much larger. 
Overall, these results support the argument that the structural break in 2006Q4 is due to the 
application of A-IFRS. The possible explanation is that, since direct debt occurs only 
between foreign corporations and their affiliates, it is more likely to be used simply to 
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accrue taxation benefits (IMF, 2009); therefore, it is less affected by information 
asymmetry. Consequently, consistent with tax-motivated debt and income–shifting 
incentives, the improved quality of financial reporting and increased international 
comparability under A-IFRS limited the ability of MNCs to manipulate their profit by 
using different measurement methods; therefore, the only legal way to transfer profit from 
Australia was by using internal finance. This interpretation is supported by a number of 
previous studies. For instance, Márquez-Ramos (2011) found that IFRS application had a 
significant effect on direct debt in Europe. It was also supported by De Simone (2016), 
who found an increase in income-shifting in MNCs, after the shift to IFRS. Like the 
present result, he found that this increase occurred within a two-years period of the 
change-over to IFRS. Taylor et al. (2011) also found that MNCs in Australia were subject 
to thin capitalisation, after the introduction of Australian equivalents of IFRS. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the improved quality and increased comparability of financial 
reporting under A-IFRS, reduced the opportunities for entities to engage in profit-
manipulation (See Horton et al., 2013), thereby, leading to an increase in FDD as the only 
legal way of shifting income. This result highlights a very important debate over the 
legality-versus-ethics of using internal debt as an income-shifting strategy; therefore, it 
should be considered a fertile area for future research.   
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Table 6. 8: Foreign Direct Debt (FDD) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 4.21 6.39** 5.39** 4.46 6.80*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.16*** 
(3.84) 
0.15*** 
(3.72) 
0.173*** 
(4.08) 
0.16*** 
(3.89) 
0.160*** 
(4.33) 
ECT (-1) -0.13*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.22*** 
(-6.13) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.16*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.25*** 
(-5.42) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.94* 
(1.83) 
0.66*** 
(2.92) 
1.26* 
(1.93) 
0.716* 
(1.71) 
0.44*** 
(2.93) 
R
^2
 0.994583 0.995083 0.994848 0.994509 0.994949 
F test 1713.580 1888.944 1802.241 1690.541 1838.452 
 
 
 
Foreign Portfolio Debt and Loan: 
i- Foreign Portfolio Debt (FPD) 
As suggested by the results in Figure 6.1, the GFC may have had a bearing on the 
behaviour of FPD; therefore, the observations for 2008Q3–2009Q2 are excluded from the 
study. The results in Table 6.9 show that the DA-IFRS coefficients, in both the short and 
long run, are positive and significant. The existence of this long-run effect is supported by 
the ECT, which indicates a significant stable effect on FPD from the significant regressors, 
specifically A-IFRS. This result supports the argument that the structural break in 2004Q3 
is due to the application of A-IFRS, a finding that is in line with that of Beneish et al. 
(2015) and Florou and Kosi (2015), where IFRS adoption had a significant, positive effect 
on FPD. Compared to that on FDD, however, this effect is smaller. 
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Table 6. 9: Foreign Portfolio Debt (FPD) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 8.98*** 6.48** 11.33*** 6.66** 8.34*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.10*** 
(4.33) 
0.09*** 
(3.63) 
0.07*** 
(2.79) 
0.093*** 
(3.84) 
0.096*** 
(3.58) 
ECT (-1) -0.24*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.15*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.17*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.26*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.18*** 
(-4.56) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.25*** 
(2.82) 
0.56** 
(2.18) 
0.38** 
(2.27) 
0.29** 
(2.30) 
0.35** 
(2.20) 
R
^2
 0.998341 0.997178 0.997771 0.998150 0.997441 
F test 6392.492 3754.443 4756.050 5732.528 4141.154 
 
 
 
ii- Foreign Loan (FL) 
The results reported in Table 6.10 indicate that there is a positive effect on FL in 2005Q3, 
in both the short and long-run, at the 10% level of significance or better. The short-run 
coefficient of DA-IFRS indicates an increase in FL around 25%, while the long-run 
coefficient is on average around 90% indicating a larger increase in inflows. The ECT 
supports the existence of a significant and stable long-run effect of A-IFRS on FL (-1). 
These findings are consistent with the findings by Kim et al. (2011). 
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Table 6. 10: Foreign Loan (FL) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 4.36 3.03 6.15** 3.83 4.22 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.27** 
(2.49) 
0.24* 
(1.90) 
0.26** 
(2.23) 
0.27** 
(2.38) 
0.24* 
(1.91) 
ECT(-1) -0.18*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.21*** 
(-3.40) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.93** 
(2.52) 
0.73 
(1.63) 
1.03*** 
(2.64) 
0.83** 
(2.09) 
0.48 
(1.35) 
R
^2
 0.990149 0.986391 0.988447 0.988711 0.987242 
F test 938.0803 676.4702 798.5033 817.4219 722.2444 
 
 
 
Overall, there was a significant increase in both FPD and FL, within the first year of the 
availability of annual reports under A-IFRS, with structural breaks appearing in them, in 
2004Q3, and 2005Q3, respectively. This may be an indication that FPD was more 
sensitive to the improved-quality of accounting information and greater transparency under 
the newly-adopted standards, than FL and FPE, both of which showed a structural break in 
2005Q3. This explanation has since been successively supported by Ball et al (2008) and 
Florou and Kosi (2015). There are a number of possible explanations for these results. 1) 
The introduction of AASB 1, 1047, 132,139 and use of fair value, under A-IFRS, appeared 
to result in more relevant and reliable information, which allowed debt providers (in 
portfolio and loans) to estimate the quality of credit more accurately (Florou & Kosi, 2015; 
Kim et al., 2011). 2) Public financial reporting under A-IFRS played an important role in 
reducing information asymmetry, especially in view of these standards’ requirement for 
more extensive disclosure. This, in turn, permitted investors in debt to more accurately 
assess debt risk. 3) Improved financial statements, in terms of international comparability, 
   
146 
 
post-A-IFRS application, reduced both the information disadvantage for foreign creditors 
and the risk and so encouraged more investment in cross-border debt (Chan et al., 2013). 
This last explanation is also consistent with Armstrong et al. (2010), and with Australian 
studies that provide evidence that A-IFRS increased the relevancy, reliability, and 
international comparability of financial reporting (Cheong et al., 2010; Goodwin et al., 
2008; Taylor et al., 2010). Thus, this thesis concludes that the A-GAAP convergence to A-
IFRS may have been associated with more relevant and reliable information, which 
reduced the information disadvantage for foreign investors, and thus, increased foreign 
debt, in both portfolio and loan inflows. 
Foreign Derivatives (FDR) 
In Chapter 5, FDR indicated a positive structural break in 2007Q2, a time close to the 
implementation of AASB 7. This suggests that the implementation of AASB 7, which 
required extensive disclosure of quantitative and qualitative information, provided a 
greater amount of more value-relevant information to foreign investors (Birt et al., 2013). 
However, the increase in uncertainty during the GFC (2008–2009) may have driven 
foreign investors to invest in FDR in an attempt to mitigate the risk. Therefore, in this 
chapter, by using the control variables, I control for the commodity-price risk, credit risk, 
and exchange-rate risk. The results in Table 6.11 show that even after these risks are 
controlled for, FDR is still positively affected by A-IFRS application, in both the short and 
long run. The existence of the long-run effect is further supported by the ECT, which has a 
coefficient that is both negative and significant. The results of the ARDL model support 
those of the BP structural break test, in Chapter 5. This suggests that the implementation of 
AASB 7 may have encouraged foreign debt providers to be more confident about using 
derivatives. This interpretation is consistent with the suggestion of Birt et al. (2013) that 
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the introduction of AASB 7 appeared to have resulted in more transparent reporting of 
risk-management policies relating to hedging activities. In addition, they suggest that the 
provision under AASB 7, of more qualitative and quantitative disclosure enhanced the 
information environment for decision-makers. In this way, the introduction of AASB 7 
may have attracted more foreign investment in derivatives. To the best of the knowledge, 
the present study is the first in the field of accounting to investigate the effect of the 
convergence of A-GAAP to A-IFRS on the foreign derivatives. In addition, no other study 
has investigated the association between IFRS application and FDR.  
Table 6.11: Foreign Derivatives (FDR) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 10.08*** 13.48*** 10.17*** 10.67*** 10.73*** 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.63*** 
(3.49) 
0.73*** 
(4.08) 
0.63*** 
(3.40) 
0.63*** 
(3.49) 
0.65*** 
(3.58) 
ECT(-1) -0.77*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.88*** 
(-6.41) 
-0.73*** 
(-5.27) 
-0.77*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.75*** 
(-5.41) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 1.16*** 
(6.85) 
1.18*** 
(8.41) 
1.06*** 
(7.05) 
1.12*** 
(7.61) 
1.09*** 
(6.74) 
R
^2
 0.985035 0.985154 0.983862 0.984953 0.984848 
F test 526.5852 530.8561 487.7300 523.6595 519.9971 
 
 
Other Foreign Debts (OFD) 
Like FRD, in Chapter 5, OFD showed a significant structural break, but this time in 
2007Q3, a date close to both AASB 7 implementation and the GFC. The results, after the 
effects of other variables were controlled for, are presented in Table 6.12. While it has 
been suggested that IFRS adoption increased other debt (IASB, 2010, p.9; Hail et al., 
2010), the DA-IFRS coefficients, in the short-run, are positive, but not significant, while in 
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the long-run, they are significant. The only exceptions to this, in the long-run, are those 
under Model 2 (and Models 6 and 7 in Appendix H.10). These findings fail to support 
either the information-asymmetry-based explanation of Li et al., (2017), which suggests 
that IFRS adoption increases other debt (trade credit, in their study), or that advanced by 
Love (2011), that providers of other debt choose to support their customers during credit 
squeezes. One possible explanation for this is that prior to the shift to A-IFRS, there was 
no information asymmetry/trust issue for providers of other debt in countries such as 
Australia, that have a strong legal system and enforcement regime (Li et al., 2017). To the 
best of the knowledge, the study of Li et al. (2017) is the only other accounting study to 
have investigated the effect of IFRS application on other foreign debt; however, unlike the 
present study, they examined trade credit only. Furthermore, they used cross-sectional 
data, and covered only a limited time-period around the implementation of IFRS use. 
Table 6.12: Other Foreign Debts (OFD) 
Control variables 
included in each model 
Model 1 
RGDP 
Model 2 
TOT 
Model 3 
OPEN 
Model 4 
EXCH 
Model 5 
INT 
Bound test 4.19 4.55 * 4.48 * 4.50* 4.55* 
Short Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.06 
(0.93) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.08 
(1.25) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.08 
(1.17) 
ECT(-1) -0.26 *** 
(-3.60) 
-0.25 *** 
(-3.79) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.28*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.74) 
Long Run Coefficients 
DA-IFRS 0.20 * 
(1.72) 
0.16 
(1.10) 
0.25*** 
(2.66) 
0.171* 
(1.68) 
0.22* 
(1.95) 
R
^2
 0.995007 0.994601 0.994963 0.995155 0.994639 
F test 2448.306 2263.165 2426.845 2523.317 2279.385 
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6.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, to ensure that any such structural break indicated in Chapter 5 was indeed, 
due to A-IFRS application, the ARDL approach was used to control for the effects of other 
macroeconomic events, such as the commodity-price boom or currency fluctuations, both 
of which occurred within the same window. To do this, five control variables were chosen: 
RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXC, and INT. The results provided compelling evidence of a 
significant increase in most foreign investment components.  
This section provides a conclusion, followed by a discussion of the findings of the study in 
relation to the research questions established in Chapter 1, and developed in Chapter 4. To 
compare the findings of the present study with those of past empirical research, the 
discussion draws on the overview of the latter, in Chapter 3. The results for each 
component, in relation to the research question, are now summarised in Table 6.13. 
Table 6. 13: Summary of the Results Under ARDL Model 
Control V.s DA-IFRS RGDP TOT OPEN EXCH INT 
TFI Short-run 0.14*** 
(4.07) 
0.14*** 
(2.82) 
0.13*** 
(3.02) 
0.13*** 
(3.13) 
0.14*** 
(2.87) 
Long-run 0.40*** 
(2.92) 
0.44 
(1.29) 
0.28* 
(1.69) 
0.42** 
(2.09) 
0.14 
(0.99) 
TFE Short-run 0.169** 
(2.034) 
0.118 
(1.115) 
0.1501 
(1.516) 
0.1375 
(1.5994) 
0.0956 
(0.9033) 
Long-run 0.0927 
(0.6691) 
0.2897 
(1.0421) 
-0.0008 
(-0.004) 
0.1053 
(0.6684) 
-0.0522 
(-0.358) 
FPE Short-run 0.36*** 
(2.87) 
0.29** 
(2.12) 
0.41*** 
(3.04) 
0.32*** 
(2.64) 
0.307** 
(2.15) 
Long-run 0.96*** 
(3.79) 
1.07*** 
(3.37) 
1.42*** 
(3.80) 
0.93*** 
(3.65) 
0.79*** 
(3.87) 
FDE Short-run -0.04 
(-0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.07 
(-0.75) 
-0.03 
(-0.36) 
-0.03 
(-0.30) 
Long-run 0.07 
(1.48) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
-0.09 
(-0.49) 
0.06 
(0.60) 
-0.08 
(-0.57) 
TFD Short-run 0.051 0.061 0.0762 0.049 0.054 
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(1.219) (1.059) (1.478) (1.016) (0.999) 
Long-run 0.431 
(1.611) 
0.1445 
(0.531) 
0.1729 
(1.091) 
0.2349 
(1.376) 
-0.044 
(-0.288) 
FDD Short-run 0.16*** 
(3.84) 
0.15*** 
(3.72) 
0.173*** 
(4.08) 
0.16*** 
(3.89) 
0.160*** 
(4.33) 
Long-run 0.94* 
(1.83) 
0.66*** 
(2.92) 
1.26* 
(1.93) 
0.716* 
(1.71) 
0.44*** 
(2.93) 
FPD Short-run 0.10*** 
(4.33) 
0.09*** 
(3.63) 
0.07*** 
(2.79) 
0.093*** 
(3.84) 
0.096*** 
(3.58) 
Long-run 0.25*** 
(2.82) 
0.56** 
(2.18) 
0.38** 
(2.27) 
0.29** 
(2.30) 
0.35** 
(2.20) 
FL Short-run 0.27** 
(2.49) 
0.24* 
(1.90) 
0.26** 
(2.23) 
0.27** 
(2.38) 
0.24* 
(1.91) 
Long-run 0.93** 
(2.52) 
0.73 
(1.63) 
1.03*** 
(2.64) 
0.83** 
(2.09) 
0.48 
(1.35) 
FDR Short-run 0.63*** 
(3.49) 
0.73*** 
(4.08) 
0.63*** 
(3.40) 
0.63*** 
(3.49) 
0.65*** 
(3.58) 
Long-run 1.16*** 
(6.85) 
1.18*** 
(8.41) 
1.06*** 
(7.05) 
1.12*** 
(7.61) 
1.09*** 
(6.74) 
OFD Short-run 0.06 
(0.93) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.08 
(1.25) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.08 
(1.17) 
Long-run 0.20 * 
(1.72) 
0.16 
(1.10) 
0.25*** 
(2.66) 
0.171* 
(1.68) 
0.22* 
(1.95) 
 
 
In general, the results of the ARDL model support those of the BP structural break test, 
thereby confirming that A-IFRS application significantly increased foreign investment 
inflows in the short- and long-run. The only exception to this are FDE, which already 
indicated a structural break outside the A-IFRS event window, and OFD, where the 
evidence of a significant effect is limited, and in the long-run only. Furthermore, the 
consistency of the results for all components of foreign investment provides further 
support for the prediction of this thesis by implying that the introduction of A-IFRS 
provided more relevant, reliable and comparable information, particularly in view of the 
requirement for more extensive disclosure under AASB 7, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry. This, in turn, enabled foreign providers to more accurately assess of risk 
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aspect of their investments (Birt et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2010; Yu & Wahid, 2014). The 
long-run positive effects appear to be present for almost all the debt flow variables.  As 
suggested by Bruggemann et al. (2013) and Callao et al. (2007), this is most likely due to 
the steady improvement of compliance over time, as preparers and auditors of financial 
reports gradually became more conversant with the new regulations. 
Overall, the results confirm that A-IFRS application played an important role in both the 
short and long term, in attracting foreign capital to Australia, despite the fact that this 
country already had a set of high-quality accounting standards prior to application. It 
confirms the realisation by Australia, of its primary reason for adopting an internationally-
accepted set of accounting standards such as A-IFRS, that is, “ [to] facilitate cross-border 
comparisons by investors, and enable Australian companies to access international capital 
markets”(Commonwealth, 2002, p. 102). 
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CHAPTER7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction  
The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the application of A-IFRS had an effect 
on foreign investment. This was achieved through a comprehensive analysis of the 
components of Australia's foreign investment, for the period 1989Q1–2012Q4. These 
included all types of foreign investment inflows, that is, both aggregated and disaggregated 
components of debt and equity. Section 7.2 of this chapter provides a summary of the 
thesis. Section 7.3 discusses the implications of the findings, and Section 7.4 highlights the 
main contributions of the study, while Section 7.5 considers its limitations. The chapter 
concludes with Section 7.6, which outlines possible directions for future research. 
7.2 Summary of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 provided a brief background to the global application of IFRS, including a 
discussion of its expected benefit. The general expectation was that the use of the new 
standards would result in reduced information asymmetry between local and foreign 
investors. This, in turn, was expected to enhance foreign investment mobility, which was 
the main long-term goal of IFRS application. Consequently, in 2002, the decision was 
made by the EU countries to apply IFRS as of 1
st
 of January 2005.  
The discussion then, was, extended to include the background to A-GAAP’s convergence 
to IFRS, which, for the purposes of this thesis, is termed A-IFRS. The Australian 
government and its standard-setters considered the application of A-IFRS to be the optimal 
way to support Australian businesses, in order to improve their capacity to compete, 
internationally. Such an economic benefit is the consequence of the improved quality and 
global comparability of financial statements, under A-IFRS. However, as Australia already 
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had high-quality accounting standards (A-GAAP), it would not reap the full benefits of A-
IFRS as the convergence might actually compromise the quality of its A-GAAP, especially 
under AASB 132, AASB 138, AASB 139, and AASB 7, which are connected with the use 
of fair value (e.g., Cheong & Al Masum, 2010; Haswell & Langfield-Smith, 2008; Taylor 
& Tower, 2009).   
Chapter 3 reviewed the theoretical and empirical studies in the fields of finance and 
accounting. These showed that investment mobility, across borders, is affected by 
information asymmetry and, perhaps, more importantly, by the accounting differences 
between countries. Thus, foreign investors are aware of being informationally 
disadvantaged, compared to local investors. Therefore, a single accounting regime, such as 
the IFRS, could be expected to reduce such differences in accounting standards and 
thereby increase investor confidence in investing abroad.  
The empirical evidence, from both international and Australian accounting studies, showed 
mixed results. Portfolio debt and equity, as well as loans, increased significantly, following 
the application of IFRS. However, this effect was associated more with countries where 
the application of IFRS was mandatory and where the country had strong enforcement. In 
contrast, evidence of an association between IFRS and increased direct investment was 
found, more often in developing countries whose local accounting standards differed 
considerably from IFRS. Moreover, other factors, such as tax rate and restrictions on 
foreign investment, also play a key role in attracting direct equity. Also, while there was 
evidence of a significant increase in foreign direct debt, by MNCs, following a country’s 
application of IFRS, no study investigated the connection between foreign derivatives and 
IFRS; however, there was evidence of a significant association between disclosure 
concerning the use of the derivatives, and the introduction of IFRS. Finally, as was the 
   
154 
 
case for foreign direct equity, while there was evidence of a link between other foreign 
debt and the application of IFRS, there was no such association in countries with strong 
governance.  
Chapter 4 developed a broad, theoretical framework that focused on foreign investment 
inflows. It argued that foreign investors are informationally disadvantaged, compared to 
local investors because of the differences in accounting standards and disclosure 
requirements between countries. Consequently, it was expected that using a set of global 
accounting standards would reduce such a disadvantage, thereby increasing the relevance 
and reliability of accounting information and so making foreign investors more confident 
to invest abroad. According to this conceptual viewpoint, Australia may have benefitted 
from the introduction of A-IFRS by enjoying increased foreign capital inflows.  
Building on the above argument, a research question was established with which to 
investigate the relationship between the application of A-IFRS and foreign investment 
inflow. Given that the effect of this application could vary, according to the particular 
component of such investment, the research question had to describe the anticipated effect 
on each, individual component of foreign investment: FPE, FDE, FDD, FPD, FL, FRD, 
and OFD.  
Consistent with the above argument, the prediction was that the date of the effect of A-
IFRS would also vary among these components, manifesting itself either earlier or later 
dates from the official implementation. Therefore, the A-IFRS event window had to cover 
the first transition, consolidation and reporting periods, finally being set at 2004Q3 –
2007Q3.   
In Chapter 5, the research design was outlined. This involved the use of a range of 
structural-break methods. Basically, two types of tests to determine the date of the 
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structural break (the first exogenously and the second endogenously) were applied. The 
latter type is considered the principal contribution of the present study. Firstly, a single 
structural break was identified exogenously using the Perron (1989) IO and AO models. In 
order to apply these, the comprehensive models, the IO3 and AO3, which allowed for the 
change to be detected in both the intercept and trend, were used. The date of 2005Q3, 
which marks the first half-year reporting under A-IFR, was pre-selected as that of the 
structural break. The results obtained from both models were mixed for all components; 
this could have been due to an earlier or later effect, or, alternatively, to the presence of 
more than one structural break in the series. Therefore, next, the test to identify the date of 
the structural break endogenously was used. Since it was anticipated that there could be 
more than one break, as the time-series covered a lengthy period of 24 years, the decision 
was made to apply the Bai and Perron (2003) test. Overall, the findings indicated a 
significant structural break around the date of A-IFRS application, in all Australian foreign 
investment inflows, except FDE. The consistency of these results provides further support 
for the study’s prediction. The results revealed that while the aggregated components (TFI, 
TFE, and TFD) showed a structural break in 2004Q4, different dates were indicated for the 
disaggregated ones: some components (PEL and FL) had a significant break in 2005Q3; 
another (FPD) showed the effect in 2004Q3, while the remainder (FDD, FRD, and OFD) 
registered the break in 2006Q4, 2007Q2, and 2007Q, respectively. To add robustness to 
the above findings, the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test that endogenously determines two 
structural breaks was applied. Although this test differs from the Bai and Perron (2003) 
both identified, approximately, the same break date for each of the variables, falling within 
the A-IFR event window. This provides further support for the results of the Bai and 
Perron (2003) multiple structural break test. 
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In general, since all of the break dates fall around 2005, they are consistent with the effects 
of the introduction under A-IFRS of a high-quality financial reporting regime with greater 
comparability. However, an important concern in studies on the impact of mandatory IFRS 
application is being able to provide evidence that the documented increase in foreign 
investment is, indeed, a direct benefit of such an application, rather than the result of other 
institutional or macroeconomic changes that also affected Australia during the application 
period. Therefore, in Chapter 6, the ARDL model was used to control for the effects of 
these other variables (i.e., RGDP, TOT, OPEN, EXC, and INT). By considering the 
application of A-IFRS in isolation, it was hoped that this thesis would confirm that the 
application of A-IFRS resulted in a significant structural break in foreign investment flows 
into Australia. For TFI the results strongly supported the notion that A-IFRS had a positive 
effect on Australian foreign investment inflows. The next steps in the investigation focused 
on the aggregated components of TFI, namely, TFE and TFD. Firstly, for TFE, the results 
were not significant. This could have been due to the fact that the various components of 
TFE react differently and so may have offset each other in the overall effect. Therefore, 
this chapter then investigated the disaggregated components, namely, FPE and FDE. The 
results of the ARDL model did confirm that A-IFRS application had a positive effect on 
FPE; however, they also confirmed the finding, presented in Chapter 5 that there was no 
such effect on FDE.  
 Following this, the effect of the application of A-IFRS on TFD was investigated; as in the 
case of TFE, the results were inconclusive. Therefore, next, the disaggregated components 
were investigated. Overall, the results confirmed the existence of a positive and 
statistically significant effect of A-IFRS application on most components of Australia's 
foreign investment inflow, that is, FDD, FPD, FL, and FDR. The only exception to this 
was OFD, for which the results were non-significant. This could have been due to a lack of 
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information symmetry between the OFD providers and the Australian firms whose data 
were used in the study. 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates support for the premise that, following the 
introduction of A-IFRS, most foreign investment inflows were significantly higher than 
before. These findings are consistent with the theoretically based prediction that IFRS 
application reduces the information disadvantage that is faced by foreign investors. A 
possible explanation for the increase in foreign investment inflows is that the move to A-
IFRS was akin to the introduction of a new regulation, in that it provided the impetus for 
firms to review their disclosure requirements, both qualitative and quantitative and so 
modify their existing accounting policies and practices. Such modifications, subsequently, 
created a financial environment characterised by greater transparency, reduced uncertainty, 
and enhanced comparability – one that increased the flow of quality information to 
investors, thereby encouraging them to participate more extensively in foreign capital 
markets. This greater pressure on firms to enhance the information environment during the 
post-A-IFRS-application period may, in turn, have been an important driver of increased 
foreign investment inflows. Moreover, while there is no theoretical support for a long-term 
effect, the significant long-run coefficients under the ARDL model could signify that in 
the long-run, as preparers, users, auditors and enforcers become more conversant with, and 
proficient in, the application of A-IFRS, compliance will improve, and common guidelines 
and interpretations of the standards, emerge. This is consistent with the suggestion of 
Bruggemann et al. (2013). 
In addition, the disaggregated analysis was undertaken to provide new, deeper insights into 
inconclusive previous empirical findings and so help to resolve theoretical arguments 
regarding the effect of IFRS application, in a country such as Australia, which already had 
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high-quality accounting standards. The results of such an analysis indicate that the increase 
in foreign investment inflows was, indeed, associated with A-IFRS application. Thus, 
these findings are consistent with the suggestion of Zeff (1978), that accounting changes 
are associated with economic consequences and also, with the objectives of the regulator, 
as stated in CLERP No 9, that:    
“In a globalised economy with large and growing cross-border capital movements, high 
quality internationally accepted accounting standards will facilitate cross-border 
comparisons by investors, and enable Australian companies to access foreign capital 
markets at lower cost…” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 102). 
7.3 Implications of the Findings 
The findings of the present study have a number of implications. The first, and most 
important, relates to the generic role that financial reporting standards can play in 
promoting overall foreign investment inflows to a country. While some researchers and 
policymakers assumed that IFRS application by a country such as Australia, would have 
no effect on its overall foreign investment inflow, such an assertion is challenged by the 
findings of this thesis, that A-IFRS are likely to be a useful decision-making tool for 
foreign investors, wishing to invest in Australian projects.  
Moreover, the findings from the current study show that A-IFRS application had, on 
average, a positive and statistically significant effect on foreign investment inflows, with 
the only exceptions to this being foreign direct equity and other foreign debt. These 
findings have implications for regulators, standard-setters and financial-reporting 
stakeholders. For instance, they are potentially useful to the IASB in its quest for a strategy 
that will encourage the global application of IFRS. In addition, the findings could also be 
important for any other country considering the adopting of IFRS, such as the US and 
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Switzerland, or countries that are considering the partial adoption of IFRS, such as 
Canada. Moreover, it is also important for global organisations such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, as these are considered to be the most prolific providers of foreign 
investment as aid loans to developing countries (e.g., Nobes & Zeff, 2016; Camfferman & 
Zeff, 2018).  
In addition, previous studies (e.g., Gordon et al., 2012) have concluded that, following 
IFRA application, FDE increased in developing countries, but not in developed countries. 
This is because FDE is driven by more than information asymmetry; it is also sensitive to 
investment restrictions and tax rates (Golub et al., 2003). By using time-series data for a 
single country, the present study reached the same conclusion, that is, that there was no 
significant effect on Australian foreign direct equity inflow, following the application of 
A-IFRS. This result is economically significant, and, so, may have an important 
implication for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as the greater the 
regulations it introduces to protect Australian resources, the greater will be the cost to 
those investors who do not pose a threat to national interests. DFAT, therefore, may need 
to consider reducing the regulatory restrictions, such as those on the percentage of 
ownership, that are faced by foreign direct investors wanting to invest in Australia,  as well 
as simplifying the approval process for projects. Furthermore, the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) may need to take action to devise tax policies that do not deter foreign direct 
investment, so as to ensure that Australia gets its fair share of such investment, from 
sources such as MNCs.   
Finally, the results also indicate an increase in FDD following the application of IFRS, a 
finding that was indicated in a cross-sectional study by Márquez-Ramos (2011). This may 
imply that 'income-shifting', that is, a company shifting its profits to another jurisdiction, 
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may have been operating (Taylor & Richardson, 2014). While this may appear to be a 
negative effect of the application of A-IFRS, the research’s interpretation is that income-
shifting may have always been practised by companies wishing to conceal their true 
financial performance, but has only come to light because of the greater transparency of 
financial information, under A-IFRS. Therefore, there is a need for the ATO to curb such a 
practice, by making thin-capitalisation rules applicable only to corporate groups with 
foreign affiliates, to prevent the transfer the nation’s wealth to other jurisdictions. 
7.4 Contributions  
The present study contributes, in a number of ways, to the existing literature that 
investigates the benefits of IFRS application (e.g., Akisik & Pfeiffer, 2009; Callao et al., 
2007; Godfrey et al., 2003; Wang & Welker, 2011). Firstly, it sheds light on the question 
of whether the introduction of A-IRFS positively impacted the level of foreign investment 
inflow to Australia. As this effect can vary from component to component of foreign 
investment, each was investigated separately. The findings contribute to the previous 
literature that has also investigated different components of investment (e.g., Akisik & 
Pfeiffer, 2009; Ball et al., 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015); however, the present study 
extended these investigations by examining all foreign investment components. In this 
way, it complements these earlier studies (e.g., Dyckman & Zeff, 2015; Zeff, 1978).   
Secondly, this thesis extends event-study research on IFRS, by identifying a positive 
reaction by foreign investors, around the date of the application of A-IFRS. These findings 
are consistent with those of previous studies, which also identified a favourable benefit, 
following transition to IFRS (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Daske et al., 2008; Yu & 
Wahid, 2014). Such studies used a pre-selected date that pre-empted when the effect of 
IFRS would be likely to appear. However, the present study chose to identify the date of 
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the effect endogenously by means of the multiple-structural-break test that is used in the 
fields of finance and economics. This permitted the data to determine whether any effect of 
A-IFRS application occurred earlier or later than the actual date of mandated adoption, 
2005. This approach has been suggested by Dyckman and Zeff (2015). The endogenously 
identified structural breaks may help to alleviate an earlier concern about the practice of - 
the date of an event; such a practice may result in a spurious outcome, as it could fail to 
capture the targeted effect. The present study also takes into account the influence of other 
contemporaneous events, such as financial crises and the commodity-price boom, which, if 
ignored, could result in a biased estimation. In this way, the present study incorporates 
other disciplines, i.e., finance and economics, into accounting research; this is one of the 
future lines of enquiry suggested by Dyckman & Zeff (2015).  
Thirdly, in international accounting, there is a limited number of studies that investigate 
the effect of IFRS, using cross-sectional data at a national level. Of these, most focus on 
the EU countries (e.g., Beneish et al., 2015; Gordon et al, 2012; Ramanna & Sletten, 
2014). The present study is the only one to be conducted at a national level, using a single 
country. By using such an approach, the study avoids having to deal with any differences 
that may exist between countries, in terms of their date and process of implementation, and 
their particular type of institutional setting (e.g. economic, political, cultural) (See, Brochet 
et al., 2013; Camfferman & Zeff, 2018). Moreover, the study examines the case of 
Australia, that, ex-ante, already had high quality accounting standards, with legislative 
backing. This fact had informed the principal argument against Australia’s adopting IFRS. 
Therefore, the study complements previous ones by documenting that the application of 
IFRS had benefits even for a country that already had high quality accounting standards.  
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 7.5 Limitations 
As with any research, this thesis, too, has limitations, and these must be taken into account 
when interpreting the results.  
The main limitation is that the analysis is restricted to Australia's inflows and, as such, the 
results cannot be extrapolated to other countries. For example, countries that were late-
adopters or are still non-adopters of IFRS may exhibit different breaks or patterns, either 
during the transition-to-application phase, or during the time of the study, itself. Similarly, 
those that adopted IFRS under a different economic structures or policies, may exhibit 
breaks that differ from those identified in this thesis with an Australian focus. For 
example, the UK and Germany are service-orientated economies, with few restrictions on 
foreign, direct investment, while Australia is a commodity-driven economy, where very 
restrictive regulations concerning such investment, operate 
Secondly, the thesis does not investigate the association between A-IFRS and other various 
components of portfolio debt and loans, such as short- and long- run debt and public and 
private debt, nor that of A-IRFS and other foreign debt, such as bank deposits, payable 
accounts, and trade credit. Including these variables in the testing may have produced 
different results in terms of the effect of A-IFRS application on foreign debt. These issues 
will need to be dealt with by future studies.    
7.6 Directions for Future Research  
Despite these limitations, it may be worthwhile for future researchers to replicate, as well 
as extend, the line of research undertaken by the current study. There are a number of 
possible directions that this could take: 
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The first is to extend the current study, by examining the structural breaks of early 
adopters, such as Australia, and then comparing this data with those of countries that did 
not adopt IFRS in 2005–2006. If the foreign investment components show a consistent 
pattern around 2005 for IFRS adopters, and no structural break for non- or late-adopting 
countries, such research will add weight to the argument that IFRS did facilitate the 
movement of global capital. 
A second possible line of future research is to compare the effect of IFRS application on 
the components of foreign investment inflow in countries with strong enforcement, such as 
Australia and New Zealand, with that of countries with less-stringent enforcement regimes 
and weaker investor and creditor protection, such as Venezuela and Brazil. This would test 
the findings that the synergy of IFRS application and strong enforcement, positively 
affects the components of foreign investment (e.g., Daske et al., 2008). 
A third possibility for future research would draw on the following theories of agency 
conflict and adverse selection. Investment in debt can be categorised in two ways: firstly, 
in terms of its mutuality (short-term or long-term debt); secondly, in terms of its source 
(private or public debt). Typically, the literature (e.g., Goldstein & Razin, 2006) adopts the 
view that because of agency conflict, long-term debt is affected more than short-term debt, 
by information asymmetry. Also, it indicates that due to this agency conflict between 
managers and outside-investors, which arises from the former having the advantage of 
being able to access private information, private debt is managed more efficiently than 
public debt. This creates a situation of information asymmetry (adverse selection) among 
investors in different types of debt (Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). Therefore, future 
researchers, by applying a method similar to the one used in this study, might be able to 
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obtain even more evidence of the effect of IFRS application on information asymmetry 
among investors in different types of debt.  
Moreover, as the present study failed to reach a definite conclusion concerning A-IFRS 
and other foreign debt, future researchers might consider extending it by investigating 
disaggregated other foreign debt, such as bank deposits, payable accounts, and trade credit. 
The study also indicated that in Australia’s foreign investment inflow, there was a 
significant, positive structural break, in 2007Q2, in derivatives. This was the date of the 
implementation of IFRS 7 and AASB 7, both of which required a greater quantity and 
quality of disclosure. This investigation could be extended to include other adopter 
countries, in order to determine whether or not derivatives component of their foreign 
investment inflow shows the same structural break in 2007. If it does, this would provide 
more support for the result of this thesis.  
Prior studies (e.g., Nobes & Zeff, 2016) claim that in a country, like Australia, whose 
GAAP converged to IFRS, the comparability of the resulting financial information may be 
reduced. In order to determine whether this is so, yet another line of future research may 
be to compare the results of a country/countries that adopts/adopt the IFRS as issued by the 
IASB, such as Canada, with those of one/ones, like Australia, whose GAAP converged to 
IFRS.  
Another future line of enquiry may be to extend the present study's finding - that A-IFRS 
implementation is followed by increased foreign investment inflows - by exploring how 
this may translate into actual economic benefits, such as a more efficient market,  or 
increased growth and employment (Bruggemann et al., 2013). The study could apply a 
similar method to the one employed in the present study, to evaluate whether the 
application of A-IFRS is associated with these economic benefits.  
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The present study investigates structural breaks using a time series. This could be extended 
by using panel data estimations of structural breaks, to improve the process of estimating a 
break for each of the components of foreign investment, in a comparative study between 
developing and developed countries. This may shed more light on the effect of IFRS 
application, as Gordon et al. (2012) find that developing countries are more attractive to 
FDE than developed countries.  
 The present study also raises some important questions that need to be answered. These 
are in relation to the increase in direct debt following a shift to A-IFRS. The study by De 
Simone (2016) claims that profit-shifting by MNC is carried out in three main ways: by 
manipulating their income through accounting methods, using transfer pricing, and using 
internal debt among the affiliates. Prior studies provide strong evidence that IFRS, by 
increasing the quality and the comparability of information, enable international auditors 
to be more stringent and efficient. This, consequently, lessens the likelihood of entities 
being able to use accounting methods or transfer pricing to manipulate their income. 
Future studies in this area could focus on these three profit-shifting methods, to determine 
the frequency with which they are employed before and after the application of IFRS.  
Comparing these frequencies would provide direct evidence of the association between 
IFRS, direct debt and profit-shifting in MNC. 
Finally, because of its rich and varied theoretical frameworks, international accounting 
presents endless opportunities for future IFRS research. This could include comparative 
studies of countries’ political systems, regulatory environments, cultures, and business 
systems, to determine whether the introduction of new standards, such as IFRS 9, affects 
such countries differently. Another possibility is to conduct a single-country investigation 
of the effect of accounting education on the long-run economic benefits of IFRS. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics for the Components of Australia’s 
International Investment Inflow 
 
Table A: Descriptive statistics 
Description Vs. Mean S. D Skew. Kurt. J.Bera Prob. % Ob. 
Total 
Foreign 
Investment: 
TFI 27.09 0.781 0.415 1.791 8.594 0.013 %100 96 
Total 
Foreign 
Equity 
TFE 26.13 0.790 0.238 1.810 6.572 0.037 0.380 96 
Total 
Foreign 
Debt: 
TFD 26.61 0.781 0.510 1.8048 9.8801 0.0071 0.619 96 
Foreign 
Portfolio 
Equity 
FPE 25.21 0.994 -0.11 1.908 4.989 0.082 0.172 96 
Foreign 
Direct 
Equity 
FDE 25.60 0.682 0.461 1.839 8.800 0.012 0.208 96 
Foreign 
Direct Debt 
FDD 24.39 0.786 0.692 1.859 12.88 0.001 0.068 96 
Foreign 
Portfolio 
Debt 
FPD 26.10 0.784 0.482 1.849 9.019 0.011 0.374 96 
Foreign 
Loan 
FL 24.56 0.59 0.539 1.675 11.66 0.003 0.07 96 
Foreign 
Derivative 
FDR 23.95 0.958 0.173 1.564 6.814 0.033 0.038 76 
Other 
Foreign 
Debt 
OFD 24.33 0.89 0.23 1.867 6.018 0.049 0.068 96 
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Appendix B: Time Sequences of the Australian International Investment 
Inflows, US$bn, in Natural Logs, 1989 – 2015. 
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Appendix C: Endogenous Single Break (Vogelsang & Perron, 1998) 
 
In 1998, Vogelsang and Perron developed the Perron (1989) single structural break test 
into a test with an unknown (endogenous) structural break. This endogenous single 
structural break test indicates only the most important structural change in the whole time 
series. As this study cover 24 years, there is possibility of the occurrence of more than one 
important event that could cause a structural break in the foreign investment time series 
(e.g., the AFC and GFC) and, thus, there is the possibility that no evidence will be found of 
a structural break around 2005. Alternatively, even if one is detected, the presence of any 
other major event might mask the true date of the effect of the A-IFRS, turning what might 
otherwise be a strongly positive result, into a weak positive, or even a negative. 
Nevertheless, it is still of vital importance to this investigation to determine approximately 
when such a structural break happened in order to decide whether or not it was related to 
A-IFRS or to other events. Overall, there is week evidence of a structural break within the 
A-IFRS event window in most cases, which was expected.   
Table C: Innovational and Additive Outlier Model for determining the Break Date in Intercept and 
Slope (IO3 & AO3) (Vogelsang & Perron, 1998) 
  Panel A: Innovational outlier 
(IO3) method 
Panel B: Additive Outlier (AO3) 
method 
Description V.s BT 𝛿 𝛶 BT 𝛿 𝛶 
Total foreign 
investment 
TFI 1999Q4 -0.07** 
(-2.11) 
0.0057*** 
(3.01) 
2003Q2 
 
0.268*** 
(7.984) 
0.0167*** 
(12.70) 
Total foreign 
equity 
TFE 2003Q3 0.086** 
(2.31) 
0.0019 
(1.27) 
2003Q2 0.204*** 
(3.926) 
0.0091*** 
(4.5254) 
Total foreign 
debt 
TFD 1997Q1 -0.05** 
(-2.22) 
0.0028** 
(2.35) 
2002Q4 0.248*** 
(8.703) 
0.0230*** 
(21.33) 
Foreign 
portfolio equity 
FPE 2000Q2 -0.16*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.005** 
(-2.13) 
1993Q1 0.391*** 
(4.298) 
0.0180* 
(1.9278) 
Foreign direct 
equity 
FDE 2003Q2 0.116*** 
(3.26) 
0.006*** 
(3.18) 
2003Q2 0.277*** 
(6.608) 
0.0164*** 
(10.009) 
Foreign direct 
debt 
FDD 2002Q1 0.16*** 
(4.82) 
0.0112*** 
(3.76) 
2002Q1 0.35*** 
(9.299) 
0.0401*** 
(29.32) 
Foreign 
portfolio debt 
FPD 2003Q1 0.087*** 
(4.09) 
0.004*** 
(2.85) 
2003Q2 0.281*** 
(7.869) 
0.0207*** 
(14.83) 
Foreign loan FL 1993Q1 -0.065 
(-1.43) 
0.00260 
(0.5965) 
2002Q1 0.4232*** 
(6.437) 
0.0286*** 
(11.88) 
Foreign 
derivative 
FDR 2007Q1 0.35*** 
(3.85) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.92) 
2007Q1 0.572*** 
(6.906) 
-0.014*** 
(-2.818) 
Other foreign 
debt 
OFD 2005Q2 0.0004 
(0.0139) 
0.0035* 
(1.940) 
2004Q4 -0.032 
(-0.68) 
0.0137*** 
(6.528) 
For stationarity, the critical values, using Vogelsang’s (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-values, are: values at 
1%, 5% and 10% are -5.719131, 5.175710, and -4.893950, respectively for IO3, and -5.719131, -5.175710, 
and -4.893950 at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively for AO3. 
TB is selected as a value that minimises the absolute value on the t-statistic on the parameter associated with 
a change in the intercept. The max l=11. 
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Appendix D: Multiple Structural Breaks (Bai and Perron, 2003) 
The BP multiple structure breaks are identified in a process consisting of two steps. The 
first involves testing for structural change while, in the second step, determines the number 
of breaks:  
1- Testing for any Structural Break: 
The BP test is applied to test the validity of the null hypothesis (H0), that there is no 
structure break, against the alternative hypothesis (H1), that there is an unknown number 
(m) of structural breaks. The procedure for detecting structural breaks, suggested by BP, is 
the following: first, the UDMAX and WDMAX statistics are calculated. These are double 
maximum tests, where the null hypothesis, that there are no structural breaks, is tested 
against the alternative, that there are an unknown number of breaks, to determine if at least 
one structural break is present: 
 let Ft(l) denote the F statistic for the null hypothesis, of no break structure, versus the 
alternative hypothesis, of a number of breaks, and let m denotes the maximum number of 
breaks that allowed. The break points (𝑇𝛽1, 𝑇𝛽2, ..., 𝑇𝛽𝑚) are treated as unknown. The 
break date estimates are obtained from a global minimisation of the sum of squared 
residuals. In order to complete the above process, sequential procedure is used to select the 
number of breaks (Bai & Perron, 2006). To determine whether at least one break occurred, 
UDmax and WDmax are used; the double maximum statistic, UDmax= max 1≤l≤m sup Ft 
(l), and the weighted double max statistic, WDmax = max1≤l≤Mwl sup Ft (l),  
where the weights, wl, are such that the marginal p-values are equal across values of l.  
The null hypothesis of both tests is: 
H0= no structural breaks are present. 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H1: an unknown number of breaks are present. 
 As mentioned previously, neither the sup Ft, UDmax nor the WDmax test provides 
sufficient information about the exact number of breaks, as both simply indicate the 
presence of at least one break. The significance level of the tests is 5%. 
2- The test for l as opposed to l+1 structural breaks, (l+1/l): 
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After the above hypothesis of no structural break has been rejected, the second step of the 
B&P test investigates the possibility of an l+1th structural break, since l has already been 
considered in the first step. Accordingly, the null hypothesis is: 
H0= there is l break. 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H1: There are l+1 breaks. 
l breaks, denoted by T1, ... ,Tl, (the estimated sub-samples), have already been identified, 
by minimising the sum of the squares of the residuals. Therefore, what is now being 
sought is an answer to the question of whether a structural break occurs, in one of the sub-
samples, around the time of A-IFRS adoption. To do this, the test statistic Ft (l + 1 / l) is 
used. In addition, to determine the number of breaks, the sequential supFt(l+1/l) tests the 
null hypothesis of l breaks, versus the alternative, l+1 breaks.  
Each of the various types of foreign investment that could possibly be affected by A-IFRS 
is tested, one-by-one. As mentioned earlier, these tests are carried out at unknown points 
since each point is considered a potential break point (𝑇𝛽), and a regression is run to test 
for each of them, sequentially. 
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Table D1: Results of the Multiple Structural Break Test for Foreign Investment 
Inflows ( 𝒚𝒕 = 𝒄𝒋 + 𝜷𝒕 + 𝒖𝒕) 
Statistics TFL  
  TFE  TFD  
   FPE FDE  FDD FPD FL FDR OFD 
Step 1                                                                      F. tests 
Sup 𝐅𝐓 (1) 65.29 47.49 37.52 69.18 84.398 112.172 100.244 128.7 39.89 9.932 
Sup 𝐅𝐓 (2) 46.95 27.06 30.93 38.97 93.393 121.21 89.234 148.4 71.26 21.12 
Sup 𝐅𝐓 (3) 67.17 9.801 33.57 56.14 128.65 113.94 123.50 131.3 50.26 24.51 
UDmax 67.170 47.49 37.52 69.18 128.65 121.21 123.50 148.4 71.26 24.51 
WDmax 108.69 47.49 54.32 90.84 208.17 184.37 199.83 212.4 89.71 39.66 
Optimal number of breaks selected 
Sequential 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UDmax 3 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 2 3 
WDmax 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Step 2                                                        F test for structural break 
Sup𝐅𝐓 
(1/0) 
123.67 47.49 37.52 92.78 143.59 125.83 126.82 136.92 39.89 50.13 
Sup𝐅𝐓 
(2/1) 
36.66 16.73 24.45 40.96 29.64 43.54 72.44 67.11 50.97 5.59 
Sup 𝐅𝐓 
(3/2) 
     28.51  14.52   
Break dates selected 
TB1 1997Q4 2000Q1 1993Q4 1997Q4 1997Q2 1996Q4 1998Q1 1995Q1 2002Q4 2007Q3 
TB2 2004Q4 2004Q4 2005Q3 2003Q4 2004Q4 2001Q4 2004Q3 1999Q4 2007Q2  
TB3      2006Q4  2005Q3   
Coefficients 
@trend 
S.E 
0.0258 
0.0010 
0.0265 
0.0010 
0.0259 
0.0013 
0.0233 
0.0011 
0.0255 
0.0011 
0.0171 
0.0019 
0.0267 
0.0010 
0.0114 
0.0018 
0.0246 
0.0016 
0.0289 
0.0006 
C0 
S.E 
25.901 
0.0213 
24.875 
0.0254 
23.493 
0.0243 
24.570 
0.0230 
25.452 
0.0250 
23.494 
0.0373 
24.918 
0.0225 
24.013 
0.0282 
22.117 
0.0653 
22.895 
0.0261 
Cj1 
S.E 
5.6589 
0.0540 
24.685 
0.0627 
23.975 
0.0579 
24.246 
0.0581 
25.155 
0.0582 
23.094 
0.0811 
24.561 
0.0538 
23.579 
0.0668 
22.562 
0.1144 
23.158 
0.0550 
Cj2 
S.E 
6.0193 
0.0842 
24.984 
0.0857 
24.294 
0.1115 
24.581 
0.0904 
25.566 
0.0932 
23.506 
0.1267 
24.961 
0.0832 
23.835 
0.1039 
23.120 
0.1441 
 
Cj3 
S.E 
     24.152 
0.1616 
 24.448 
0.1479 
  
Note: @trend is the trend Coefficient; Cj is the intercept for each sub-period; S.E is the standards error for the coefficient.  
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Appendix E: Testing for Two Structural Breaks in the Present of Unit 
Root (Lee and Strazicich test (2003, 2004)) 
Methods that determine a single break date, including the Perron (1989) and the Vogelsang 
and Perron (1998) tests, ignore the possibility of there being more than one break with unit 
root. This can lead to loss of information if more than one break does exist. To add 
robustness to the above tests, the Lee and Strazicich tests are used. These can identify 
breaks occurring both under the null and alternative hypotheses. Two models are used: 
One-Break Minimum LM Unit-Root Tests (2004) and Two-Break Minimum LM Unit-
Root Tests (2003).  Lee and Strazicich (2003) unit root tests can be obtained from the 
regression: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿′𝑧𝑡 + е𝑡,    е𝑡  = 𝛽е𝑡−1  𝜀𝑡,  1 
Two models of structural break have considered by Lee and Strazicich (2003); model A 
which allows for intercept’s shift, and model C which allows for shift in both intercept and 
slop. The latter will be used in the present studies. The hypothesis under model C can be 
interpreted by 𝑧𝑡=1, t, 𝐷1𝑡 ,  𝐷2𝑡, 𝐷𝑇1𝑡 , 𝐷𝑇2𝑡.  
where 𝐷𝑇1𝑡= 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵1 for  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝐵1 + 1, and zero otherwise.  
where 𝐷𝑇2𝑡= 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵2 for  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝐵2 + 1, and zero otherwise.  
To obtain the LM unit root test statistic, Lee and Strazicich (2003) use the following 
regression: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = ∅?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛿′∆𝑧𝑡 +   𝜇𝑡 2 
 
?̃?𝑡  = 𝑦𝑡 −  ?̃?𝑥 − 𝑧𝑡 𝛿 , t=2,…,T, 𝛿 are the coefficient in the regression of ∆𝑦𝑡 on 
∆𝑧𝑡, and ?̃?𝑥 is given by 𝑦1 − 𝑧𝑡𝛿,    and 𝑦1, 𝑧𝑡 consists of exogenous variables. 
The unit root null hypothesis is ∅= 0.The location ( 𝜆) of the break (𝑇𝐵𝑗) is determined by 
minimising t value.  
where 𝜆𝑗 = 𝑇𝐵𝑗 𝑇⁄  and j=1,2, and 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1]. 
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Table E.1: Lee and Strazicich (2003) two-break minimum LM unit root test (Model C: 
two breaks in the intercept and the trend) 
 
Variables in levels 𝑇𝐵1 𝑇𝐵2 𝑡. 𝑎 Result 
TFI 2000Q2  2003Q3 -5.3557 * Stationary 
TFE 2000Q1 2005Q1 -4.974705 Unit root 
TFD 1999Q4 2005Q1 -4.9707 Unit root 
FPE 1999Q4 2005Q2 -5.3305* Stationary 
FDE 2000Q3 2007Q3 -5.7696 ** Stationary 
FDD 1995Q2N 2005Q2 -4.9673 Unit root 
FPD 1996Q4 2006Q4 -4.0738 Unit root 
FL 1993Q2 2000Q4 -5.4872 ** Stationary 
FDR 1996Q1 2006Q4 -4.948374 Unit root 
OFD 2000Q3 2006Q4 -5.3637* Stationary 
Critical values of Lee and Strazicich (2003, Table 2) two-break minimum LM unit root test 
𝜆2  0.4   0.6   0.8  
𝜆1 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
0.2 -6.16 -5.59 -5.27 -6.41 -5.74 -5.32 -6.33 -5.71 -5.33 
0.4 - - - -6.45 -5.67 -5.31 -6.42 -5.65 -5.32 
0.8 - - - - - - -6.32 -5.73 -5.32 
N=not significant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
188 
 
Appendix F: Diagnostic Tests Results (ARDL) 
Models 
Model 
1 
(RGDP) 
Model 
2 
(TOT) 
Model 
3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 
5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 
9 
(RGDP 
& INT) 
TFI 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.3967 0.5021 0.6277 0.1037 0.2978 0.3076 0.3426 0.4058 0.4609 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.0499 0.2584 0.0520^4 0.9799 0.6574 0.0726 0.1400^2 0.0662 0.0689 
TFE 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.1537 0.6068 0.8977 0.4805 0.2392 0.6923 0.7262 0.3841 0.6758 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.8277 0.0593 0.1109^2 0.8726 0.0750^2 0.3524 0.9852 0.7326 0.8379 
FPE 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.1421 0.3910 0.8261 0.1820 0.2607 0.4492 0.2997 0.0892 0.4170 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.4339 0.3342 0.9632 0.5291 0.0783 0.5938 0.8713 0.5194 0.6597 
FDE 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.8487 0.4687 0.1052 0.6879 0.9096 0.7601 0.3374 0.9340 0.8120 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.3994 0.7084 0.9518 0.6649 0.6937 0.5261 0.7868 0.2891 0.5688 
TFD 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.1537 0.2166 0.1824 0.0561 0.2291 0.1534 0.1515 0.1992 0.8684 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.2016 0.2955 0.0240 0.9195 0.9833 0.1831 0.0753 0.067^2 0.0723 
FDD 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.7793 0.7957 0.6442 0.7960 0.5391 0.8202 0.7188 0.8017 0.4764 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.8199 0.5740 0.9497 0.8085 0.8196 0.5879 0.9421 0.9365 0.6141 
FPD 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.0546^3 0.3444^1 0.2861 0.1397 0.6103^1 0.0551 0.0599 0.084^3 0.2026 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.6668 0.4839 0.9436 0.7895 0.8686 0.5568 0.4749 0.2709 0.3479 
FL 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.1687 0.4484 0.8936 0.4341 0.4803 0.1842 0.2803 0.3964 0.0636 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.6780 0.5537 0.5939 0.8272 0.5840 0.6837 0.6664 0.8741 0.6088 
FDR 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.4710 0.0976 0.6277 0.4396 0.7459 0.2113 0.4225 0.5060 0.4797 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.9913 0.2694 0.9745 0.9600 0.8303 0.4037 0.8943 0.8672 0.8969 
OFD 
Serial Correlation (LM) 0.1000 0.0505 0.1358 0.3104^1 0.1095^1 0.2234^1 0.9903^1 0.279^1 0.232^1 
Hetroscedasticity (ARCH) 0.2153 0.1797 0.0922 0.6192 0.2008 0.1994 0.0585 0.6369 0.3799 
In serial correlation test, the default lags are two; however, if the result is not significant, different lags are used (1-4 lags) ^ 
In Hetroscedasticity test, the default lag is one; however, if the result is not significant, more than one lag is used (2-4) ^ 
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Appendix G: Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ (ARDL) 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & INT) 
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Appendix H: The Results of ARDL Model 
Table H.1: Total foreign investment (TFI) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(TL(-1)) -0.506*** 
(-5.00) 
0.141 
(1.375) 
0.756*** 
(6.963) 
-0.266** 
(-2.448) 
0.1092 
(0.996) 
-0.512*** 
(-4.952) 
-0.510*** 
(-5.129) 
-0.505*** 
(-4.877) 
-0.481*** 
(-4.77) 
D(X1) 0.983*** 
(11.839) 
    0.9340*** 
(10.582) 
0.916*** 
(9.282) 
0.869*** 
(5.424) 
1.065*** 
(11.096) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.335*** 
(3.689) 
    0.345*** 
(3.744) 
0.236** 
(2.308) 
0.337** 
(2.264) 
0.314*** 
(3.359) 
D(X2)  -0.582*** 
(-3.057) 
-1.534*** 
(-4.347) 
0.0123*** 
(8.748) 
0.0534*** 
(3.208) 
-0.158 
(-1.135) 
-0.098 
(-0.325) 
0.002 
(0.833) 
-0.018 
(-1.423) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.085 
(-0.412) 
-0.086 
(-0.176) 
0.0039** 
(2.387) 
-0.0327** 
(-2.194) 
-0.081 
(-0.576) 
-0.520* 
(-1.808) 
0.0002 
(0.068) 
0.020* 
(1.689) 
DA-IFRS 0.137*** 
(4.067) 
0.140*** 
(2.82) 
0.132*** 
(3.023) 
0.1250*** 
(3.132) 
0.141*** 
(2.873) 
0.138*** 
(4.098) 
0.137*** 
(4.137) 
0.135*** 
(3.946) 
0.135*** 
(4.073) 
D1997Q4 0.026 
(1.017) 
-0.019 
(-0.527) 
-0.006 
(-0.185) 
-0.0053 
(-0.186) 
-0.028 
(-0.804) 
0.0223 
(0.863) 
0.020 
 (0.770) 
0.023 
(0.883) 
0.035  
(1.379) 
ECT (-1) -0.205*** 
(-3.366) 
-0.108*** 
(-2.643) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.974) 
-0.152*** 
(-2.875) 
-0.233*** 
(-3.550) 
-0.179*** 
(-3.034) 
-0.176*** 
(-3.055) 
-0.198*** 
(-3.348) 
-0.235*** 
(-3.690) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.716*** 
(4.645) 
    0.701*** 
(3.541) 
0.648*** 
(3.024) 
0.646* 
(1.737) 
0.638*** 
(3.984) 
X2  -0.381 
(-0.399) 
-5.697*** 
(-3.187) 
0.008** 
(2.076) 
0.036** 
(2.362) 
0.039 
(0.125) 
-1.055 
(-0.872) 
0.001 
(0.170) 
0.009 
(0.885) 
DA-IFRS 0.40*** 
(2.919) 
0.441 
(1.293) 
0.277* 
(1.692) 
0.417** 
(2.088) 
0.1425 
 (0.986) 
0.433** 
(2.531) 
0.407*** 
(2.665) 
0.409*** 
(2.747) 
0.351*** 
(2.803) 
D1997Q4 0.099 
(1.249) 
-0.120 
(-0.700) 
-0.075 
(-0.749) 
0.008** 
(2.076) 
-0.137 
(-1.617) 
0.120 
(1.279) 
0.099  
(1.108) 
0.099 
(1.152) 
0.0820  
(1.126) 
R
^2
 0.998253 0.996168 0.996968 0.997608 0.996126 0.998300 0.998332 0.998271 0.998346 
F test 6072.771 2762.036 3493.173 4431.444 2732.364 4378.530 4461.568 4305.201 4500.457 
X1 represents the RGDP and X2 represents the rest of variables, one variable each time. 
The coefficient of the intercept and the trend has not tabulated to save space. 
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Table H.2: Total foreign equity (TFE) 
Control variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(TFE(-1)) -0.284*** 
(-2.708) 
0.130 
(1.268) 
-0.015 
(-0.168) 
-0.202* 
(-1.928) 
0.166 
(1.510) 
-0.324*** 
(-2.983) 
-0.345*** 
(-3.366) 
-0.280** 
(-2.633) 
-0.251** 
(-2.314) 
D(X1) 1.202*** 
(8.558) 
    1.166*** 
(8.219) 
1.137*** 
(6.876) 
0.784*** 
(3.021) 
1.335*** 
(8.342) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.322** 
(2.118) 
    0.219 
(1.497) 
0.104 
(0.613) 
0.250 
(1.027) 
0.207 
(1.309) 
D(X2)  -0.969*** 
(-3.389) 
-2.097*** 
(-4.219) 
0.018*** 
(8.319) 
0.073*** 
(2.838) 
-0.581** 
(-2.503) 
-0.075 
(-0.144) 
0.008** 
(1.990) 
-0.025 
(-1.102) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.0682 
(-0.215) 
-1.198** 
(-2.025) 
0.005** 
(2.145) 
-0.032 
(-1.345) 
-0.082 
(-0.326) 
-1.023* 
(-1.951) 
0.002 
(0.530) 
0.033 
(1.503) 
DA-IFRS 0.169** 
(2.034) 
0.118 
(1.115) 
0.1501 
(1.516) 
0.1375 
(1.5994) 
0.0956 
(0.9033) 
0.1637** 
(2.0181) 
0.1697** 
(2.0826) 
0.1580* 
(1.9142) 
0.1744** 
(2.0924) 
D2000Q1 0.0011 
(0.0193) 
-0.056 
(-0.755) 
-0.010 
(-0.143) 
-0.0182 
(-0.3060) 
-0.0855 
(-1.1483) 
0.0079 
(0.1390) 
0.0032 
(0.0569) 
0.0024 
(0.0412) 
0.0120 
(0.2008) 
ECT (-1) -0.266*** 
(-4.320) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.158) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.365) 
-0.2462*** 
(-4.5189) 
-0.3816*** 
(-4.483) 
-0.2398*** 
(-3.3704) 
-0.1722*** 
(-3.260) 
-0.289*** 
(-4.5712) 
-0.2930*** 
(-4.3547) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.213 
(0.770) 
    0.709** 
(2.204) 
-0.146 
(-0.198) 
0.669 
(1.077) 
0.499 
(1.505) 
X2  -0.812 
(-1.105) 
-5.041** 
(-2.058) 
0.001 
(0.166) 
0.022 
(1.618) 
-0.975** 
(-2.040) 
-2.464 
(-0.660) 
-0.007 
(-0.848) 
-0.023 
(-1.039) 
DA-IFRS 0.0927 
(0.6691) 
0.2897 
(1.0421) 
-0.0008 
(-0.004) 
0.1053 
(0.6684) 
-0.0522 
(-0.3584) 
0.2573 
(1.5756) 
0.0855 
(0.4137) 
0.12374 
(0.9575) 
0.189  
(1.1181) 
D2000Q1 -0.1690 
(-1.4719) 
-0.227 
(-1.4342) 
-0.2260 
(-1.607) 
-0.2230** 
(-2.0435) 
-0.2538*** 
(-3.077) 
-0.0885 
(-0.791) 
-0.2626 
(-1.1227) 
-0.1197 
(-0.957) 
-0.0834 
(-0.6395) 
R
^2
 0.994810 0.991686 0.992557 0.994626 0.991494 0.995245 0.995054 0.995176 0.994977 
F test 2036.632 1267.365 1416.902 1966.357 1238.485 1560.151 1499.725 1537.710 1476.556 
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Table H.3: Foreign portfolio equity (FPE) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FPE(-1)) -0.142 
(-1.353) 
0.081 
(0.797) 
-0.077 
(-0.832) 
-0.132 
(-1.270) 
0.125 
(1.177) 
-0.208** 
(-2.016) 
-0.220** 
(-2.195) 
-0.153752 
(-1.4612) 
-0.173* 
(-1.653) 
D(X1) 1.231*** 
(6.290) 
    1.187*** 
(6.303) 
1.099*** 
(4.742) 
0.478 
(1.297) 
1.456*** 
(6.520) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.309 
(1.417) 
    0.168 
(0.825) 
-0.151 
(-0.644) 
0.3611 
 (1.012) 
0.210 
(0.950) 
D(X2)  -1.108** 
(-2.958) 
-2.388*** 
(-3.643) 
0.020*** 
(7.075) 
0.085** 
(2.549) 
-0.916*** 
(-2.766) 
-0.066 
(-0.087) 
0.0135** 
(2.4169) 
-0.038 
(-1.146) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.239 
(-0.570) 
-1.792** 
(-2.261) 
0.006* 
(1.687) 
-0.042 
(-1.278) 
-0.011 
(-0.030) 
-1.808** 
(-2.330) 
0.0008 
(0.137) 
0.045 
(1.368) 
DA-IFRS 0.361*** 
(2.872) 
0.299** 
(2.124) 
0.415*** 
(3.043) 
0.320*** 
(2.641) 
0.307** 
(2.146) 
0.356*** 
(3.015) 
0.4384*** 
(3.562) 
0.327*** 
(2.713) 
0.3055** 
(2.503) 
D1993Q4 0.2256** 
(2.520) 
0.14828 
(1.507) 
0.3038*** 
(3.144) 
0.2020** 
(2.321) 
0.1840* 
(1.802) 
0.2110** 
(2.516) 
0.2780*** 
(3.204) 
0.2032** 
(2.351) 
0.1647* 
(1.875) 
ECT(-1) -0.260*** 
(-4.125) 
-0.250*** 
(-3.790) 
-0.235*** 
(-3.910) 
-0.235*** 
(-4.370) 
-0.356*** 
(-4.400) 
-0.281*** 
(-4.293) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.354) 
-0.252*** 
(-4.442) 
-0.250*** 
(-4.733) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.017 
(0.052) 
    0.756** 
(2.172) 
-0.421 
(-0.720) 
0.6455 
(0.7825) 
0.4011 
(1.1537) 
X2  -1.481 
(-1.638) 
-7.669** 
(-2.388) 
-0.003 
(-0.532) 
-0.007 
(-0.300) 
-2.123*** 
(-2.643) 
-6.414 
(-1.306) 
-0.0130 
(-0.886) 
-0.0792* 
(-1.849) 
DA-IFRS 0.9573*** 
(3.787) 
1.0701*** 
(3.374) 
1.4197*** 
(3.796) 
0.932*** 
(3.655) 
0.7938*** 
(3.869) 
0.9887*** 
(4.070) 
1.4994*** 
(2.75) 
0.8103*** 
(2.686) 
0.8624*** 
(3.239) 
D1993Q4 0.529*** 
(4.021) 
0.3818** 
(2.011) 
0.9250*** 
(3.859) 
0.454*** 
2.808 
0.4264*** 
(3.050) 
0.3514** 
(2.471) 
0.839*** 
(2.989) 
0.4014** 
(2.218) 
0.3124* 
(1.797) 
R
^2
 0.992878 0.990893 0.991896 0.993200 0.990456 0.993773 0.993545 0.993466 0.993375 
F test 1481.162 1156.058 1300.430 1551.902 1102.611 1189.748 1147.397 1133.419 1117.715 
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Table H.4: Foreign direct equity (FDE) 
Control variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FDE(-1)) 0.019624 
(0.170) 
0.180* 
(1.783) 
0.003 
(0.032) 
-0.038 
(-0.345) 
0.115 
(1.072) 
0.016 
(0.132) 
0.038 
(0.327) 
0.058 
(0.487) 
0.030 
(0.255) 
D(X1) 1.151*** 
(9.149) 
    1.114*** 
(8.284) 
1.249*** 
(8.058) 
1.024*** 
(4.232) 
1.209*** 
(8.208) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.016 
(0.125) 
    0.046 
(0.352) 
-0.013 
(-0.092) 
0.024 
(0.109) 
0.005 
(0.037) 
D(X2)  -0.692*** 
(-2.616) 
-1.901*** 
(-4.165) 
0.015*** 
(7.163) 
0.067*** 
(2.862) 
-0.161 
(-0.739) 
0.445 
(0.935) 
0.002 
(0.660) 
-0.014 
(-0.710) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.053 
(-0.191) 
-0.574 
(-1.114) 
0.001 
(0.488) 
-0.043** 
(-2.024) 
0.061 
(0.285) 
-0.675 
(-1.584) 
-0.0003 
(-0.086) 
0.015 
(0.802) 
DA-IFRS -0.041 
(-0.583) 
-0.0133 
(-0.140) 
-0.068 
(-0.755) 
-0.0296 
(-0.363) 
-0.0290 
(-0.301) 
-0.0387 
(-0.5368) 
-0.024 
(-0.330) 
-0.037 
(-0.519) 
-0.033 
(-0.451) 
D1997Q4 -0.072 
(-1.430) 
-0.133** 
(-2.002) 
-0.122* 
(-1.939) 
-0.098* 
(-1.7355) 
-0.1334** 
(-1.9685) 
-0.0715 
(-1.396) 
-0.0774 
(-1.5293) 
-0.0749  
(-1.4815) 
-0.0608 
(-1.177) 
ECT(-1) -0.783*** 
(-6.093) 
-0.259*** 
(-3.733) 
-0.249*** 
(-4.063) 
-0.3818*** 
(-4.477) 
-0.3481*** 
(-4.351) 
-0.753*** 
(-5.547) 
-0.836*** 
(-5.934) 
-0.826*** 
(-6.1625) 
-0.784*** 
(-6.064) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.898*** 
(11.748) 
    0.887*** 
(8.676) 
0.951*** 
(12.036) 
1.057*** 
(6.441) 
0.878*** 
(9.537) 
X2  0.133 
(0.340) 
-4.208** 
(-2.347) 
0.009*** 
(3.714) 
0.029** 
(2.260) 
0.013 
(0.103) 
0.672 
(1.329) 
-0.002 
(-1.101) 
0.002 
(0.357) 
DA-IFRS 0.0685 
(1.4786) 
0.0708  
(0.420) 
-0.087 
(-0.487) 
0.0623 
 (0.5968) 
-0.0763 
(-0.5748) 
0.074  
(1.483) 
0.0973** 
(1.992) 
0.0799* 
(1.7416) 
0.065 
(1.303) 
D1997Q4 -0.0437 
(-1.235) 
-0.292** 
(-2.480) 
-0.306*** 
(-3.010) 
-0.1729** 
(-2.5025) 
-0.3078*** 
(-3.705) 
-0.0422 
(-1.1168) 
-0.0338 
(-0.993) 
-0.0320 
(-0.9033) 
-0.0439 
(-1.151) 
R
^2
 0.994807 0.990906 0.991824 0.993568 0.990783 0.994848 0.994979 0.994950 0.994880 
F test 2035.285 1157.702 1288.940 1641.273 1142.082 1439.544 1477.166 1468.761 1448.414 
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Table H.5: Total foreign debt (TFD) 
Control variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(TFD(-1)) -0.460*** 
(-4.745) 
0.116 
(1.175) 
-0.081 
(-0.887) 
-0.202* 
(-1.955) 
0.013 
(0.140) 
-0.438*** 
(-4.410) 
-0.452*** 
(-4.600) 
-0.470*** 
(-4.868) 
-0.536*** 
(-5.985) 
D(X1) 0.665*** 
(9.847) 
    0.670*** 
(9.223) 
0.633*** 
(7.2667) 
0.715*** 
(5.314) 
0.761*** 
(9.880) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.266*** 
(3.572) 
    0.296*** 
(3.820) 
0.209** 
(2.347) 
0.326** 
(2.464) 
0.289*** 
(4.055) 
D(X2)  -0.282* 
(-1.787) 
-1.122*** 
(-4.192) 
0.008*** 
(7.002) 
0.053*** 
(4.254) 
0.044 
(0.358) 
-0.043 
(-0.155) 
-0.001 
(-0.459) 
-0.009 
(-0.867) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.103 
(-0.630) 
-0.269 
(-0.923) 
0.003** 
(2.160) 
-0.030** 
(-2.534) 
0.012 
(0.101) 
-0.037 
(-0.148) 
-0.001 
(-0.561) 
0.020* 
(1.932) 
DA-IFRS 0.051 
(1.219) 
0.061 
 (1.059) 
0.0762 
(1.478) 
0.049 
(1.016) 
0.054 
(0.999) 
0.058 
(1.395) 
0.0475 
(1.130) 
0.054 
(1.322) 
0.078** 
(2.056) 
D1997Q2 -0.068** 
(-2.396) 
-0.062 
(-1.527) 
-0.038 
(-1.047) 
-0.063* 
(-1.875) 
-0.063* 
(-1.640) 
-0.065** 
(-2.263) 
-0.068** 
(-2.300) 
-0.070** 
(-2.443) 
-0.042 
(-1.570) 
ECT (-1) -0.077*** 
(-2.203) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.715) 
-0.158*** 
(-4.508) 
-0.126** 
(-2.338) 
-0.172*** 
(-3.750) 
-0.122*** 
(-2.628) 
-0.094** 
(-2.400) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.036) 
-0.150*** 
(-3.008) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.408 
(1.159) 
    0.334 
(1.268) 
0.277 
(0.796) 
-0.489 
(-0.836) 
0.247 
(1.026) 
X2  -0.007 
(-0.009) 
-5.692*** 
(-4.112) 
0.010*** 
(2.929) 
0.0550*** 
(3.714) 
0.604* 
(1.644) 
-2.799 
(-1.621) 
0.017** 
(2.159) 
0.048*** 
(3.142) 
DA-IFRS 0.431 
(1.611) 
0.1445 
(0.531) 
0.1729 
(1.091) 
0.2349 
(1.376) 
-0.044 
(-0.288) 
0.304* 
(1.747) 
0.352* 
(1.725) 
0.292* 
(1.725) 
0.267* 
(1.918) 
D1997Q2 -0.051 
(-0.378) 
-0.307 
(-1.633) 
-0.1913** 
(-2.032) 
-0.125 
(-1.288) 
-0.260*** 
(-2.806) 
-0.030 
(-0.317) 
-0.074 
(-0.668) 
-0.112 
(-1.167) 
-0.029 
(-0.359) 
R
^2
 0.998558 0.997353 0.997953 0.998162 0.997681 0.998596 0.998614 0.998665 0.998880 
F test 7359.343 4003.555 5180.208 5769.698 4571.630 5300.837 5372.296 5578.382 6649.595 
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Table H.6: Foreign direct investment (FDD) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 (RGDP 
& INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FDD(-1)) -0.259*** 
(-2.600) 
-0.206** 
(-2.330) 
-0.307*** 
(-3.219) 
-0.223** 
(-2.313) 
-0.217** 
(-2.411) 
-0.215** 
(-2.250) 
-0.282*** 
(-2.867) 
-0.253** 
(-2.517) 
-0.273*** 
(-2.767) 
D(X1) 0.124 
(0.871) 
    0.039 
(0.269) 
-0.042 
(-0.249) 
0.206 
(0.733) 
0.195 
(1.119) 
D(X1(-1)) -0.150 
(-1.119) 
    -0.027 
(-0.198) 
-0.063 
(-0.379) 
-0.100 
(-0.384) 
-0.101 
(-0.772) 
D(X2)  -0.454** 
(-2.085) 
-0.998** 
(-2.330) 
0.001 
(0.680) 
0.023 
(1.277) 
-0.407* 
(-1.713) 
-1.127** 
(-2.048) 
-0.001 
(-0.260) 
0.009 
(0.376) 
D(X2(-1))  0.088 
(0.354) 
-0.084 
(-0.180) 
-0.001 
(-0.931) 
-0.018 
(-0.971) 
0.061 
(0.221) 
-0.271 
(-0.457) 
-0.001 
(-0.203) 
0.002 
(0.098) 
DA-IFRS 0.157*** 
(3.843) 
0.1534*** 
(3.7255) 
0.1730*** 
(4.0811) 
0.1567*** 
(3.888) 
0.161*** 
(4.329) 
0.1511*** 
(3.6099) 
0.1762*** 
(4.048) 
0.1464*** 
(3.642) 
0.1544*** 
(4.0148) 
D2001Q4 0.0148 
(0.3167) 
0.0117 
(0.2569) 
0.0160 
(0.3437) 
0.0157 
(0.3356) 
0.0152 
(0.3431) 
0.0101 
(0.221) 
0.0219 
(0.4649) 
0.0029  
(0.061) 
0.0059  
(0.1306) 
D1996Q4 -0.0256 
(-0.610) 
-0.0228 
(-0.572) 
-0.0173 
(-0.4235) 
-0.0368 
(-0.8736) 
-0.0339 
(-0.843) 
-0.0202 
(-0.501) 
-0.0252 
(-0.611) 
-0.0307 
(-0.729) 
-0.0260 
(-0.648) 
ECT(-1) -0.1308*** 
(-4.774) 
-0.2218*** 
(-6.134) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.700) 
-0.1590*** 
(-4.893) 
-0.2527*** 
(-5.419) 
-0.2216*** 
(-5.402) 
-0.1493*** 
(-5.0408) 
-0.1557*** 
(-4.8776) 
-0.2217*** 
(-4.949) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 -0.175081 
(-0.229) 
   0.069*** 
(3.923) 
-0.038 
(-0.085) 
0.366 
(0.593) 
-0.785 
(-0.719) 
-0.146 
(-0.317) 
X2  1.071** 
(2.053) 
3.456 
(0.665) 
0.003 
(0.345) 
0.069*** 
(3.923) 
1.134* 
(1.747) 
2.821 
(0.598) 
0.014 
(0.866) 
0.073*** 
(2.800) 
DA-IFRS 0.9454* 
(1.8273) 
0.6611*** 
(2.9214) 
1.2585* 
(1.9312) 
0.7157* 
(1.7150) 
0.4421*** 
(2.9329) 
0.6615** 
(2.1673) 
1.0377* 
(1.8655) 
0.6988 
(1.5256) 
0.4914** 
(2.108) 
D2001Q4 0.3184 
(1.0334) 
0.2816* 
(1.7259) 
0.5599 
(1.1348) 
0.2110 
(0.8144) 
0.0885 
(0.7550) 
0.2838 
(1.5159) 
0.4663 
(1.1690) 
0.1578 
(0.5521) 
0.1076 
(0.726) 
D1996Q4 -0.5381*** 
(-3.101) 
-0.3633*** 
(-3.4633) 
-0.5299*** 
(-3.251) 
-0.5007*** 
(-3.9152) 
-0.3606*** 
(-4.3782) 
-0.3590*** 
(-3.096) 
-0.4777*** 
(-3.1722) 
-0.5244*** 
(-3.538) 
-0.360*** 
(-3.579) 
R
^2
 0.994583 0.995083 0.994848 0.994509 0.994949 0.995094 0.994872 0.994648 0.995066 
F test 1713.580 1888.944 1802.241 1690.541 1838.452 1369.038 1309.456 1254.474 1361.440 
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Table H.7: Foreign portfolio debt (FPD) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 (RGDP & 
INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FPD(-1)) -0.176 
(-1.581) 
0.351*** 
(3.467) 
0.055 
(0.599) 
-0.073 
(-0.644) 
0.225** 
(2.238) 
-0.134 
(-1.170) 
-0.192* 
(-1.764) 
-0.186* 
(-1.690) 
-0.19534* 
(-1.812) 
D(X1) 0.708*** 
(8.950) 
    0.678*** 
(7.977) 
0.625*** 
(6.475) 
0.469*** 
(3.169) 
0.705*** 
(7.614) 
D(X1(-1)) 0.171* 
(1.930) 
    0.202** 
(2.239) 
0.076 
(0.736) 
0.340** 
(2.381) 
0.231*** 
(2.639) 
D(X2)  -0.323* 
(-1.909) 
-1.161*** 
(-4.223) 
0.010*** 
(7.681) 
0.053*** 
(3.948) 
-0.034 
(-0.247) 
-0.164 
(-0.541) 
0.004* 
(1.731) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
D(X2(-1))  -0.091 
(-0.525) 
-0.196 
(-0.632) 
0.002 
(1.613) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.030) 
-0.009 
(-0.067) 
-0.127 
(-0.456) 
-0.002 
(-1.101) 
-0.002 
(-0.177) 
DA-IFRS 0.102*** 
(4.331) 
0.098*** 
(3.635) 
0.069*** 
(2.787) 
0.093*** 
(3.849) 
0.096*** 
(3.581) 
0.1115*** 
(4.6458) 
0.0851*** 
(3.574) 
0.098*** 
(4.274) 
0.1080*** 
(4.862) 
D1998Q1 -0.0003 
(-0.014) 
0.0016 
(0.050) 
-0.007 
(-0.239) 
-0.0394 
(-1.132) 
0.007 
(0.220) 
0.0029 
(0.1196) 
-0.0039 
(-0.156) 
-0.013 
(-0.516) 
0.008 
(0.344) 
ECT(-1) -0.246*** 
(-4.328) 
-0.147*** 
(-4.421) 
-0.175*** 
(-5.704) 
-0.257*** 
(-4.020) 
-0.1798*** 
(-4.565) 
-0.2867*** 
(-4.729) 
-0.251*** 
(-4.540) 
-0.246*** 
(-4.419) 
-0.301*** 
(-5.414) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.766*** 
(5.845) 
    0.680*** 
(4.738) 
0.615*** 
(3.394) 
0.272 
(0.895) 
0.577*** 
(3.608) 
X2  0.298 
(0.655) 
-5.536*** 
(-3.784) 
0.010*** 
(4.899) 
0.048*** 
(3.405) 
0.232 
(1.203) 
-1.762* 
(-1.665) 
0.008* 
(1.857) 
0.022** 
(2.271) 
DA-IFRS 0.2549*** 
(2.8250) 
0.5598** 
(2.1822) 
0.3795** 
(2.276) 
0.2935** 
(2.3015) 
0.3507** 
(2.209) 
0.2320*** 
(3.004) 
0.224** 
(2.478) 
0.226** 
(2.549) 
0.211***  
(3.010) 
D1998Q1 -0.0703 
(-1.2856) 
-0.0638 
(-0.5007) 
-0.136 
(-1.445) 
-0.122* 
(-1.845) 
-0.1189 
(-1.264) 
-0.059 
(-1.238) 
-0.091 
(–1.589) 
-0.104* 
(-1.844) 
-0.074 
(-1.605) 
R
^2
 0.998341 0.997178 0.997771 0.998150 0.997441 0.998379 0.998440 0.998453 0.998483 
F test 6392.492 3754.443 4756.050 5732.528 4141.154 4590.109 4769.906 4810.266 4905.564 
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Table H.8: Foreign loan (FL) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 
(RGDP & INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FL(-1)) 0.058 
(0.584) 
0.037 
(0.365) 
0.049 
(0.499) 
0.096 
(0.958) 
0.032964 
0.325146 
0.0558 
(0.5617) 
0.0700 
(0.7072) 
0.0233 
(1.1608) 
0.0704 
(0.7169) 
D(X1) 0.808 
(6.251) 
    
 
0.8327*** 
(6.0551) 
0.7399*** 
(4.5067) 
1.1608*** 
(4.2667) 
0.9728*** 
(6.0088) 
D(X1(-1)) -0.261 
(-1.791) 
    -0.2185 
(-1.3788) 
-0.2305 
(-1.3402) 
0.0439 
(0.1580) 
-0.3083* 
(-1.9614) 
D(X2)  -0.256 
(-0.926) 
-1.906*** 
(-3.877) 
0.010**** 
(4.602) 
0.0545** 
2.5294 
0.0579 
0.2286 
-0.2352 
-0.4062 
-0.0062 
-1.46323 
-0.0381 
-1.5937 
D(X2(-1))  0.050 
(0.176) 
0.866* 
(1.650) 
-0.003 
(-1.509) 
-0.0386* 
-1.8044 
0.1756 
0.6817 
0.6825 
1.2912 
-0.0056 
-1.3577 
0.0394* 
1.7786 
DA-IFRS 0.2732** 
(2.4899) 
0.2457* 
(1.9045) 
0.2648** 
(2.233) 
0.2708** 
(2.387) 
0.2399* 
(1.9109) 
0.2617** 
(2.3493) 
0.2606** 
(2.3547) 
0.2819*** 
(2.589) 
0.2607** 
(2.3188) 
D1999Q4 0.1542* 
(1.7544) 
0.1221  
(1.1895) 
0.1696* 
(1.782) 
0.1514 
(1.6168) 
0.1128 
(1.1184) 
0.1480* 
(1.6721) 
0.1503* 
(1.7000) 
0.14930* 
(1.7124) 
0.1453 
(1.6223) 
D1995Q1 -0.0197 
(-0.323) 
-0.0381 
(-.5311) 
0.0020 
(0.031) 
-0.017 
(-0.264) 
-0.0431 
(-0.608) 
-0.0237 
(-0.3850) 
-0.0089 
(-0.1456) 
-0.0237 
(-0.390) 
-0.0299 
(-0.4805) 
ECT(-1) -0.178*** 
(-3.182) 
-0.167*** 
(-2.948) 
-0.216*** 
(-4.280) 
-0.168*** 
(-3.081) 
-0.211*** 
(-3.407) 
-0.1776*** 
(-3.081) 
-0.1829*** 
(-3.299) 
-0.1979*** 
(-3.426) 
-0.1813*** 
(-3.0319) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.702** 
(2.083) 
    0.5962 
(1.3314) 
0.3238 
(0.6993) 
0.9646 
(1.1825) 
0.6348 
(1.2369) 
X2  0.165 
(0.211) 
-6.0494*** 
(-2.767) 
0.0079 
(1.3213) 
0.0520** 
(2.1471) 
0.1616 
(0.2056) 
-2.851559 
(-0.9900) 
-0.0041 
(-0.3160) 
-0.0032 
(-0.0885) 
DA-IFRS 0.9275** 
(2.525) 
0.736 
(1.6364) 
1.0309*** 
(2.646) 
0.8354** 
(2.096) 
0.4848 
(1.3524) 
0.8818** 
(2.3643) 
0.9928** 
(2.5012) 
0.9581*** 
(2.660) 
0.8349* 
(1.9250) 
D1999Q4 0.3656 
(1.318) 
0.1124 
 (0.3417) 
0.3309 
(1.1913) 
0.2311 
(0.7590) 
0.0238 
(0.1007) 
0.3338 
(1.1626) 
0.3502 
(1.2127) 
0.3977 
(1.488) 
0.2793 
(0.8727) 
D1995Q1 -0.238 
(-1.584) 
-0.358 
(-1.759) 
-0.1345 
(-0.775) 
-0.2745 
(-1.5450) 
-0.3059** 
(-2.0735) 
-0.2399 
(-1.4245) 
-0.1773 
(-1.0115) 
-0.2213 
(-1.341) 
-0.2832* 
(-1.871) 
R
^2
 0.990149 0.986391 0.988447 0.988711 0.987242 0.990241 0.990384 0.990595 0.990479 
F test 938.0803 676.4702 798.5033 817.4219 722.2444 684.8933 695.2086 710.9799 702.2337 
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Table H.9:Foreign derivatives (FDR) 
Control 
variables 
included in 
each model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 (EXCH) Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 (RGDP 
& INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(FDR(-1)) 
0.039 
(0.332) 
0.112 
(1.037) 
0.068 
(0.580) 
0.054 
(0.463) 
0.047 
(0.418) 
0.060 
(0.521) 
0.004 
(0.039) 
0.037 
(0.315) 
0.017 
(0.149) 
D(X1) 
0.134 
(0.459) 
    
0.300 
(1.008) 
0.490 
(1.403) 
0.441 
(0.684) 
0.248 
(0.668) 
D(X1(-1)) 
0.406 
(1.490) 
    
0.365 
(1.254) 
0.658 
(1.817) 
0.495 
(0.768) 
0.161 
(0.542) 
D(X2)  
-0.373 
(-0.797) 
-0.170 
(-0.172) 
0.002 
(0.338) 
0.041 
(0.911) 
-0.013 
(-0.025) 
1.236 
(0.964) 
-0.005 
(-0.518) 
0.015 
(0.264) 
D(X2(-1))  
0.850* 
(1.714) 
-0.751 
(-0.776) 
0.006 
(1.458) 
0.037 
(0.819) 
0.945* 
(1.792) 
0.531 
(0.475) 
-0.001 
(-0.124) 
0.069 
(1.253) 
DA-IFRS 
0.6341*** 
(3.4912) 
0.7278*** 
(4.0852) 
0.6329*** 
(3.3999) 
0.6353*** 
(3.4923) 
0.6479*** 
(3.5829) 
0.6710*** 
(3.7396) 
0.6028*** 
(3.3173) 
0.5960*** 
(3.2193) 
0.6051*** 
(3.3496) 
D2002Q4 
0.2463** 
(2.0084) 
0.2611** 
(2.1610) 
0.2869** 
(2.2243) 
0.2587** 
(2.0869) 
0.2618** 
(2.1040) 
0.2391** 
(1.9941) 
0.2460** 
(1.9852) 
0.2342* 
(1.8573) 
0.2136* 
(1.7569) 
ECT(-1) 
-0.7716*** 
(-5.481) 
-0.8855*** 
(-6.414) 
-0.7363*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.7774*** 
(-5.587) 
-0.757*** 
(-5.411) 
-0.8497*** 
(-5.9445) 
-0.7414*** 
(-5.6083) 
-0.7720*** 
(-5.412) 
-0.7998*** 
(-5.7644) 
Long Run Coefficients  
X1 
-0.316* 
(-1.652) 
    
-0.181 
(-0.777) 
-0.270 
(-1.120) 
0.084 
(0.120) 
-0.363* 
(-1.645) 
X2  
-0.912** 
(-2.410) 
0.473 
(0.354) 
-0.006* 
(-1.801) 
-0.019 
(-0.755) 
-0.541 
(-1.033) 
1.896 
(0.865) 
-0.007 
(-0.589) 
0.004 
(0.129) 
DA-IFRS 
1.1603*** 
(6.8522) 
1.1810*** 
(8.4116) 
1.0591*** 
(7.0536) 
1.1178*** 
(7.6163) 
1.0947*** 
(6.7448) 
1.1670*** 
(7.3087) 
1.1684*** 
(6.565) 
1.0807*** 
(5.0911) 
1.1666*** 
(6.6049) 
D2002Q4 
0.4972*** 
(5.0831) 
0.4562*** 
(5.7459) 
0.4921*** 
(4.6515) 
0.4868*** 
(5.4369) 
0.4739*** 
(5.0271) 
0.4478*** 
(4.7832) 
0.5254*** 
(4.7420) 
0.4577*** 
(3.9560) 
0.4856*** 
(4.8566) 
R
^2
 0.985035 0.985154 0.983862 0.984953 0.984848 0.985826 0.985416 0.985141 0.985831 
F test 
526.5852 530.8561 487.7300 523.6595 519.9971 385.7018 374.6919 367.6631 385.8393 
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Table H.10: Other foreign debt (OFD) 
Control 
variables 
included in each 
model 
Model 1 
(RGDP) 
Model 2 
(TOT) 
Model 3 
(OPEN) 
Model 4 
(EXCH) 
Model 5 
(INT) 
Model 6 
(RGDP& 
TOT) 
Model 
7(RGDP& 
OPEN) 
Model 8 
(RGDP& 
EXCH) 
Model 9 (RGDP 
& INT) 
Short Run Coefficients 
D(OFD(-1)) 
-0.067 
(-0.657) 
-0.006 
(-0.060) 
-0.038 
(-0.383) 
-0.041 
(-0.407) 
-0.005 
(-0.045) 
-0.058 
(-0.557) 
-0.073 
(-0.744) 
-0.059 
(-0.567) 
-0.124 
(-1.266) 
D(X1) 
0.258* 
(1.870) 
    0.225 
(1.514) 
0.178 
(1.053) 
0.212 
(0.727) 
0.614*** 
(3.689) 
D(X1(-1)) 
0.238* 
(1.714) 
    0.253* 
(1.679) 
0.215 
(1.279) 
-0.058 
(-0.208) 
0.196 
(1.372) 
D(X2) 
 0.060 
(0.229) 
-0.673 
(-1.438) 
0.004* 
(1.757) 
-0.014 
(-0.678) 
-0.008 
(-0.029) 
-0.572 
(-0.978) 
0.001 
(0.175) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.357) 
D(X2(-1)) 
 -0.398 
(-1.521) 
-1.023** 
(-2.162) 
0.005** 
(2.298) 
0.028 
(1.399) 
-0.131 
(-0.482) 
-1.070* 
(-1.948) 
0.005 
(1.206) 
0.073*** 
(3.245) 
DA-IFRS 0.0608 
(0.9313) 
0.0677 
(0.999) 
0.0817 
(1.2529) 
0.0575 
(0.893) 
0.079 
(1.1723) 
0.0513 
(0.7722) 
0.0464 
(0.7220) 
0.0628 
(0.9696) 
0.0828 
(1.3346) 
ECT(-1) -0.257 *** 
(-3.598) 
-0.2514 *** 
(-3.7877) 
-0.252*** 
(-3.703) 
-0.280*** 
(-3.670) 
-0.260*** 
(-3.742) 
-0.265*** 
(-3.645) 
-0.266*** 
(-4.053) 
-0.281*** 
(-3.661) 
-0.245*** 
(-3.831) 
Long Run Coefficients 
X1 0.241 
(1.040) 
    0.170 
(0.545) 
0.578 
(1.958) 
-0.283 
(-0.561) 
0.225 
(0.810) 
X2  0.338 
(0.789) 
-1.282 
(-0.989) 
0.006* 
(1.666) 
0.012 
(0.697) 
0.266 
(0.493) 
1.833 
(0.891) 
0.010 
(1.207) 
-0.009 
(-0.434) 
DA-IFRS 0.2057 * 
(1.7214) 
0.1611 
(1.1065) 
0.2488*** 
(2.6592) 
0.1714* 
(1.6795) 
0.2256* 
(1.9540) 
0.1524 
(1.1050) 
0.1206 
(1.0411) 
0.1925* 
(1.7729) 
0.242054* 
(1.866023) 
R
^2
 0.995007 0.994601 0.994963 0.995155 0.994639 0.995040 0.995326 0.995220 0.995575 
F test 2448.306 2263.165 2426.845 2523.317 2279.385 1665.046 1767.462 1728.114 1867.251 
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